Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

In the first two and one-half years, the task forces produced 1,721 indictments against 6,545
defendants, the majority through plea agreements (President’s Commission on Organized Crime,
1986:319; General Accounting Office, 1987:13). The conviction rate is about 95 percent in
cases reaching disposition and assets seized approach the cost of the program. In its first two
years, assets seized totaled US$158 million and forfeitures totaled US$52 million (General
Accounting Office, 1987:9). In addition, close to US$10 million in fines were assessed during
the first two years of the program. The task forces have also enhanced international cooperation
among law enforcement agencies as nearly half the cases target organizations that are
international in scope.
In Canada, the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia (2001/2002) operates like the
American task forces. Established in 1999, it has developed close working relationships with
many Canadian law enforcement agencies, as well as the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency,
the FBI, and the US Drug Enforcement Agency, among others. On average, projects include
eight to nine partners. While no independent assessment as to the outcome of OCABC
operations have been conducted, its 2001/2002 Annual Report claims that it has caused
“disruption and suppression of organized crime group activities such as geographic
displacement, friction and mistrust among crime groups and disruption of drug distribution
networks” (OCABC, 2001/2002:14). In addition, one case led to the confiscation of $6 million
in assets.
4.13 Undercover Operations and Informants
Undercover work may involve one or more of: informants, who are usually suspects who have
“flipped” and are exchanging information for consideration in terms of charges or at sentencing;
paid agents, who are insiders receiving cash for information; or, undercover officers, who are
police officers trying to infiltrate criminal organizations or obtain information about their
operations (Beare, 1996:189).
Proceeds of crime and money laundering investigations, for example, often require sophisticated
undercover work involving the establishment of elaborate storefront money laundering
operations. These storefronts are staffed by individuals knowledgeable about financial
transactions and laundering. The goal of such operations is to gain the confidence of the
criminal organization toward the end of learning more about its personnel and operations. Sting
operations of this type sometimes produce many convictions, but may be costly, involving many
officers over a considerable period of time (Albanese, 1996:181).
Undercover work is dangerous—the danger appears to increase in proportion to the severity of
sentences targets of such operations stand to serve—and open to manipulation (Beare, 1996:190-
191). For example, informers might provide false information in order to receive payments or to
punish competitors or enemies (Marx, 1988:152). Other informers may become overzealous
“supercops” and create criminals, using prohibited methods. Because of their protected status,
the information they provide and techniques they use to gather information are rarely challenged.
Marx (1988:153) points out that informers are often unchallenged because they rarely appear in
court. These court appearances are rare because “the information they provide is used to obtain a
warrant or they are “cut away” after providing an introduction for a sworn agent.”
Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 43