Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies:
A Review of the Literature
creating incentives for companies to do business with those who could provide this service at
cut-rate prices. Criminal syndicates expanded their operations in the solid and hazardous waste
hauling industries in response to the desire of corporations to externalize their responsibilities
and minimize their costs in this area.
Historically, there has been a widespread reluctance, on the part of both regulators and the
regulated, to treat environmental crime as crime. Criminal sanctions are generally viewed as a
last resort. Voluntary compliance and civil or administrative sanctions have been the standard
means of environmental crime control (Carter, 1996/97:28). Weak controls, however, have led
to degradation of the environment and one study notes that inadequate sanctions probably
increase rather than decrease OC activities (Reuter, 1987).
Carter’s (1996/97) analysis of the waste hauling and disposal industries provides some lessons in
terms of regulation. A balance must be struck between inadequate regulation and its unnecessary
proliferation, as the latter might hinder industrial activity. Carter asserts that regulations need to
be comprehensive, so as to avoid loopholes that might be exploited by unscrupulous operators.
The State of New York, for example, has permitted the disposal of construction materials on the
property owner’s land without requiring a permit. OC groups took advantage of this situation by
burying toxic waste along with construction debris, unbeknownst to property owners.
Carter adds that enforcers and regulators must be equipped with better tools to permanently
revoke all permits, licenses, and other privileges to operate in an industry. Furthermore, he notes
that penalties for deliberate violations of environmental laws should be increased and adequate
resources must be available to enforcers.
Regulatory reform in a number of areas illustrates the promise of this approach. When Rudolph
Giuliani, formerly a US attorney known for his vigorous prosecution of OC, became mayor of
New York City, the city moved quickly to use its licensing power to remove corrupt unloading
companies at the Fulton Fish Market (Jacobs and Gouldin, 1999:175). The Giuliani
administration also used its regulatory authority and licensing powers to free the Feast of San
Gennaro, one of New York’s most famous street fairs, from the grip of OC. The Cosa Nostradominated
organization that for many years had run and profited from the festival was replaced
by an organization with no OC connections and by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese (Jacobs and
Gouldin, 1999:175).
Under Giuliani, the New York City Council also created the Trade Waste Commission TWC) in
order to remove OC’s control over the waste hauling industry and to restore competition (Jacobs
and Gouldin, 1999:175). The executive officers of this Commission included attorneys and
police detectives with experience in OC investigations and prosecutions. The TWC was
authorized to license carting companies and individuals with criminal records or known
associations with OC or the mob-dominated cartel were denied licenses. The TWC also sought
to strengthen the position of the customer by setting maximum rates, regulating contract
duration, and by informing customers of their rights.
52 | Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada