6. Conclusion (PDF, 69 kb) - Center for the Study of Democracy

115
CONCLUSION
There are several factors that determine Bulgaria’s entry into the crucial
phase of its anti-corruption reforms. First, there is a positive trend,
captured both by Coalition 2000’s Corruption Monitoring System and
by international surveys after 1997, of a decrease of administrative
corruption that should be developed further. There were some
indications in late 2004 of a marginal increase in corruption prevalence
compared to earlier that year. This implies that anti-corruption policies
may be exhausting their effect and need to be consolidated and
expanded. Second, political and large-scale corruption, which has
been only slightly affected by reforms so far, impacts negatively on
competitiveness and economic growth. This may lead to a vicious
circle in which low economic efficiency bolsters corruption and vice
versa. Third, the success of Bulgaria’s integration into the European
Union depends on how it confronts corruption. Corruption hampers the
country’s accession process in several ways: it weakens its institutions
and impedes the implementation of common EU rules and policies;
it heightens the risk of embezzlement and poor management of the
EU pre-accession and structural funds; and it facilitates the “export” of
crime to the Union.
The challenges and opportunities of EU membership require that anticorruption
reforms be an integral part of Bulgaria’s overall modernization
strategy. In this context, the priority areas of anti-corruption policy in
the next few years should be a fundamental reform of the judiciary
and law-enforcement and the curbing of organized crime and the
hidden economy. Anti-corruption policies should be more tailored
to specific areas as well as targeted at the broader root causes of
corruption:
• Continuing the development of democratic institutions. Constitutional
changes should introduce improved checks and balances of the
branches of government thus enhancing their anti-corruption potential.
In order to meet the - as the USAID Anticorruption Strategy puts
it - “dual challenges of grand and administrative corruption” 10
mechanisms of democratic control should be reinforced. Specialized
anti-corruption units should receive more authority and higher profile.
Legal provisions on political party financing, lobbying, campaigning
and the restriction of political intervention in the judiciary, economy
and media should be considered with priority.
10
USAID Anticorruption Strategy, January 2005, p.2

116 ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS IN BULGARIA
• An effective and stable judiciary that is free from corruption is
the most powerful agent of the rule of law and anti-corruption.
Thus, anti-corruption reforms in the judiciary and law-enforcement
should remain a priority area in Bulgaria’s progress towards EU
accession. Several key challenges must be met: completing the
reform in the pre-trial phase of the criminal process; transforming
the role and functions of the investigation and prosecution bodies 11 ,
making judicial bodies and law enforcement improve their information
exchange and cooperation.
• Market economy institutions should be strengthened to encourage
legitimate business. Economic freedom and competition need to
be bolstered, business should be burdened less by bureaucracy, and
business ethics should be promoted. Bulgaria’s economic growth is
held back by a lack of consistent policy to promote competition,
as well as by monopolies established through political corruption.
Bulgarian business is still debilitated by a heavily bureaucratized
administrative control system which leads to excessive costs and
corruption. Corruption schemes allowing a particular bidder to win
in public tenders and concessions still exist. It is also important to
set clear and transparent provisions on the use of EU pre-accession
funds and to build a reliable system for internal and independent
oversight of their programming and management.
• Reducing the influence of organized crime in government and the
economy. Suppressing the economy of crime would be an important
step towards reducing corruption practices which sustain it in the
first place. The customs administration is still implicated in significant
corruption and customs fraud in export/import deals and smuggling
operations. Business and its associations are crucial stakeholders in
ridding the economy of its gray sector and corruption and should
be thus involved in anti-corruption policies. Bringing the hidden
economy below 20% of GPD before the time of Bulgaria’s accession
to the EU is a bold but realistic target.
• Civil society should maintain its active role in anti-corruption
initiatives. NGO efforts should venture into areas where reform is
underdeveloped or is yet to be launched, such as health care reform,
education, and social security. Reducing corruption in these public
services would indicate that the country is irreversibly on the road of
successful and sustainable reforms.
A strategy of social modernization has to rely on an effective anticorruption
policy. Even a well-designed anti-corruption program would
fail to bring about lasting impact if implemented outside the overall
philosophy of legal, institutional, social and economic reforms. Anticorruption
reforms should follow a holistic approach and when properly
coordinated should manage to increase the risk, cost and insecurity for
11
The case for these reforms has been extensively argued by Coalition 2000 and the Center
for the Study of Democracy in the period 2002-2004. See Judicial Anti-Corruption Program,
Sofia, 2003 and Corruption Assessment Report 2003.

CONCLUSION 117
both parties to a corruption deal. As long as corruption is perceived as a
low-risk, low-cost, high-profit endeavor, the efforts towards its reduction
will be of small consequence.
Effective coordination between all stakeholders - the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary with all their separate agencies; the central
and local governments and institutions; NGOs and the media - is a
must of the anti-corruption process. Civil society should keep the
momentum of its anti-corruption initiatives and maintain its crucial
watchdog function. The latter, together with the partnership of public
and private institutions are the key factors for the success of anticorruption
reforms.