Download PDF file - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Road blocks, using containers, rickshaws and moveable steel fences, were placed by
the police on all access roads leading to the Sindh High Court The area around City Courts on
M.A. Jinnah Road was barricaded using smaller vehicles – mostly, Suzuki pickups. 40
1.3 Evaluating the Security Plan
From reported statements it is clear that the authorities identified at least four distinct
types of security threats on May 12. These were articulated by responsible officials in the days
leading up to May 12. The four types of security threats that were identified were:
1. Clashes between rival supporters and their rallies
2. Targeted assassination attempts on key individuals
3. Suicide bomb attack on CJ and members of his entourage
4. Terrorist ambushes of political rallies
It appears that three types of security measures were taken.
1. Dissuade the CJ from making the trip to Karachi, or to modify his programme.
This it appears was the primary focus of the efforts of government
functionaries.
2. Place police contingents along the routes of the rallies and use helicopters and
CCTVs for surveillance; with additional police contingents and Rangers acting
as backup.
3. Pre-emptive measures such as the declaration of a public holiday and
emergency alerts at hospitals.
The most significant preparation for the day was the setting up of roadblocks and
barricades on various roads and streets in different parts of the city. This was also admitted by
Home Affairs Advisor Wasim Akhtar in a subsequent TV interview. Roadblocks and
barricades could only possibly deal with the first of the four types of security threats identified
by the various functionaries in the lead up to May 12, i.e., the possibility of a clash between
rival rallies. This particular security threat appears to have received much of the attention of
officials. As such, it is useful to examine the points where this threat was the most acute.
HRCP
There was considerable confusion about the route plan of the various rallies. In the
case of the CJ, at least two parameters were fixed. He was to arrive at the airport and end up
at the Sindh High Court. In addition, it was expected that he would address the Malir District
Bar and pay a visit to the Quaid’s Mazar. His movement, therefore, was mostly to be along
the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal axis.
The MQM had announced that it would hold its rally at Tibet Centre on M.A. Jinnah
Road and that it would use Numaish and Quaid’s Mazar as collection points. It further
announced that its supporters will arrive at Tibet Centre from two separate directions: one,
along the main thoroughfares from Liaqatabad and Nazimabad via Guru Mandir and, two,
along National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal via Shahrah-e-Quaideen. The MQM claimed that it
needed the latter route in order to bring its supporters from eastern parts of Karachi, including
from Thatta and Badin areas.
Potentially, there were several flashpoints where the CJ’s and MQM’s supporters
might have crossed each other’s paths en route to their respective destinations, either in
processions, groups or individually. However, two points of potential conflict that emerged
40
Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.
8