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Such charges were later withdrawn, but they do nevertheless indicate the manner in which the
idea of collective political responsibility has been misinterpreted and misused.
In fact, in the context of the events of May 12, collective political responsibility is too
general and non-specific a concept to be of much help. The MQM and the CJ supporters can
have mutually opposing views regarding political responsibility. But it needs to be stated very
clearly that the events of May 12 require much more than the assignment of collective political
responsibility. We must immediately dispense with the notion that just because the CJ’s plane
landed at midday, and that the firing on rallies also started at that time, the CJ or his
supporters share any of the responsibility for the violence. Similarly, the fact that the MQM
leadership had been openly raising the rhetoric against the CJ and his supporters is not
sufficient to indicate their responsibility for what happened.
On May 12 in Karachi, actions did speak louder than words, and it is these actions that
require accountability of a more specific nature than the concept of collective political
responsibility allows. In this regard the MQM to a great extent, and other political parties to a
smaller extent have a case to answer. It is not just their propaganda against each other, or the
atmosphere of fear and hatred, that is relevant. All the evidence shows that these parties,
particularly the MQM, acted like organized military forces, which mobilized large numbers of
people to carry out acts of brutal violence against their opponents as well as non-partisan
citizens. For this the level of responsibility needs to be more specific and direct than the one
implied in the notion of collective political responsibility.
The actions of armed MQM activists stand out in this regard. It is clear that there was
a prior intent to stop opposition rallies with the use of force. In some cases it even appears
that the premeditated use of force was itself the objective – regardless of whether a rally could
be held. The level of prior meticulous planning that went into the commandeering of vehicles
and the setting up of roadblocks from the day before, the manning of ambushes, the organized
military manner of attack and retreat, the attempts at holdings prisoners and hostages, the
abduction, torture and execution of suspects, and the reports of armed cadres receiving
instructions from their handlers via cell phone – all suggest a frightening military organization
cohabiting within a political party. Not even a small part of this activity would have been
possible without a high level of coordination. The fact that such a military organization exists
hidden behind the cover of a legitimate and popular political party must be a matter of great
concern for all citizens.
The other political parties are not without their own specific responsibility. It is clear
that MQM activists were not the only private citizens bearing arms on that day and its
aftermath. Many of the opposition party supporters had also clearly come prepared for an
armed showdown. In some areas it was they who were the assailants and MQM activists who
were the victims.
In sum, the primary responsibility (both in terms of omission and commission) must lie
with the organs of the state – federal, provincial, and military. The MQM, or at least its
military organization, bears the direct and specific responsibility for the majority of the
violence. Residual responsibility lies with the armed supporters of other political and religious
parties.
5.4 Lessons for the future
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