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Lawyer of a Society As a Fiduciary

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<strong>Lawyer</strong> <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Society</strong> <strong>As</strong> a <strong>Fiduciary</strong><br />

Chandra Nath ∗<br />

May 3, 2014<br />

∗ nath@computer.org He is an Independent researcher engaged in research in information<br />

security, privacy, law & justice.<br />

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Contents<br />

I Introduction 3<br />

II Aiding and Abetting Standard 3<br />

III Application <strong>of</strong> Aiding and Abetting Liability Standard 4<br />

IV Liability for an Attorney 4<br />

V Mr <strong>Lawyer</strong>: First, Do No Harm; Second, Prevent Harm 5<br />

VI Civil Conspiracy 6<br />

VIIFraudulent Scheme 6<br />

VIIIThird Party Derivative Client 7<br />

IX <strong>Lawyer</strong>s Duty to Client Who is a Trustee 8<br />

X Perpetrating Frauds or Illegal Activity 9<br />

XI <strong>Society</strong> Context 9<br />

XIIConclusion 10<br />

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LAWYER OF A SOCIETY AS A FIDUCIARY<br />

I<br />

Introduction<br />

Attorneys face a variety <strong>of</strong> ethical challenges. While doing the “right”<br />

thing may not always be easy, it should always be clear. Rules <strong>of</strong><br />

pr<strong>of</strong>essional conduct demarcate the line between right and wrong in<br />

some instances. Other areas, however, are left to common law (and judicial<br />

interpretation) to develop. The question is whether (and, if so, under what<br />

circumstances) an attorney (and in our case legal counsel <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong>) may<br />

be held liable for aiding and abetting a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty and<br />

hence criminal Breach <strong>of</strong> Trust..<br />

II<br />

Aiding and Abetting Standard<br />

The common law <strong>of</strong> torts imposes liability for aiding and abetting another in<br />

commission <strong>of</strong> a wrongful act. The parameters <strong>of</strong> aiding and abetting liability<br />

are laid out in the Restatement (Second) <strong>of</strong> Torts using a three-prong test:<br />

1. the aided party must commit tortious conduct;<br />

2. the aider must know that the aided partys conduct constitutes a breach<br />

<strong>of</strong> duty; and<br />

3. the aider must give substantial assistance or encouragement to the<br />

aided party.<br />

Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor<br />

and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon<br />

the liability <strong>of</strong> the adviser as participation or physical assistance. However,<br />

assistance can be so slight so as to avoid liability; the factors to consider in<br />

determining liability are:<br />

1. the nature <strong>of</strong> the act encouraged;<br />

2. the amount <strong>of</strong> assistance given by the defendant;<br />

3. the presence or absence <strong>of</strong> the defendant at the time <strong>of</strong> the tort;<br />

4. the defendants relation to the other; and<br />

5. the defendants state <strong>of</strong> mind.<br />

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III<br />

Application <strong>of</strong> Aiding and Abetting Liability<br />

Standard<br />

A fiduciary relationship is one in which one person [called a fiduciary] is under<br />

a duty to act for the benefit <strong>of</strong> another [called a beneficiary] on matters<br />

within the scope <strong>of</strong> the relationship. Common examples <strong>of</strong> fiduciary relationships<br />

include guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client.The fiduciarys<br />

obligation to act for the benefit <strong>of</strong> another is known as a fiduciary duty,<br />

and breach <strong>of</strong> that duty causes the fiduciary to be liable to the beneficiary.<br />

Combining aiding and abetting liability with this breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty<br />

liability creates a straightforward result: one who knowingly provides substantial<br />

assistance or encouragement to another in breaching a fiduciary duty<br />

is liable for aiding and abetting the breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty. <strong>As</strong> explored<br />

above, providing advice or encouragement satisfies the substantial assistance<br />

prong. Therefore, it follows that an attorney who counsels his or her client to<br />

breach a fiduciary duty should be liable for aiding and abetting that breach<br />

<strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty. Aiding in a breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty may also be aiding in<br />

the commission <strong>of</strong> a crime. For example, an attorney may advise a trustee<br />

on how to siphon funds from a beneficiary. In this case, since the breach <strong>of</strong><br />

fiduciary duty is a Criminal Breach <strong>of</strong> Trust by a public servant ( Section<br />

409 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 and punishable with imprisonment <strong>of</strong><br />

either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also<br />

be liable to fine), the act <strong>of</strong> the lawyer is a clear case <strong>of</strong> aiding and abetting<br />

a crime.<br />

IV<br />

Liability for an Attorney<br />

If an attorney advised that agent or that partner as to how to breach their<br />

fiduciary duty with greater stealth or success, that attorney would have aided<br />

and abetted in a breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty. This begs the question <strong>of</strong> whether<br />

the attorney, who owes a fiduciary duty to his or her own clients, should<br />

be liable to their clients beneficiary. Reynolds sued Schrock and Markely<br />

for breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty for aiding and abetting a breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary<br />

duty. The lawsuit against Schrock was settled, leaving Markley as the sole<br />

defendant. The court held that summary judgment in the attorneys favor was<br />

proper, recognizing an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and<br />

abetting a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty. However, the exception created<br />

for attorneys is not unlimited: For a third party to hold an attorney liable for<br />

aiding and abetting a client in breach <strong>of</strong> a fiduciary duty, the burden is on the<br />

third party to prove that the lawyer acted outside the scope <strong>of</strong> the lawyer-<br />

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client relationship. This exception extends liability to attorney conduct that<br />

is unrelated to the representation <strong>of</strong> a client (even if the person is a client), in<br />

the attorneys own self-interest, or within the crime or fraud exception to the<br />

attorney-client privilege. While the court in Granewich 1 did accept as true<br />

the allegations in the complaint pleading that the attorneys acted outside<br />

the scope <strong>of</strong> their legitimate employment, the court did not state that this<br />

fact was determinative to its decision, declaring instead that the defendants<br />

status as lawyers is irrelevant.<br />

V<br />

Mr <strong>Lawyer</strong>: First, Do No Harm; Second,<br />

Prevent Harm<br />

This leads us to the question whether attorneys have an affirmative duty to<br />

prevent their clients from causing harm in the form <strong>of</strong> a breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary<br />

duty. The argument over whether an attorney must, must not, or may disclose<br />

to a clients beneficiary that the client is acting inappropriately with<br />

regard to the fiduciary relationship presupposes the basic notion that the<br />

attorney should not contribute to the clients malfeasance.<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Ge<strong>of</strong>frey Hazard, perhaps the primary figure in legal ethics to<br />

day,advocates that where an attorneys client is a fiduciary <strong>of</strong> a third party,<br />

that third party assumes derivative client status and the actual client is<br />

the primary client.(THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 5th ed.<br />

Foundation Press 2010 with Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton, George M.<br />

Cohen & W. Bradley Wendel) Under this model, the attorney effectively has<br />

two clients: the primary client (the actual client who hired the attorney) and<br />

the derivative client (the beneficiary <strong>of</strong> the primary clients fiduciary duty).<br />

Since the primary client (as a fiduciary) is obligated to work in the interest<br />

<strong>of</strong> the derivative client (as a beneficiary), the attorney is as well. Three<br />

consequences <strong>of</strong> this primary-derivative client model follow:<br />

1. the lawyers obligation to avoid participation in his or her clients fraud<br />

is engaged by a more sensitive trigger than usual;<br />

2. the lawyer must ensure that the fiduciary-primary client volunteers<br />

complete and truthful information to the third party-derivative client;<br />

and<br />

3. the lawyer has a duty to disobey instructions that would wrongfully<br />

harm the third party-derivative client (because a client is not permitted<br />

to use an attorney to harm the clients beneficiary).<br />

1 http://caselaw.findlaw.com/or-court-<strong>of</strong>-appeals/1437855.html<br />

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While the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, it is apparent<br />

that the decision was influenced by the monumental stupidity <strong>of</strong> the<br />

plaintiff’s legal theory!<br />

VI<br />

Civil Conspiracy<br />

“Civil conspiracy is a separate cause <strong>of</strong> action that requires, interalia,<br />

1. an underlying tort and a ’meeting <strong>of</strong> the minds’ among the co-conspirator<br />

’on the object or course <strong>of</strong> action’ to be taken. By contrast, a cause <strong>of</strong><br />

action requires only the knowing participation <strong>of</strong> a party in a breach<br />

<strong>of</strong> a fiduciary duty and does not require a conspiratorial agreement.”<br />

2. Second, the breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duties or scheme <strong>of</strong> oppression must<br />

involve misrepresentations, failure to disclose, or deceptive conduct so<br />

that breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duties constitutes fraudulent conduct.<br />

3. Third, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the attorney had knowledge<br />

<strong>of</strong> the object and purpose <strong>of</strong> the conspiracy; that there was an<br />

understanding or agreement to inflict a wrong against, or injury on,<br />

the third party; that there was a meeting <strong>of</strong> minds on the object or<br />

cause <strong>of</strong> action; and that there was some mutual mental action coupled<br />

with an intent to commit the act that resulted in the injury.<br />

4. Finally, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the attorney’s conduct<br />

went beyond mere fulfillment <strong>of</strong> his pr<strong>of</strong>essional duties to the majority<br />

shareholder.<br />

In the present context <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong> counsel, all the above are satisfied.<br />

Certainly, personal benefit from the proceeds <strong>of</strong> the fraud would certainly<br />

satisfy this burden. Here in the present context, <strong>Society</strong> counsel benefited<br />

from the appointment as legal counsel <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong> over a prolonged period.<br />

VII<br />

Fraudulent Scheme<br />

The plaintiff could also plead and prove conduct by the attorney necessary<br />

to the accomplishment <strong>of</strong> the fraudulent scheme, such as meaningless work<br />

designed to convey a false impression. The illegitimate and illegal Rules <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>Society</strong> and the <strong>Society</strong>’s insistence on compliance <strong>of</strong> the members <strong>of</strong> the<br />

<strong>Society</strong> to these Rules are sufficient to prove this. The “welfare” facade <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>Society</strong> that it is engaged in some noble welfare activity for the veteran<br />

is another fraudulent scheme.<br />

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The attorney will argue that everything done in devising and implementing<br />

a scheme to oppress the members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong> over a period <strong>of</strong><br />

3 decades is merely “the rendering <strong>of</strong> legal services”; however the plaintiff<br />

should counter that these particular services are “foreign to the duties <strong>of</strong> an<br />

attorney.” Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry, 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882).<br />

VIII<br />

Third Party Derivative Client<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Hazard advocates that where an attorneys client is a fiduciary <strong>of</strong> a<br />

third party, that third party assumes derivative client status and the actual<br />

client is the primary client. Under this model, the attorney effectively has<br />

two clients:<br />

• the primary client (the actual client who hired the attorney) and<br />

• the derivative client (the beneficiary <strong>of</strong> the primary clients fiduciary<br />

duty).<br />

Since the primary client (as a fiduciary) is obligated to work in the interest<br />

<strong>of</strong> the derivative client (as a beneficiary), the attorney is as well. Three<br />

consequences <strong>of</strong> this primary-derivative client model follow:<br />

1. the lawyers obligation to avoid participation in his or her clients fraud<br />

is engaged by a more sensitive trigger than usual;<br />

2. the lawyer must ensure that the fiduciary-primary client volunteers<br />

complete and truthful information to the third party-derivative client;<br />

and<br />

3. the lawyer has a duty to disobey instructions that would wrongfully<br />

harm the third party-derivative client (because a client is not permitted<br />

to use an attorney to harm the clients beneficiary).<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Hazard accounts for such problems however, stating that where<br />

the client is openly adverse to the beneficiary, the joint client model is not<br />

viable. Examples <strong>of</strong> such clear cases arise:<br />

1. where the lawyer is retained to represent the fiduciary in litigation<br />

concerning the performance <strong>of</strong> the fiduciary duty;<br />

2. where the lawyer is hired to represent the fiduciary in negotiating the<br />

terms and conditions <strong>of</strong> his or her <strong>of</strong>fice (the duties and compensation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the fiduciary, for example); and<br />

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3. where a lawyer with no prior involvement is hired to negotiate for<br />

the termination or reformation <strong>of</strong> the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship.<br />

However, Hazard argues that in the normal legal relationship between<br />

fiduciary and beneficiary the fiduciary is fulfilling his or her duties and<br />

therefore the joint client model poses no such problems. However, if<br />

the properly functioning fiduciary relationship collapses and becomes<br />

antagonistic, the lawyer would only be able to represent the interests<br />

<strong>of</strong> his or her true (or primary) client.<br />

IX<br />

<strong>Lawyer</strong>s Duty to Client Who is a Trustee<br />

Traditionally, an attorney could only be liable in tort to his or her own<br />

client. However, inroads have reconstructed this maxim, and an attorney<br />

has certain responsibilities to third parties, particularly when the third party<br />

has a relationship with the attorneys client. In the situation where a lawyers<br />

client is also a fiduciary, the lawyer may have a duty to prevent the client<br />

from breaching his or her own duties to the non-client. While argument<br />

exists as to whether an attorney is required to prevent a clients breach <strong>of</strong><br />

fiduciary duty, a lawyer owes a duty <strong>of</strong> care to a nonclient when and to the<br />

extent that:<br />

1. the lawyers client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary acting<br />

primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient;<br />

2. the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary<br />

with respect to a matter within the scope <strong>of</strong> the representation to prevent<br />

or rectify the breach <strong>of</strong> a fiduciary duty owed by the client to the<br />

nonclient, where<br />

(a) the breach is a crime or fraud or<br />

(b) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;<br />

3. the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and<br />

4. such a duty would not significantly impair the performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

lawyers obligations to the client.<br />

<strong>As</strong> laid out in subsections above, this duty does not attach in all circumstances<br />

in which the client is a fiduciary only those in which the client<br />

exercises substantial power over another (as in the case <strong>of</strong> a guardian or<br />

trustee) and the clients beneficiary is not reasonably able to protect its own<br />

rights. (Here the <strong>Society</strong> Members qualify on this as they suffered under this<br />

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for 3 decades) This duty requires attorneys in certain circumstances to clean<br />

up their own mess when they have assisted a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty,<br />

or prevent a mess from being made when the clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty<br />

would be illegal or fraudulent. Such affirmative duties imply a fundamental<br />

duty not to aid in a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty at the <strong>of</strong>fset. While<br />

imposing a duty <strong>of</strong> disclosure on the attorney could arguably create conflict<br />

<strong>of</strong> interest problems and chill clients willingness to communicate frankly<br />

with their attorneys, those same problems do not arise by merely barring<br />

the attorney from advising or participating in a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary<br />

duty . Despite courts conclusions to the contrary, no solid foundation exists<br />

to create an exception for attorneys from liability for aiding and abetting<br />

a clients breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty. Whether created explicitly or by strict<br />

interpretation <strong>of</strong> the elements <strong>of</strong> the tort, such an exception is inappropriate.<br />

X<br />

Perpetrating Frauds or Illegal Activity<br />

In protecting attorneys from lawsuits alleging aiding and abetting a breach<br />

<strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty through the imposition <strong>of</strong> a heightened pleading standard,<br />

requiring the plaintiff to lay out his or her claim in more rigorous detail in<br />

the complaint is especially inappropriate. Pleading with such particularity<br />

is usually reserved for situations in which even the allegation <strong>of</strong> the tortious<br />

activity could damage a potentially innocent defendant (for example, fraud or<br />

mistake). Allegations <strong>of</strong> aiding and abetting a breach <strong>of</strong> fiduciary duty do not<br />

rise to the same level <strong>of</strong> damage in accusation. Any charge <strong>of</strong> tortious activity<br />

inevitably causes some harm to the defendant, but this particular cause <strong>of</strong><br />

action does no more harm to a pr<strong>of</strong>essional reputation than other torts, such<br />

as malpractice, which do not command heightened levels <strong>of</strong> specificity at the<br />

pleading stage.Attorneys who aid or advise clients in perpetrating frauds or<br />

engaging in illegal activity may be held liable for their actions, and indeed<br />

the attorney client privilege is not available for communications regarding<br />

the fraud or crime.<br />

XI<br />

<strong>Society</strong> Context<br />

In the present context, the attorney is the legal counsel <strong>of</strong> the registered <strong>Society</strong><br />

and paid from contributions <strong>of</strong> the contributing members ( and NOT<br />

the members <strong>of</strong> the Board <strong>of</strong> Management) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong>. He is fully aware<br />

that the BoM are usurpers and the rules constructed to administer the <strong>Society</strong><br />

are both illegitimate and also illegal to boot. He is aware that that he is<br />

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NOT employed by a Trustee company providing services <strong>of</strong> trusteeship and<br />

his compensation did not come from the trustee company funds! Hence, the<br />

beneficiary members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong> are the actual clients <strong>of</strong> the legal counsel<br />

because the funds came from the Members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong>! Thus, he decidedly,<br />

deliberately, knowingly and willingly violated his fiduciary duties to his<br />

actual clients.<br />

XII<br />

Conclusion<br />

The acts <strong>of</strong> the legal counsel are hence “unconscionable” from this legal<br />

theory alone.<br />

The reasoning behind such a rule (that a legal counsel is criminally liable)<br />

is that society rightfully wishes to discourage attorneys from making such<br />

suggestions to clients. The same rationale applies to advising clients to breach<br />

fiduciary duties. Since such advice is to be discouraged, attorneys who pr<strong>of</strong>fer<br />

it should be held liable to the extent they cause harm.<br />

Legal counsel <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Society</strong> should prepare to be charged with criminal<br />

liability on the basis <strong>of</strong> this legal theory alone. Where all the counsel from A<br />

to Z from the “legal counsel” are illegal, is it possible that the counsel was<br />

referring to laws unknown or conflicting with the laws <strong>of</strong> the land? Or, could<br />

it be that all the advise <strong>of</strong> the counsel and the decisions <strong>of</strong> the defendant<br />

monumental stupidity <strong>of</strong> his legal theory? One such theory seems to be<br />

that <strong>Society</strong> can be compelled to be compliant to the rule <strong>of</strong> law only if<br />

its aggrieved members take them to the court, not other wise with all the<br />

exhortations to comply with the law. For us, the essence <strong>of</strong> adjudication<br />

is the opportunity to state our case in our own words to some one who is<br />

listening.<br />

**********************************<br />

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