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Road blocks, using containers, rickshaws and moveable steel fences, were placed by<br />
the police on all access roads leading to the Sindh High Court The area around City Courts on<br />
M.A. Jinnah Road was barricaded using smaller vehicles – mostly, Suzuki pickups. 40<br />
1.3 Evaluating the Security Plan<br />
From reported statements it is clear that the authorities identified at least four distinct<br />
types <strong>of</strong> security threats on May 12. These were articulated by responsible <strong>of</strong>ficials in the days<br />
leading up to May 12. The four types <strong>of</strong> security threats that were identified were:<br />
1. Clashes between rival supporters and their rallies<br />
2. Targeted assassination attempts on key individuals<br />
3. Suicide bomb attack on CJ and members <strong>of</strong> his entourage<br />
4. Terrorist ambushes <strong>of</strong> political rallies<br />
It appears that three types <strong>of</strong> security measures were taken.<br />
1. Dissuade the CJ from making the trip to Karachi, or to modify his programme.<br />
This it appears was the primary focus <strong>of</strong> the efforts <strong>of</strong> government<br />
functionaries.<br />
2. Place police contingents along the routes <strong>of</strong> the rallies and use helicopters and<br />
CCTVs for surveillance; with additional police contingents and Rangers acting<br />
as backup.<br />
3. Pre-emptive measures such as the declaration <strong>of</strong> a public holiday and<br />
emergency alerts at hospitals.<br />
The most significant preparation for the day was the setting up <strong>of</strong> roadblocks and<br />
barricades on various roads and streets in different parts <strong>of</strong> the city. This was also admitted by<br />
Home Affairs Advisor Wasim Akhtar in a subsequent TV interview. Roadblocks and<br />
barricades could only possibly deal with the first <strong>of</strong> the four types <strong>of</strong> security threats identified<br />
by the various functionaries in the lead up to May 12, i.e., the possibility <strong>of</strong> a clash between<br />
rival rallies. This particular security threat appears to have received much <strong>of</strong> the attention <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials. As such, it is useful to examine the points where this threat was the most acute.<br />
HRCP<br />
There was considerable confusion about the route plan <strong>of</strong> the various rallies. In the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> the CJ, at least two parameters were fixed. He was to arrive at the airport and end up<br />
at the Sindh High Court. In addition, it was expected that he would address the Malir District<br />
Bar and pay a visit to the Quaid’s Mazar. His movement, therefore, was mostly to be along<br />
the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal axis.<br />
The MQM had announced that it would hold its rally at Tibet Centre on M.A. Jinnah<br />
Road and that it would use Numaish and Quaid’s Mazar as collection points. It further<br />
announced that its supporters will arrive at Tibet Centre from two separate directions: one,<br />
along the main thoroughfares from Liaqatabad and Nazimabad via Guru Mandir and, two,<br />
along National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal via Shahrah-e-Quaideen. The MQM claimed that it<br />
needed the latter route in order to bring its supporters from eastern parts <strong>of</strong> Karachi, including<br />
from Thatta and Badin areas.<br />
Potentially, there were several flashpoints where the CJ’s and MQM’s supporters<br />
might have crossed each other’s paths en route to their respective destinations, either in<br />
processions, groups or individually. However, two points <strong>of</strong> potential conflict that emerged<br />
40<br />
Eyewitness account, HRCP observer.<br />
8