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the main security threat, the lessons of Muharram policing appear not have been much in
evidence in the preparation for May 12. In fact, some of the known preparations for May 12th
were in direct contradiction to the lessons of successful policing of Moharram processions.
While there is some logic in setting up roadblocks and barricades to channel rival processions
away from one another and to restrict the number of entry points into the main procession
route, the setting up of barriers across the main route of the rallies – i.e., on Sharah-e-Faisal –
appeared to make no sense at all. Rather than facilitating the passage of the two rival rallies,
the barriers actually ensured that none of the rallies could actually pass.
There is no evidence either of a serious attempt at negotiating a time-lag between the
two potential rival rallies. There was an indication that among the options being considered by
the government one included allowing the CJ to move from the airport after the MQM rally
had ended. It is not known if this option was pursued with any seriousness. There is also no
evidence that the authorities made any attempt to persuade the MQM to alter the route or
timing of its proposed rallies along the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor. As it
turned out, there was no MQM rally along the National Highway/Sharah-e-Faisal corridor
towards the Quaid’s Mazar and M.A. Jinnah Road. It is, therefore, quite likely that the
authorities had already decided that there would not be any rival rallies along the route. The
objective, it then appears, was to obstruct opposition rallies.
The roadblocks were also the wrong instruments for dealing with the other three
security threats, as perceived by authorities. Again, as the experience of VVIP movement
along the Shara-e-Faisal corridor shows, avoiding any of the three kinds of threats requires
blocking of entry onto Sharah-e-Faisal from the side roads and unimpeded flow of traffic along
the corridor. While the former procedure was carried out, i.e., entry onto Sharah-e-Faisal
from the side roads was restricted, the placing of barriers across Shahrah-e-Faisal created ideal
conditions for an assassin, a suicide bomber or a terrorist aiming to target or ambush anyone.
HRCP
2. Flashpoints on May 12 and After
At least 34 people were killed and 140 injured on May 12 th alone as parts of Karachi
turned into battlegrounds 41 . The main areas that saw fierce clashes between rival groups were
along the National Highway/Shahrah-e-Faisal corridor, as well as in other parts of the city.
The situation was so grim that the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre (JPMC) receptionist
asked those enquiring for their loved ones to first check the morgue 42 .
An overall picture of the May 12 events is reconstructed in this section using published
accounts and individual testimonials of victims and eyewitnesses. An attempt is made to
identify flashpoints, or locations where violence and casualties are known to have taken place,
and to provide an account of what happened at these various locations during the course of
the day.
The earliest reports of violence relate to the difficulties experienced by lawyers in
reaching their designated meeting points in the City Courts, the Sindh High Court and the
Malir District Courts respectively. This violence was threatening but mostly non-lethal.
However, from around midday onwards, many segments of the National Highway/Sharah-e-
Faisal corridor experienced intensive use of firearms and a large number of casualties and
injuries caused by firing. Violence then spread to other parts of the city from around 1.30 pm
41
Dawn 13 May (i)
42 Daily Times 14 May (b)
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