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Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

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<strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Effectiveness</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Organized</strong> <strong>Crime</strong> <strong>Control</strong> <strong>Strategies</strong>:<br />

A Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Literature<br />

over <strong>the</strong> telephone and in meetings, <strong>the</strong>re is a minimum <strong>of</strong> written communications that can be<br />

used to construct a paper trail <strong>of</strong> criminal transactions (Kenney and Finckenauer, 1995:337).<br />

Despite <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> electronic surveillance, it constitutes a considerable invasion <strong>of</strong> privacy and<br />

hence must be governed by strict regulations in non-totalitarian societies. The extensive<br />

surveillance <strong>of</strong> civil rights leader Martin Lu<strong>the</strong>r King, Jr., in <strong>the</strong> 1960s, is just one example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

potential abuse <strong>of</strong> this investigative tool for political or o<strong>the</strong>r ends (Krajick, 1983:30).<br />

Aside from concerns about <strong>the</strong> civil liberties <strong>of</strong> targets, <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> electronic surveillance is<br />

limited by its prohibitive cost. In <strong>the</strong> US, <strong>the</strong> cost per tap has risen from an average <strong>of</strong> $5,524 in<br />

1970 to $46,492 in 1992 (Albanese, 1996:177). This elevated cost is partly due to regulations in<br />

<strong>the</strong> US that require <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> a police <strong>of</strong>ficer who must listen to <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> each<br />

conversation and turn <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> recorder, if <strong>the</strong> conversation is not related to <strong>the</strong> eavesdropping<br />

warrant. Also, tapes must be transcribed, conversations analyzed, and leads provided by <strong>the</strong><br />

intercept must be followed-up through physical surveillance and o<strong>the</strong>r means. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<br />

material from electronic intercepts <strong>of</strong>ten must be enhanced by specialists to reduce background<br />

noise (Abadinsky, 2003:347).<br />

There are o<strong>the</strong>r practical problems associated with surveillance, as well as problems in<br />

interpreting material that has been intercepted. Schlegel (1988) points out that <strong>the</strong> planning <strong>of</strong><br />

conspiratorial acts takes a considerable amount <strong>of</strong> time and <strong>of</strong>ten occurs in a variety <strong>of</strong> locations,<br />

<strong>the</strong>reby undermining <strong>the</strong> utility <strong>of</strong> electronic eavesdropping. There are also problems in<br />

interpreting conversations (e.g., a “hit” can refer to a murder or robbery) and in <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong><br />

what people are overheard to say, as <strong>the</strong>y may be lying or bragging.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> US, <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> court-authorized electronic surveillance has grown measurably from 1970<br />

to <strong>the</strong> 1990s (Albanese, 1996:175). Telephone taps have been <strong>the</strong> most popular means <strong>of</strong><br />

surveillance, although interceptions <strong>of</strong> electronic communications have grown perceptibly since<br />

<strong>the</strong> late 1980s. The average length <strong>of</strong> surveillance operations has doubled from 19 to 38 days.<br />

Surveillance now is more likely to be used in drug and racketeering cases, but less <strong>of</strong>ten in<br />

gambling cases, reflecting <strong>the</strong> changing priorities <strong>of</strong> US law enforcement agencies (Albanese,<br />

1996:176).<br />

Albanese (1996:177) has found that three times as many conversations were intercepted in 1992<br />

as in 1970, but that <strong>the</strong> percent <strong>of</strong> conversations containing incriminating information dropped<br />

from 45 percent to 19 percent during that same period. He interprets this finding to mean that<br />

crimes may be less conspiratorial and hence may produce fewer conversations that are crimerelated.<br />

Or, alternatively, <strong>the</strong> cases selected for surveillance are becoming less appropriate.<br />

Ano<strong>the</strong>r possibility is that <strong>the</strong>re may be a saturation point beyond which surveillance is no longer<br />

useful in investigations. It may also be <strong>the</strong> case that members <strong>of</strong> criminal organizations are more<br />

aware that <strong>the</strong>ir communications may be intercepted by law enforcement are <strong>the</strong>refore more<br />

prudent with <strong>the</strong>ir communications.<br />

The analysis conducted by Albanese indicates that <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> arrests and convictions arising<br />

from electronic surveillance in <strong>the</strong> US has increased from 1970 to 1992, although <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong><br />

arrests and convictions per tap has remained fairly stable. The National Wiretap Commission, a<br />

46 | Research and Statistics Division / Department <strong>of</strong> Justice Canada

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