Download PDF file - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

that day might find parallel only very occasionally. Well over 40 people lost their lives, and
the number of the injured ran into hundreds. But it was in qualitative terms that the events of
May 12 were truly without historical comparison. An entire city of nearly 15 million was held
hostage by people who appeared to be private citizens. The violence and the threat of
violence engulfed nearly all of the localities of this huge city – in the east, west, north, south
and the centre.
There was something qualitatively distinct also about the nature and scale of the
violence that was unleashed, and the political context in which this happened (the fact that
MQM is in government). The escalation of tensions in the build-up to May 12 was entirely
avoidable. The idea of a showdown between supporters of the CJ – who despite the reference
was a serving functionary of the state – and supporters of a political party was almost entirely
artificially created. There was nothing inherently antagonistic in the two positions held by the
supporters of the lawyers’ movement and the MQM that warranted any form of violence or
bloodshed. It appears almost incomprehensible that large-scale violence of various types –
roadblocks, ambushes, armed clashes, abductions etc. – was meticulously planned and
executed across the city, while the state security apparatus was effectively withdrawn.
There can be no doubt that the events of May 12 have changed how Karachi is viewed.
Despite the normalcy that has returned to the city, the very fact that political violence of this
nature could be organized and executed and state security agencies withdrawn, ought to be
taken extremely seriously. There is a need for accountability. No city can be allowed to
descend deliberately into organized chaos. But there are also lessons to be learnt – both of
foreboding as well as opportunity. If the civil society fails to take seriously the events of May
12 there is a danger that they will be repeated on a far bigger scale some time in the future. At
the same time, how various actors behaved provides possible avenues of opportunity for the
maintenance of sustainable peace in the city.
HRCP
5.2 Absence or compromised presence of state agencies
May 12: 2007 will be remembered as the day the State withdrew. While the loss of
precious lives is the most deplorable aspect of the day, a matter of grave concern from the
perspective of institutional integrity of the state is the virtual withdrawal of the state’s security
apparatus for almost 20 hours and the actual takeover of the city by armed cadres of one or
more than one political party. The spectacle of a disarmed police force 136 operating on the
directions of armed cadres was highly disturbing, especially since key officers of the state
responsible for security were reduced to expressing their helplessness. That such armed groups
were allowed to hold almost complete sway and operate with impunity for most of the day,
despite the presence of a duly installed government in the province and the presence of more
than one federal security agency in the city, represented an alarming phenomenon with respect
to the writ of the government and the state.
The failure of the state’s security apparatus to discharge its responsibilities has been
confirmed by Lt.-General (R) Moinuddin Haider, acting chairman of the National Public
Service Commission (NPSC). Addressing a news conference in Quetta, Lt.-General (R)
Haider expressed his dismay at the performance of police and other law enforcement agencies
and admitted that certain security lapses were witnessed and that the police could not provide
safety to the general public in Karachi 137 .
136
See Daily Times, “Sindh police deprived of arsenal on Day 2”, May 14, 2007
137
See The News, “NPSC dismayed at police performance”, May 17, 2007
36