Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies ...

Assessing the Effectiveness of Organized Crime Control Strategies:
A Review of the Literature
(Albanese, 1996:227). Furthermore, the President’s Commission on Organized Crime
(1986:345) has noted that the reliability of information on the seizure of non-drug assets is
undermined by double counting, decentralization, and variations in data gathering methods.
According to a study cited by the Commission (Stellwagen, 1985), more than one-half of state
and local officials could not estimate the value of confiscated property. The determination of the
value of such property is an essential part of an overall analysis of the benefits of forfeiture laws.
Levi (1997: 12-13) argues that the UK experience shows that the proportion of crime proceeds
confiscated is miniscule—far less than one percent by his calculations—because major criminals
are often not convicted, forfeiture proceedings may be unsuccessful, and offenders may spend
much of their proceeds, leaving them with far fewer assets than profits from crime.
An evaluation of the Australian experience also illustrates the limitations of forfeiture laws.
Freiberg and Fox (2000) begin by pointing out that the determination of the deterrent effects of
these laws is complex, as the effects of forfeiture must be disentangled from the effects of the
sentence imposed for the predicate offence. The authors note that, in Australia, only 10 percent
of all convictions are on indictable offences—the remainder are summary convictions—and only
indictable offences can serve as the basis for confiscation applications. Thus, a significant
proportion of crime proceeds acquired in the commission of federal offences is not recoverable
via the proceeds of crime legislation in that country. Just over 10 percent of cases involving
indictable offences--1 percent of all offences--are subject to a confiscation order.
In Australia, assets confiscated under the proceeds of crime legislation average between A$10
and A$13 million per year (Freiberg and Fox, 2000:250). When one considers that the proceeds
of crime have been estimated to be as high as $9 billion a year, well under one percent of crime
profits are forfeited. The authors, as well as other commentators in Australia, assert that this
record reflects a low level of enforcement of confiscation laws and a minimal incapacitation
effect on crime.
Furthermore, just a minority of the forfeitures involved persons affiliated with OC groups. The
authors cite a study in Germany indicating that there, too, the most common forfeitures involve
drugs or assets used in offences by consumers or small-scale dealers, rather than members of OC
groups (Benseler, 1997). Further undermining the effects of forfeiture laws is the gap between
confiscation orders and assets actually recovered. In the UK, less than one-quarter of the funds
ordered to be confiscated between 1987 and 1993 were actually recovered (Levi and Osofsky,
1995:3). In Australia, the amount realized by pecuniary penalty orders and forfeiture orders was
28% of the value of restraining orders (Freiberg and Fox, 2000:253). As for the costs of
confiscation, the Australian experience indicates that, at the federal level, the efforts are
marginally profitable, as it is estimated that it costs roughly $75 to recover $100.
30 | Research and Statistics Division / Department of Justice Canada