Limitations of the Owner-Driven Model in Post-Disaster ... - IIIRR

Limitations of the Owner-Driven Model in Post-Disaster
Housing Reconstruction in Urban Settlements
Mojgan TAHERI Tafti 1
1 PhD Candidate, Dep. of planning., The University of Melbourne
(3010, Victoria , Australia)
E-mail: m.taheritafti@student.unimelb.edu.au
This paper explores the potential shortcomings in the owner-driven model of housing reconstruction in
urban settlements affected by disasters. The owner-driven model has been widely adopted in recent
post-disaster housing reconstruction projects. While the advantages of this model over other models such as
donor-driven or state-driven models are discussed in hazard literature, discussions over the potential
shortcomings of this model are scant. Looking at the experiences of post-earthquake reconstruction in Bhuj
in India and Bam in Iran, the paper sheds light on the inadequacies of the owner-driven model in housing
recovery and their unintended consequences for households and the urban fabric.
The paper suggests three main arguments based on the ways the owner-driven model has been conceived,
formulated, and practiced in two post-earthquake housing recovery projects. The first argument is
that the owner-driven model should be conceived as one component of a holistic housing recovery programme.
The second argument revolves around the shortcomings of the standardized arrangements of the
owner-driven model. The last argument identifies practical problems that prevailed in the two projects.
While acknowledging the advantages of the owner-driven model, the paper concludes by advocating a
more holistic, nuanced, and inclusive housing recovery programme in disaster-stricken urban settlements
for responding the complexities of housing recovery in urban setting.
Key Words : Urban disasters, owner-driven model, housing reconstruction
Provision of permanent housing following disasters is often described as absorbing a considerable portion of
post-disaster lending inthe developing world 1) Planning for this component of post-disaster activities has
decade, the advantages of the owner-driven model of housing reconstruction - particularly vis-à-vis the
state-driven and the donor-driven models - has been widely acknowledged, and the model is often described in
2) . However, the ways in which
this model are often conceived, formulated, and implemented have implications that have been largely unexplored
in the literature. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to develop a better understanding about the
limitations of this model by investigating its application in the aftermath of disasters in the developing countries.
Owner-driven housing reconstruction has its roots in the pioneering work of John F.C. Turner. Following
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allowed rebuilding of the damaged dwellings by their residents. Despite being acknowledged as an influential
initiative in promoting mechanisms for low-income housing provision in developing countries 3) , the idea of
aided self-help housing provision was rarely put into practice in subsequent post-disaster reconstruction activities.
During the following two decades, post-disaster housing reconstruction projects were predominantly
contractor-based, managed by state or donor agencies 4) . The new form of owner-driven housing reconstruction
was promoted in some villages affected by the Indian Latur earthquake in 1993.
The owner-driven model of housing reconstruction in its current form has become prevalent after the 2001
Gujarat earthquake 5) . The main idea in this model is to enable individuals to undertake the reconstruction of
their houses. Diverse mechanisms such as conditional financial assistance - usually on an instalment basis - as
well as technical support and supervision are integrated into this model to ensure safe building practices.
During the last decade, the model has become the default strategy in post-disaster housing recovery as a result
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of being advocated by key lending agencies including the World Bank and prominent international institutions
such as the UN-Habitat e.g., 6) . Funding the majority of reconstruction projects in disaster-affected developing
uence post-
has advised this approach as the most successful housing assistance strategy 2:93) . Therefore, many disaster-stricken
countries including India (after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake), Iran (the 2003 Bam earthquake),
Pakistan (the 2005 earthquake), and Thailand (the 2004 Tsunami) have adopted the owner-driven model as
their overall strategy for housing recovery of the affected communities.
The owner-driven model has been promoted as it involves people in decisions that are directly related to
them. By employing this
Such involvement offers intangible benefits such as instilling a sense of place attachment and empowering
people. Numerous empirical studies e.g., 7, 8-10) report that adoption of this model ensues a higher level of
perceived satisfaction and higher occupancy rate compared to other models of post-disaster housing reconstruction
including the donor-driven model. Some researchers also indicate that this approach is faster and
more economical as owners supplement the assistance with their own assets 10, 11) .
A review of literature, however, reveals that apart from concerns over the safety of the reconstructed
buildings raised by few studies e.g., 12) , little is known about the potential shortcomings of this model. As this
model is expected to be adopted in the aftermath of future disasters, it is critical to develop our understanding
about its potential drawbacks. On this basis, this paper scrutinizes the owner-driven housing reconstruction as
it has been formulated and implemented in cities of Bhuj in Gujarat and Bam in Iran, affected by earthquakes
in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Investigating the long-term impacts of housing recovery programmes on
esearch draws
upon field observations and in-depth interviews with residents of both cities, examination of policy documents
and proceedings, and interviews with decision makers and some of the key informants.
The paper suggests three main arguments about the unforeseen and contradictory outcomes of the adoption
of owner-driven model. Each argument relies on common issues that emerged in this comparative research.
The first argument is that the owner-driven model should not be conceived as the overall strategy for housing
recovery aftermath of a disaster, but as one component of a holistic housing recovery programme. The second
argument revolves around the shortcomings of the standardized arrangements of the owner-driven model. The
last argument identifies practical problems prevailed in both projects. Before presenting these arguments, the
next section provides a brief overview of the two events and their subsequent recovery activities.
1. HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAMMES IN BHUJ AND BAM
On 26 January 2001, an earthquake measuring 7.7 on the Richter scale occurred in Gujarat. In the city of
Bhuj, approximately 7,000 people, mostly inhabitants of the historic part of the city, lost their lives. Nearly
50% of this part of the city was destroyed 13) , with 11,036 houses completely and 27,617 houses partially
collapsed.
Two years later, on 26 December, 2003 a major earthquake registering 6.6 on the Richter scale devastated
the city of Bam in south-east Iran. With a population of around 120,000, the death toll was 26,271. The ca-
city and surrounding villages homeless 14) . In the wake of the earthquake, 80% of all buildings in the city were
completely destroyed.
Both governments, central government in Iran and state government of Gujarat, established apex-level,
central agencies to respond the disaster. These task forces adopted an owner-driven model for housing recovery
in the two affected cities of Bam and Bhuj. In both cases, homeowners were provided with t
financial and technical assistance, aimed at enabling these affected groups to rebuild their own houses. The
financial assistance paid on an instalment basis to ensure the conformance of construction process with seismic
building codes. The assistance of up to US$ 3,225 for building a 45-square-meter house in Bhuj and
US$ 19,375 for building an 80-square-meter house in Bam was offered to homeowners. In the case of Bam, the
ners were eligible for receiving
assistance for each and every damaged house they had in their possession. In Bhuj, according the housing
recovery programme, owners were given housing assistance for only one damaged residential unit in their own
occupancy at the time of the earthquake. Moreover, as the reconstruction of Bhuj city was a combination of
in-situ reconstruction and relocation (in contrast to the in-situ reconstruction of Bam), those landowners who
opted to move to relocation sites could receive a plot of land against their old ones.
Investigating the long-term recovery process of affected households eight and ten years after these earth-
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quakes provides some insights about the deficiencies in the housing recovery programmes, their formulation
and delivery. In the following sections, we present three main common issues, identified in these two
post-disaster housing programmes.
(1) Owner-driven housing reconstruction and the role of tenure in defining access to the programme
One of the concerns over the emphasis on the owner-driven model is the undermining of the housing needs
of non-owner disaster-affected groups including tenants, sharers and squatters. Examination of the recovery
programmes in both cases suggests that the owner-driven model was conceived as a holistic framework for
post-earthquake housing recovery. Therefore, the housing recovery of the non-owner groups was treated as a
marginal part of the programme. On this basis, in both cities the ownership of land or property was the determinant
for 18% of households in the city, were denied housing assistance. Later, this group was offered housing assistance,
provided that they could buy land within the city.
In Bhuj, on the other hand, the recovery programme included some provisions for housing recovery of
renters, but ignored sharers and squatters. The policy for the collapsed rental units was a payment to the owner
for rebuilding the rental house, provided that she/he guaranteed the restitution of the pre-
right of occupation. Based on the interviews conducted with tenants and landlords, it can be concluded that this
policy did not reach its goal, mainly due to the very low level of rent price prior to the earthquake. Later,
changes in programme due to this failure allowed tenants to buy a plot in relocation sites, if they could afford to
do so. Moreover, the local authority invited NGOs to take a part in the process and build new housing projects
for these groups. These new provisions did not provide for households with other tenure agreements which
were practicing in the city before the earthquake.
In addition, there were eighteen slum areas in Bhuj, some of which were badly damaged by the earthquake.
These slums have not been included in the new urban development plan and their low-income residents were
ignored during the recovery process. Even NGOs paid scant attention to the housing recovery of these groups
following the earthquake 15) .
These housing reconstruction policies have had long-term ramifications for non-owner groups. These policies
left tenants to the mercy of landlords and made their housing recovery dependent on the decisions of
others. These groups had to wait for long periods in temporary shelters until (and if) the rental market catches
up with demand. In Bhuj, these groups have been living in a site far from the city with poor access to livelihood
and social amenities. A local NGO built affordable housing for some of the residents of this site and others are
living in dilapidated dwellings built for temporary housing purpose.
Decision-makers in both recovery programmes employed the same discourse for ignoring the housing needs
We believed that they did not lose their properties and therefore
they were no(Interview BM-O1-05/02/2011). This questions
the very objective of allocating housing assistance which in both cases has been mainly based on the disaster-incurred
material asset losses, but were represented in programmes under the guise of creating an enabling
environment. Conceiving the owner-driven model as the holistic framework for housing recovery in both cases
was arguably in line with a more desirable outcome of the recovery process for politicians: building houses as
a tangible outcome of reconstruction 1) , instead of enabling households whose housing condition has been
affected by the disaster to achieve their housing recovery. The key to understand and distinguish between these
Bam and Bhuj, the number of (re)constructed houses is more than the damaged ones. Many people including
-earthquake housing
condition, in terms of security of tenure, affordability, location, and quality of the dwelling.
Housing recovery of non-
dynamic nature of vulnerability, because its driving forces change over time, many earthquake-affected
households in Bam could have been considered as vulnerable groups for a period of time. Among them
earthquake-induced damage aggravated the precarious living condition of low-income, female-headed
households. Realizing the housing needs of these households, some international institutions, including the
UNDP, took part in housing reconstruction for them. Ironically, the governmental organization responsible for
the reconstruction process asked these institutions to contribute to the housing recovery of these households
provided that they possessed land within the city 16) . This decision, in the context of Iran where women do not
have equal inheritance rights, deprived many female-headed families from the contribution of these institu-
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tions. For those female-headed households who did not have a plot of land, an Iranian NGO provided a limited
number of free accommodation in two complexes in the city. Holding no tenure rights, these families could
stay in these, no-male-entry residences, provided the head of the family, many of them young widows, never
get married again. The condition was even worse for those women who had not legally divorced, due to its
cultural stigma, and based on the fieldtrip interviews constituted a considerable portion of female-headed
households. This group has not been formally recognized as female-headed families and hence were deprived
of receiving such helps. Around 800 female-headed families have been left with no housing recovery option.
In Bhuj, despite enjoying the equal legal right of inheritance, women who were the head of their families
faced difficulties in receiving housing assistance, especially because majority of them were traditionally living
as sharer with their in-law families before the earthquake. Some of these interviewees were denied a share in
the new reconstructed houses by their in-law families. These female-headed families with no land ownership
and no family support were not offered any housing option. Some local NGOs such as Abhyan and religious-based
donor organizations provided housing for a group of these households, albeit at the urban fringe
where the land was available. This led to a further economic and social exclusion of these households.
The issue of housing recovery of non-owner groups has not been properly addressed by research and practice
in the field of post-disaster recovery as the majority of recent disasters with natural triggers in developing
countries have taken place in rural settlements or small towns. After the Haitian earthquake in 2010 and due to
the large number of households without formal property ownership, this issue has emerged as a concern and
drew attentions. While cities accommodate a variety of households with heterogeneous tenure arrangements,
the owner-driven model of housing reconstruction addresses the housing needs of just one group among the
others. It can be argued that conceiving the owner-driven model as the holistic framework for housing recovery,
as it has been conceptualized in Bam and Bhuj, provides benefit to a specific group and deprives others
based on their tenure condition.
(2) Different capability of beneficiaries
Not only are cities agglomerations of variety of housing with different tenure arrangements, but also they
accommodate heterogeneous communities. This paper argues that the owner-driven model, in its current
shape, sets up a standardized method of payment and technical assistance which does not respond to the different
capabilities of homeowner households to pursue their housing recovery. The different capability of
households may stems from different cultural, social, or economic factors or may be related to the disaster-induced
impacts. Looking at the long-term recovery trajectory of different groups of people depicts how
different households demonstrated different capabilities in achieving their recovery. Drawing upon the interviews
in the two cities, this section is to show, on a few examples, some implications of adopting such a unified
-term recovery.
The first example is related to land/property-owner female-headed households in Bam whose number has
sharply increased due to some social issues that emerged following the disaster (some officials reported a
ten-folded increase in the number of these families). The common problem these households faced was related
to the fact that based on the owner-driven model the management of all administrative and construction activities
is to be undertaken by owners. In the social context of this small city, many women found it difficult to
interfere in this male-dominated field. Consequently, many of them had to trust and relied on the help of their
male relatives or acquaintances to oversee the construction process by contractors. Many of the interviewed
women reported problems with contractors, the majority of whom were non-local, and replacing them during
the construction period.
Another group of households with different capability were those who started the reconstruction process
later than others or could not keep the same pace of rebuilding as others. An example of the first group,
late-starters, is traumatized families. In Bam, where at least a quarter of the residents of the city lost their lives,
traumatized households constituted a large number of population. These households or those preoccupied with
the treatment-related issues of their injured family members started their housing reconstruction later than
others. Given the double-digit inflation in the country, many of Bammi late-starters could not finish their
housing construction as the assistance was not adequate anymore for finishing the construction of their houses.
According to the Statistical Centre of Iran 17) , 51 percent of households were still living in temporary housing
three years after the earthquake.
In the case of Gujarat earthquake, those interviewees who started late, due to problems including injuries of
the family members faced with increasing construction material price and had difficulties in finishing their
houses within the required time period. Moreover, some very low-income groups consumed their first in-
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stalment for their daily needs or livelihood purposes and consequently could not seek or receive their next
instalments. Another problem reported by the very low-income owners was the difficulties in going through
the bureaucratic process of housing reconstruction as it demanded frequent trips to the administration offices
while they had to work everyday to feed their households. In general, 19,500 beneficiaries did not seek or
receive their next instalments to complete their homes in Gujarat 5) .
The capability of households to undertake their housing reconstruction, as shown in the aforementioned
examples, might be impeded by factors such as economic conditions and holding marginal assets, age, injuries
or death of the head of the household, and inheritance problems. Even issues such as the level of literacy were
important in accessing information and housing assistance. In both cases of Bam and Bhuj middle income
educated households could manipulate the regulations and received more than housing assistance.
These examples illustrate that in contrast to the equal process of housing reconstruction, assumed by the
owner-driven model in housing recovery programmes of Bam and Bhuj, different homeowner households
have demonstrated different capabilities in rebuilding their damaged houses. For many households, the
housing reconstruction processes lasted longer than others and given the availability of financial or technical
assistance only during the official period of reconstruction, they were not able to receive assistance as others
did. This raises questions about the standardized strategies embedded in formulation of the owner-driven
model.
(3) Quality of the built environment: Practical shortcomings
While the two former arguments criticize the way the owner-driven model is often conceived and formulated,
the third argument is related to issues which are not inherent in the model. This section looks at common
problems related to the quality of the built environment, observed in the two case studies. It is argued that these
issues need to be appropriately addressed in policy and implementation arrangements in the owner-driven
housing reconstruction.
The first problem, also raised by other studies 12, 18) , is related to physical vulnerability of the reconstructed
buildings. In both cities of Bam and Bhuj, the reconstruction process was predominantly executed by contractors
or skilled labours hired by homeowners. Supervising the process of construction, engineers appointed
by the government had the responsibility of controlling the conformity of construction with the seismic code at
each stage and issuing permit for disbursement of the next instalment of the grant to owners.
Although several programmes for training skilled labours and contractors were carried out in Gujarat, interviewed
academics expressed their concerns over the physical fragility of the rebuilt residential units. In
Bam, where the earthquake destroyed 80 percent of buildings including many newly built structures, people
became very conscious about adopting safety measures in construction of their houses. Over time and partly
because of a very slow reconstruction process, this concern lost its priority to the economic hardship. Consequently,
some low-income groups returned to their pre-earthquake unsafe construction practices. Furthermore,
with the official termination of the reconstruction before a considerable part of construction activities
finished and given inadequate technical knowledge transfer to builders, enduring safe construction practices
became less probable 19) .
These examples illustrate that inadequacies in safe construction practices are partly resulted from an insufficient
technical knowledge transfer to builders. The training components of the owner-driven housing programmes
are normally evaluated through the quantitative data about the number of trainees, instead of looking
at how safety practices are communicated with skilled labours in the ways tailored to their literacy level and
construction knowledge.
The second problem is related to the difficulties in reconstruction of multi-unit buildings with mixed use and
mixed tenure. In these two small cities, the issue of multiple unit buildings with mixed tenure did not appear to
be a problem, because the new building regulation limited the height of buildings to double story. However,
the reconstruction of buildings with mixed use was treated differently. In Bhuj, the housing assistance was
exclusively allocated for residential purposes. This led to the disappearance of a prevalent building typology,
i.e. buildings with shops on their ground floor from the old neighbourhoods of the city. This was not the case in
Bam where a more flexible housing recovery programme allowed construction of such buildings. Adequate
flexibility which accommodates the requirements of diverse arrangements is often a neglected aspect of the
owner-driven housing reconstruction which impinges upon the applicability of this model in urban settlements.
The
problem is not specific to the owner-driven model but is accentuated partly as this model implies more conceived
autonomy of owners in building their homes. In both cities, the historic fabric of the city, where housing
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comprised considerable portion of the cultural landscape, was dramatically transformed through the reconstruction
process. Housing reconstruction offered a unique opportunity to people to build their dream houses,
and in the absence of legal guidelines and prescriptions, the result was a hodgepodge of diverse building forms
and materials, and hence loss of distinctive characteristics of these historic cities.
Beyond addressing the short-term housing demands of the affected communities, it is essential that the
owner-driven model incorporates considerations about the quality of the built environment. Integrating
guidelines corresponding different aspects of the physical setting including physical resilience, function, and
place identity into housing recovery programme can contribute to the improvement of the quality of the built
environment.
2. CONCLUSION
This paper has scrutinized the owner-driven model of housing reconstruction based on the ways it has been
conceived, formulated, and practiced in two post-earthquake housing recovery projects. It has been argued that
the owner-driven housing reconstruction responds to the housing needs of just one group of affected communities
and therefore, cannot be conceptualized as a holistic framework for housing recovery. In fact, conceiving
the owner-driven model as the main framework for housing recovery implies the exclusion of
non-owner groups from housing recovery options. This means that an indispensible part of the housing recovery
process is left, without a clear plan, to the non-public sector, i.e., housing market or NGOs. NGOs, as
depicted, might not be able to or willing to appropriately cover all the left groups. Also, literature shows that
housing market is not often able to provide affordable housing in the aftermath of disasters 20) .
Moreover, the formulation of the owner-driven model implies an incorrect assumption about equal capability
of households to manage their housing reconstruction. Different factors including ex-ante vulnerabilities,
disaster impacts, or contextual issues might curtail the capability of households to achieve their recovery. Even
more problematic, the most vulnerable groups received the least assistance, compared to the elites who often
expand their capabilities.
These arguments indicate a structural incongruity in housing recovery programmes which define their goal
as creating an enabling environment and at the same time deprive those who need the most contribution to be
able to achieve their recovery. Finally, the paper has underpinned the importance of a better formulation of the
owner-driven model by relying on a more nuanced understanding about the complexities of housing recovery
in urban setting.
While knowledge transfer about best practices in post-disaster housing recovery is essential for informing
decision-makers in cases of future disasters, an appropriate communication of the limitations in the previous
experiences can result in a better preparation and a more efficient and equitable use of the scarce financial
resources. In this sense, the owner-driven housing reconstruction model requires a revisiting in conceptualization,
its formulation and practical arrangements with a view to create an inclusive and enabling environment
for post-disaster housing recovery.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: I wish to thank Prof. Richard Tomlison, the head of planning department at the
University of Melbourne, for his comments and contribution.
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