Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

acketeering prosecution has benefited from the testimony of one or more protected witnesses.
The US program has facilitated major defections from La Cosa Nostra (Jacobs and Gouldin,
1999). Until the 1980s, the only major OC figure who had broken the code of omerta was Joe
Valachi. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of mob figures facing the possibility of
lengthy prison terms testified for the government in exchange for concessions in the charges
against them and admission into the Witness Security Program.
Jacobs and Gouldin (1999:168) provide a list of high-profile mob figures who “flipped” and
entered the program. These individuals helped the government in its civil racketeering suit
against the Teamsters Union, and provided testimony in the “Commission”, “Pizza Connection”,
and other prominent cases. In one of the most notorious cases, Gambino family underboss
Salvatore Gravano testified against powerful John Gotti, head of that crime family. Kenney and
Finckenauer (1995:333) assert that Gotti’s conviction might not have occurred without
Gravano’s testimony and that, “There is no doubt that his [Gravano’s] cooperation would not
have been secured except under a guarantee that he and his family would be protected from
retaliation by Gotti and his followers.”
Kelly, Schatzberg, and Chin (1994:500) report that the record of the United States’ Witness
Protection program is impressive. They note that protected witnesses have helped convict over
89 percent of the defendants against whom they testified.
A 1984 study by the United States’ General Accounting Office revealed a 75 percent conviction
rate in cases involving the testimony of a protected witness (Albanese, 1996). The majority, but
not all, of the defendants were OC figures. The GAO found that, in OC cases involving
protected witnesses, twice as many defendants received prison sentences than in other OC cases.
Eighty-eight percent of those designated as bosses or ring leaders were sent to prison, for a
median time of 11.2 years. The GAO further found that just over 21 percent of witnesses
admitted into the US program were arrested within the next two years. This figure may be
modest in light of the fact that the typical protected witness has over seven arrests prior to their
entry into the program. In addition, supervision by the US Marshal’s Service may increase the
likelihood of detection for criminal activity (Giuliani, 1986:116).
Albanese (1996:195) notes that the significant OC prosecutions resulting from the program must
be weighed against the $25 million cost, the arrest rate of protected witnesses, and the occasional
lawsuit filed against the government due to the criminal actions of a witness. He points out that
the high cost of the program has brought increasing attention to easing witnesses out of the
program, although this poses a challenge in the case of older individuals and those who have
never held a legitimate job.
Overall, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the increased testimony by OC insiders in
the last two decades was due to witness protection, as opposed to the reduction of charges,
immunity, and the erosion of adherence to codes of secrecy by the more recent generation of OC
figures.
In Canada, until 1995, witness protection programs were run by several police forces, including
the RCMP (Ha, 1995). In 1995, the government tabled a bill to establish a national program.
Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada | 33