14.11.2012 Views

A POSTCAPITALIST PARADIGM: THE COMMON GOOD OF ...

A POSTCAPITALIST PARADIGM: THE COMMON GOOD OF ...

A POSTCAPITALIST PARADIGM: THE COMMON GOOD OF ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

es publicae and res universitatis (two types of public goods), res communes<br />

omnium, that is, goods belonging to everyone and therefore<br />

which could not be appropriated by anyone, and the res nullius, or things<br />

belonging to no-one and therefore which could be appropriated by anyone.<br />

An objection always made, quite rightly, to Garrett Hardin, author<br />

of the famous essay on the tragedy of commons, is that he mixed up a<br />

Commons (such as the grazing land he used as an example) with an<br />

open access regime. He concluded that the inevitable outcome was<br />

over-exploitation and destruction of the grazing land as a consequence<br />

of the selfish behaviour of each herdsman (motivated to maximize his<br />

individual interest), but he forgot that the Commons and collective property<br />

arrangements are by no means things belonging to nobody, no<br />

man’s land, or res nullius and that there are precise rules, norms and institutional<br />

arrangements that commoners adopt, working together to<br />

preserve the good, rather than competing destructively with one another<br />

as homines oeconomici. And so it is not the parcelisation and privatization<br />

of the common resource, nor the intervention of external state regulation<br />

(heteronomy) which saves the Commons, but the rules which<br />

the commoners themselves choose, and their capacity for self-government<br />

(autonomy): this is commoning. And this brings us to conclude<br />

that, in effect, Commons have always been regulated, even if the rule<br />

consciously chosen by the commoners was that of “open access”, as<br />

in the case of digital commons, unlimited and non-rival goods. This truth<br />

– which originates from actual observation of the practices of commoning,<br />

with which Hardin was not acquainted – lies well with the anti-essentialist<br />

viewpoint, according to which Commons are indissolubly a<br />

form of social relation, directed at sharing a resource. In other words,<br />

one could maintain that there is nothing which is necessarily “of itself”<br />

a Commons, that is, which can be morally claimed as a Commons more<br />

than other things can: all around us we have only natural resources or<br />

social creations which can be managed as public property, as private<br />

property or as Commons. If there is no commoning and there are no<br />

commoners, then Commons do not exist. It is all up to us. On the other<br />

hand, it is also true, looking at the same problem from a different standpoint,<br />

that in human history a vast number of things have been shared<br />

200

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!