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Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 1 of 34 PageID 124<br />
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS<br />
FORT WORTH DIVISION<br />
RICHARD VAN HOUTEN, JR. AND )<br />
STEPHEN HALL, )<br />
)<br />
Plaintiffs, )<br />
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12-cv-00826-Y<br />
)<br />
CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS, )<br />
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION )<br />
)<br />
Defendant. )<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE<br />
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Respectfully submitted,<br />
/s/ Dee J. Kelly<br />
Dee J. Kelly<br />
State Bar No. 11217000<br />
Dee J. Kelly, Jr.<br />
State Bar No. 11217250<br />
Mary H. Smith<br />
State Bar No. 24075093<br />
KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP<br />
201 Main Street, Suite 2500<br />
Fort Worth, Texas 76102<br />
Telephone: (817) 332-2500<br />
Facsimile: (817) 878-9280<br />
Gerald Pruitt<br />
State Bar. No. 16369200<br />
FORT WORTH CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE<br />
1000 Throckmor<strong>to</strong>n Street<br />
Fort Worth, Texas 76102<br />
Telephone: (817) 392-7616<br />
Facsimile: (817) 392-8359<br />
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page i
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 2 of 34 PageID 125<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Page<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv<br />
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .........................................................................................1<br />
II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2<br />
A. Factual Background .................................................................................................2<br />
B. Procedural Background ............................................................................................2<br />
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................................3<br />
IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................4<br />
A. This Court Should Decline <strong>to</strong> Exercise Supplemental<br />
Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims and <strong>Dismiss</strong><br />
Those Claims Without Prejudice .............................................................................4<br />
B. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> this Lawsuit Because Plaintiffs’<br />
Claims are Not Ripe .................................................................................................8<br />
C. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> or Stay this Lawsuit on Abstention<br />
Grounds ..................................................................................................................10<br />
1. The Brillhart Standard Governs this Court’s Abstention<br />
Analysis......................................................................................................12<br />
a. All of the Matters in Controversy May Be Fully<br />
Litigated in the State Court Action ................................................14<br />
b. Plaintiffs Filed This Lawsuit in Reaction <strong>to</strong> the<br />
State Court Action..........................................................................15<br />
c. Plaintiffs Engaged in Forum Shopping in Bringing<br />
this Action ......................................................................................15<br />
d. Plaintiffs Will Not Be Harmed If This Court<br />
<strong>Dismiss</strong>es Their Claims .................................................................16<br />
e. Allowing This Action <strong>to</strong> Proceed in This Court<br />
Would Not Serve the Purposes of Judicial Economy ....................16<br />
2. Alternatively, the Abstention Fac<strong>to</strong>rs Set Forth in<br />
Colorado River Apply................................................................................17<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page ii
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 3 of 34 PageID 126<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)<br />
Page<br />
a. State-Law Issues Predominate Over Federal Questions<br />
in This Action ................................................................................18<br />
b. This Action Poses a Threat of Piecemeal and<br />
Inconsistent Adjudication ..............................................................19<br />
c. The Tarrant County District Court Obtained Jurisdiction<br />
Prior <strong>to</strong> This Court .........................................................................20<br />
d. Plaintiffs Filed This Lawsuit in Reaction <strong>to</strong> the State<br />
Court Action...................................................................................20<br />
D. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> or Stay This Lawsuit Pursuant <strong>to</strong> Its<br />
Inherent Power .......................................................................................................21<br />
E. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> This Lawsuit for Failure <strong>to</strong> State a<br />
Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted ...........................................................22<br />
F. This Court Should Order Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> Make a More Definite<br />
Statement................................................................................................................23<br />
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................24<br />
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE .............................................................................................26<br />
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................26<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page iii
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 4 of 34 PageID 127<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES<br />
Cases:<br />
Page<br />
Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry,<br />
835 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................................17, 20<br />
Alvarado Guerva v. INS,<br />
902 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1990) .........................................................................................................23<br />
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs,<br />
398 U.S. 281 (1970) .......................................................................................................................14<br />
Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp.,<br />
204 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................12, 18<br />
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am.,<br />
316 U.S. 491 (1942) .................................................................................................................12, 19<br />
Brim v. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co.,<br />
213 F. App’x 303 (5th Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................................6<br />
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger, Inc.,<br />
174 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................... 10-11<br />
Caminiti & Iatarola, Ltd. v. Behnke Warehousing, Inc.,<br />
962 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1992) .........................................................................................................11<br />
City of Dallas v. Trammell,<br />
101 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. 1937) ..........................................................................................................6<br />
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,<br />
461 U.S. 95 (1983) ...........................................................................................................................8<br />
Collin Cnty., Tex. v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential <strong>to</strong> Neighborhoods,<br />
915 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990) .........................................................................................................13<br />
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S.,<br />
424 U.S. 800 (1976) ........................................................................................................... 10, 17-20<br />
Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.,<br />
24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds,<br />
Cal. Dept. of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................7<br />
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Hlavinka Equip. Co.,<br />
No. Civ.A.H-05-2515, 2005 WL 2792383 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ........................................................15<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page iv
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 5 of 34 PageID 128<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)<br />
Cases:<br />
Page<br />
Garber v. Sir Speedy, Inc.,<br />
930 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Tex. 1995) ...............................................................................................20<br />
Gladden v. Roach,<br />
864 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1989) .......................................................................................................23<br />
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol,<br />
133 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998) .......................................................................................................15<br />
Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,<br />
603 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2010) ...........................................................................................................4<br />
Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple,<br />
969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) ...........................................................................................................7<br />
Horne v. Firemen’s Ret. Sys. of St. Louis,<br />
69 F.3d 233 (8th Cir. 1995) ..................................................................................................... 12-13<br />
Horne v. U.S.,<br />
519 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1975) ...........................................................................................................13<br />
Itel Corp. v. M/S Vic<strong>to</strong>ria U. (Ex Pishtaz Iran),<br />
710 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................................21, 22<br />
James v. Nocona Gen. Hosp.,<br />
No. 7:02-CV-0291-R, 2004 WL 2002425 (N.D. Tex. 2004) ..........................................................7<br />
Katzenbach v. McClung,<br />
379 U.S. 294 (1964) .......................................................................................................................13<br />
Landis v. N. Am. Co.,<br />
299 U.S. 248 (1936) .......................................................................................................................21<br />
Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,<br />
954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds & remanded, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).........23<br />
Melo v. Gardere Wynne Sewell,<br />
No. 3-04-CV-2238-BD, 2005 WL 991600 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2005) .............................11, 21, 22<br />
Microsource, Inc. v. Superior Signs, Inc.,<br />
No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-2733-G, 1998 WL 119537 (N.D. Tex. 1998) .............................................21<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page v
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 6 of 34 PageID 129<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)<br />
Cases:<br />
Page<br />
MidTexas Int’l Ctr., Inc. v. Myronowicz,<br />
Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1957-R, 2006 WL 2285581 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2006) .................10, 11<br />
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,<br />
460 U.S. 1 (1983) ...............................................................................................................17, 18, 20<br />
Mourik Int’l B.V. v. Reac<strong>to</strong>r Servs. Int’l, Inc.,<br />
182 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D. Tex. 2002) .....................................................................................18, 20<br />
Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior,<br />
538 U.S. 803 (2003) .........................................................................................................................8<br />
New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Barnett,<br />
561 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 11-12<br />
Pearson v. Holder,<br />
No. 3:09-CV-0682-O-BH, 2009 WL 2444748 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2009) ..................................8, 9<br />
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co.,<br />
478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973) ....................................................................................................10, 22<br />
Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Twyman,<br />
No. 3-01-CV-1659-BD, 2002 WL 83750 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2002) ............................................22<br />
Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc.,<br />
509 U.S. 43 (1993) .......................................................................................................................8, 9<br />
Republicbank Dallas, Nat’l Assoc. v. McIn<strong>to</strong>sh,<br />
828 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987) .......................................................................................................10<br />
Rhodes v. Prince,<br />
Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-2343-D, 2010 WL 3565235 (N.D. Tex. 2010) ...............................6, 13<br />
Roark & Hardee LP v. City of Austin,<br />
522 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2008) ...........................................................................................................8<br />
Romine v. Compuserve Corp.,<br />
160 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1998) .........................................................................................................11<br />
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo,<br />
39 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 1994) ...........................................................................................................14<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page vi
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 7 of 34 PageID 130<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)<br />
Cases:<br />
Page<br />
Saucier v. Aviva Life & Annuity Co.,<br />
No. 11-60503, 2012 WL 5658711 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012) .........................................................19<br />
Severance v. Patterson,<br />
566 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2009) ...........................................................................................................8<br />
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty.,<br />
343 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................................12, 14, 16<br />
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,<br />
339 U.S. 667 (1950) .......................................................................................................................13<br />
Sisk v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t.,<br />
644 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1981) .......................................................................................................23<br />
Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc.,<br />
23 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................12, 14<br />
Tex. v. U.S.,<br />
497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................................................8<br />
Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc.,<br />
996 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1993) .........................................................................................................13<br />
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,<br />
383 U.S. 715 (1966) .....................................................................................................................6, 7<br />
U.S. v. Fisher–Otis Co.,<br />
496 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1974) .....................................................................................................13<br />
USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dydek,<br />
No. Civ.A. SA-05-333-OG, 2006 WL 3068890 (W.D. Tex.. 2006) .............................................15<br />
Walker Centrifuge Servs., L.L.C. v. D & D Power, L.L.C.,<br />
550 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Tex. 2008) ....................................................................................20, 17<br />
Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.,<br />
437 U.S. 655 (1978) .......................................................................................................................10<br />
Wil<strong>to</strong>n v. Seven Falls Co.,<br />
515 U.S. 277 (1995) .................................................................................................................12, 13<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page vii
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 8 of 34 PageID 131<br />
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)<br />
Cases:<br />
Page<br />
Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc.,<br />
57 F.3d 1406 (5th Cir. 1995) .........................................................................................................21<br />
Rules and Statutes:<br />
28 U.S.C. § 1367 .......................................................................................................................... 4-6<br />
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .............................................................................................................8, 9, 22, 23<br />
Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-0615 (2008) .......................................................................................5<br />
Tex. R. Civ. P. 60 ...........................................................................................................................16<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
Page viii
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 9 of 34 PageID 132<br />
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS<br />
FORT WORTH DIVISION<br />
RICHARD VAN HOUTEN, JR. AND )<br />
STEPHEN HALL, )<br />
)<br />
Plaintiffs, )<br />
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:12-cv-00826-Y<br />
)<br />
CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS, )<br />
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION )<br />
)<br />
Defendant. )<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF<br />
Defendant City of Fort Worth, Texas (the “City”) respectfully files this Motion <strong>to</strong><br />
<strong>Dismiss</strong> or Stay, Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement, and Brief in Support<br />
Thereof, asking this Court <strong>to</strong> decline <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law<br />
claims asserted by Richard Van Houten, Jr. and Stephen Hall (“Plaintiffs”), <strong>to</strong> dismiss or stay<br />
this lawsuit, or, alternatively, <strong>to</strong> order Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> provide a more definite statement.<br />
I.<br />
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT<br />
On Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 23, 2012, the City filed a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment action in Tarrant County<br />
District Court styled City of Fort Worth v. Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Fort Worth<br />
(the “State Court Action”), in which the parties are litigating issues nearly identical <strong>to</strong> those in<br />
this case under identical facts. Specifically, both actions concern the constitutionality of recently<br />
adopted amendments <strong>to</strong> the City’s retirement ordinance. At the time Plaintiffs filed the instant<br />
lawsuit, the State Court Action was pending before the 342nd Judicial District in Tarrant County.<br />
On the same day that Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit, the defendant in the State Court<br />
Action—the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Fort Worth (the “Fund”)—wrongfully<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT Page 1
Case 4:12-cv-00826-Y Document 10 Filed 12/06/12 Page 10 of 34 PageID 133<br />
removed the State Court Action <strong>to</strong> this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. The<br />
only federal questions in the State Court Action were raised by the Fund in its affirmative<br />
defenses. Because the City pled only state-law causes of action in its well-pleaded complaint,<br />
and a defense that raises a federal question is inadequate <strong>to</strong> confer jurisdiction, the City filed a<br />
<strong>motion</strong> <strong>to</strong> remand the State Court Action back <strong>to</strong> Tarrant County District Court. [APP 082-093].<br />
This is a reactive lawsuit filed for the sole purpose of avoiding state court jurisdiction.<br />
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit instead of intervening in the State Court Action because they<br />
knew that the requirements for removal jurisdiction could not be satisfied as a result of the City’s<br />
well-pleaded complaint.<br />
Moreover, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief and<br />
Damages instead of asserting claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment in a clear attempt <strong>to</strong> avoid<br />
dismissal under the Brillhart standard, the Declara<strong>to</strong>ry Judgment Act, or the Anti-Injunction Act.<br />
Plaintiffs cannot be permitted <strong>to</strong> manipulate the judicial process and obtain an improper result.<br />
A. Factual Background.<br />
II.<br />
BACKGROUND<br />
The Fund is a defined benefit plans for the employees of the City. A defined benefit plan<br />
guarantees that when a member retires, he will receive a specific monthly benefit for his lifetime<br />
that is calculated from a defined formula. Approximately 10,000 City employees—6,000 active<br />
and 3,600 retired—currently participate in the Fund. Plaintiff Van Houten is an active member<br />
of the Fund, and Plaintiff Hall is a participant in the Fund’s Deferred Retirement Option Plan.<br />
Over the past ten years, the Fund has not received sufficient income from investment<br />
returns and contributions <strong>to</strong> cover its pension obligations. In order <strong>to</strong> ensure the Fund’s longterm<br />
viability, the City Manager submitted a proposal <strong>to</strong> the City Council, which suggested<br />
amendments <strong>to</strong> the City’s retirement ordinance that would prospectively reduce benefits for both<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT Page 2
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current and future general employees and police officers. The first part of the City Manager’s<br />
proposal set forth amendments <strong>to</strong> the cost-of-living adjustment (the “COLA”), and the second<br />
part set forth comprehensive reductions <strong>to</strong> the defined benefits calculation. [APP 009-010]. The<br />
City Council voted <strong>to</strong> approve and adopt the prospective benefit reductions and COLA<br />
amendments proposed by the City Manager.<br />
These amendments apply prospectively only and do not affect benefits already accrued<br />
by current police officers and current general employees.<br />
Because some of the benefit<br />
reductions do affect future service of current employees, the City will use a bifurcated<br />
calculation <strong>to</strong> determine defined benefits upon retirement of current employees. [APP 011].<br />
This bifurcated calculation will protect the affected employees’ accrued benefits.<br />
B. Procedural Background.<br />
The City filed the State Court Action in Tarrant County District Court, seeking a<br />
declaration that the benefit reductions adopted by the City Council comply with Article XVI,<br />
Section 66(d) of the Texas Constitution. [APP 001-027]. Plaintiffs and the Fund subsequently<br />
worked <strong>to</strong>gether in an attempt <strong>to</strong> divest Tarrant County District Court of its proper jurisdiction.<br />
On November 19, 2012, three things happened: (1) the City received, by mail, the Fund’s<br />
Original Answer in the State Court Action, which raised affirmative defenses based on alleged<br />
violations of the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 10; 5th and 14th Amendments), 42<br />
U.S.C. § 1983, and the Texas Constitution (Article XVI, Section 66(d); Article I, Sections 16,<br />
17, 19, and 29); (2) Plaintiffs filed the instant federal lawsuit, alleging violations of the United<br />
States Constitution (Article I, Section 10; 5th and 14th Amendments), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the<br />
Texas Constitution (Article XVI, Section 66(d); Article I, Sections 16, 17, 19, and 29); and (3)<br />
the Fund removed the State Court Action <strong>to</strong> this Court. [Dkt. No. 1; APP 028-081].<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT Page 3
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III.<br />
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT<br />
For a number of reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims should not be permitted <strong>to</strong> go forward in this<br />
Court. First, the Court should decline <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction because a novel and<br />
complex issue of state law controls both this action and the State Court Action. Second, the<br />
Court should either dismiss or stay the remaining claims pending the outcome of the State Court<br />
Action. Not only are Plaintiffs’ claims premature and insufficiently pled, but also this case<br />
creates a very real threat of piecemeal litigation and inconsistent adjudications between the state<br />
and federal forums and imposes needless and duplicative expenses associated with prosecuting<br />
and defending two parallel cases. Moreover, Plaintiffs deliberately engaged in forum shopping<br />
by bringing this independent and parallel federal action. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss<br />
or stay this case pending the outcome of the State Court Action or, alternatively, order Plaintiffs<br />
<strong>to</strong> replead and make a more definite statement.<br />
IV.<br />
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES<br />
A. This Court Should Decline <strong>to</strong> Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’<br />
State-Law Claims and <strong>Dismiss</strong> Those Claims Without Prejudice.<br />
Supplemental jurisdiction extends a federal district court’s jurisdiction <strong>to</strong> claims that are<br />
within the same case or controversy as other claims over which the court has original<br />
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In other words, before a federal court can exercise supplemental<br />
jurisdiction, it must have either federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Halmekangas v. State<br />
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2010). Generally, a court must exercise<br />
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, a federal court<br />
may decline <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the following circumstances: (1) when<br />
the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) when the state-law claim substantially<br />
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, ALTERNATIVE MOTION<br />
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT Page 4
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predominates over any claims over which the court has original jurisdiction; (3) when all claims<br />
over which the federal court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed; and (4) when the<br />
state-law claim presents exceptional circumstances, and there are other compelling reasons for<br />
the court <strong>to</strong> decline jurisdiction. Id. at § 1367(c)(1)-(4). Because three of the four instances set<br />
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) exist in this lawsuit, this Court should decline <strong>to</strong> exercise<br />
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims and dismiss those claims without<br />
prejudice pursuant <strong>to</strong> Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).<br />
First, Plaintiffs raise a novel and complex issue of state law. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue<br />
that the City violated Article XVI, Section 66(d) of the Texas Constitution when it adopted<br />
amendments <strong>to</strong> the retirement ordinance that “directly and substantially impair, diminish and<br />
reduce the accrued retirement benefits of vested active and retired members of the Fund[.]”<br />
[Dkt. No. 1 at 38]. Plaintiffs further argue that these amendments violate the Texas Bill of<br />
Rights and United States Constitution because they impair Plaintiffs’ alleged contract with the<br />
City, result in a taking of private property without just compensation, and deprive Plaintiffs of<br />
their property without due course of the law. [Id. at 30-37, 41-50]. To find that the City has<br />
violated the Texas Bill of Rights or the United States Constitution, this Court first would have <strong>to</strong><br />
find that the City violated Article XVI, Section 66(d)—for that provision is the foundation for<br />
Plaintiffs’ claimed right <strong>to</strong> “benefits accrued.” Thus, in order <strong>to</strong> resolve any of Plaintiffs’ claims,<br />
this Court would be required <strong>to</strong> construe the phrase “benefits accrued” in Article XVI, Section<br />
66(d) before any Texas court has had the opportunity <strong>to</strong> do so. See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-<br />
0615 (2008) (“No Texas court has addressed this issue or otherwise construed article XVI,<br />
section 66.”). Because this important issue of Texas constitutional law presents a matter of first<br />
impression, this Court should decline <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §<br />
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1367(c)(1); Brim v. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co., 213 F. App’x 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (declining<br />
<strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claim where “[n]o Texas court . . . has<br />
decided a case on this issue.”); Rhodes v. Prince, Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-2343-D, 2010 WL<br />
3565235, at *6 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (declining supplemental jurisdiction because, “[g]iven that the<br />
case involves an unsettled area of state law, this court, by retaining jurisdiction and proceeding <strong>to</strong><br />
a final judgment on the merits, risks reaching the wrong result.”).<br />
Second, the state-law claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint predominate over<br />
the federal claims. As explained, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Texas Bill of Rights and United<br />
States Constitution arise directly from Plaintiffs’ construction of Article XVI, Section 66(d) of<br />
the Texas Constitution. [Dkt. No. 1 18]. Apart from the alleged right <strong>to</strong> receive “benefits<br />
accrued” provided under Article XVI, Section 66(d) of the Texas Constitution, Plaintiffs have no<br />
right <strong>to</strong> receive any retirement benefits. Indeed, Article XVI, Section 66 was proposed and<br />
adopted in direct response <strong>to</strong> the Texas Supreme Court’s 1937 decision in City of Dallas v.<br />
Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (Tex. 1937). In that case, the Texas Supreme Court held that<br />
pensioners have no right <strong>to</strong> receive pension benefits, whether those benefits have accrued or not:<br />
In our opinion, the rule that the right of a pensioner <strong>to</strong> receive monthly payments<br />
from the pension fund after retirement from service, or after his right <strong>to</strong><br />
participate in the fund has accrued, is predicated upon the anticipated continuance<br />
of existing laws, and is subordinate <strong>to</strong> the right of the Legislature <strong>to</strong> abolish the<br />
pension system, or diminish the accrued benefits of the pensioners thereunder, is<br />
undoubtedly the sound rule <strong>to</strong> be adopted.<br />
City of Dallas, 101 S.W.2d at 1013. This opinion remains good law <strong>to</strong> the extent it is not<br />
inconsistent with Article XVI, Section 66. Because this Court cannot reach Plaintiffs’ federallaw<br />
claims without first deciding this novel and complex issue of state law, Plaintiffs’ state law<br />
claims substantially predominate over the federal claims, and this Court should decline <strong>to</strong><br />
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2); United Mine Workers of Am. v.<br />
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Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966) (“[I]f it appears that the state issues substantially<br />
predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the<br />
comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice<br />
and left for resolution <strong>to</strong> state tribunals.”); James v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., No. 7:02-CV-0291-R,<br />
2004 WL 2002425, at *13 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (declining supplemental jurisdiction where “[s]tate<br />
law determines the scope and extent of the duties of a hospital[.]”).<br />
Finally, the state-law claims asserted by Plaintiffs present exceptional circumstances, and<br />
there are other compelling reasons for this Court <strong>to</strong> decline jurisdiction. The phrase “other<br />
compelling reasons” refers <strong>to</strong> those reasons that lead a court <strong>to</strong> conclude that declining<br />
jurisdiction best accommodates the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and<br />
comity. Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545,<br />
1557 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Cal. Dept. of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp.,<br />
533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). This is a reactive lawsuit filed for the sole purpose of avoiding<br />
state court jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit instead of intervening in the State<br />
Court Action because they knew that the requirements for removal jurisdiction could not be<br />
satisfied as a result of the City’s well-pleaded complaint. Indeed, the Fund asserted affirmative<br />
defenses in the State Court Action that raise exactly the same issues as the claims asserted by<br />
Plaintiffs herein. Because “[a]djudicating state-law claims in federal court while identical claims<br />
are pending in state court would be a pointless waste of judicial resources[,]” this Court should<br />
decline <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss those claims pursuant <strong>to</strong> Federal Rule<br />
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 1992);<br />
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).<br />
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B. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> this Lawsuit Because Plaintiffs’ Claims are Not Ripe.<br />
Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and damages are not ripe for adjudication and<br />
should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The<br />
ripeness doctrine primarily flows “from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the federal<br />
judicial power <strong>to</strong> the resolution of cases and controversies.” Pearson v. Holder, No. 3:09-CV-<br />
0682-O-BH, 2009 WL 2444748, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2009) (quoting Tex. v. U.S., 497 F.3d<br />
491, 496 (5th Cir. 2007)). The case-or-controversy requirement mandates that asserted claims<br />
are ripe before a federal court exercises jurisdiction over them. Id. (citing Nat’l Park Hospitality<br />
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003); Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509<br />
U.S. 43, 57-58 (1993)). Given this Article III requirement, “a ripeness inquiry is often required<br />
when a party is seeking pre-enforcement review of a law or regulation.” Id. (quoting Roark &<br />
Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 544 (5th Cir. 2008)).<br />
To satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III, a “plaintiff must show that<br />
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the<br />
challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate,<br />
not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02<br />
(1983) & citing Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 500 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing several<br />
fac<strong>to</strong>rs relevant <strong>to</strong> the ripeness inquiry, including whether the controversy has a direct and<br />
immediate impact on the plaintiff)). The key considerations are whether the issues are fit for<br />
judicial decision and the level of hardship <strong>to</strong> the parties resulting from withholding court<br />
consideration. Id. (citing Roark & Hardee LP, 522 F.3d at 545). With respect <strong>to</strong> the latter<br />
consideration, dismissal on grounds of ripeness is appropriate when “no irremediabl[y] adverse<br />
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consequences flow from requiring a later challenge.” Id. (quoting Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509<br />
U.S. at 58).<br />
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages in this Court.<br />
Specifically, Plaintiffs ask this court <strong>to</strong> “find Ordinance 20471-10-2012 <strong>to</strong> be void and of no<br />
effect <strong>to</strong> Plaintiffs as a violation of the above cited federal and state constitutional provisions[,]”<br />
“enjoin the City from any attempt <strong>to</strong> enforce the provisions of the subject Ordinance as it relates<br />
<strong>to</strong> vested and retired members of the Fund[,]” and “res<strong>to</strong>re the Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> the status quo ante[.]”<br />
[Dkt. No. 1 51(C)-(D)]. However, the amendments <strong>to</strong> the City’s retirement ordinance will not<br />
affect current members of the Fund, like Plaintiffs, until Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2013 at the earliest. [APP 094].<br />
In other words, for at least the next ten months, Plaintiffs will experience no change in their<br />
retirement benefits. Until Plaintiffs have been harmed, there is no “status quo ante” for this<br />
Court <strong>to</strong> “res<strong>to</strong>re,” and unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate a real and immediate threat of injury,<br />
this Court should not “enjoin the City from any attempt <strong>to</strong> enforce the provisions of the subject<br />
Ordinance as it relates <strong>to</strong> vested and retired members of the Fund.” [Dkt. No. 1 51(C)-(D)];<br />
Pearson, 2009 WL 2444748, at *3.<br />
Accordingly, the alleged controversy created by the<br />
amendments has no immediate impact on Plaintiffs, and the withholding of court consideration<br />
until a later date will cause them no more than insignificant hardship. Pearson, 2009 WL<br />
2444748, at *4.<br />
Because this lawsuit—which seeks both (1) <strong>to</strong> enjoin enforcement of the amendments<br />
and (2) an award of damages—is premature, this Court should dismiss for lack of subject matter<br />
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).<br />
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C. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> or Stay this Lawsuit on Abstention Grounds.<br />
Even if the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, it should abstain from hearing the<br />
dispute. “While it is well established that ‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar<br />
<strong>to</strong> proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having jurisdiction,’ McClellan<br />
v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910), it is equally well settled that a district court is ‘under no<br />
compulsion <strong>to</strong> exercise that jurisdiction,’ Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942),<br />
where the controversy may be settled more expeditiously in state court.” 1<br />
Will v. Calvert Fire<br />
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-63 (1978). Every federal court has inherent power <strong>to</strong> either dismiss<br />
or stay a case in favor of a parallel state court case based on considerations of “wise judicial<br />
administration, giving regard <strong>to</strong> conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive<br />
disposition of litigation.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817<br />
(1976). A dismissal or stay pending the outcome of litigation in another court involving the<br />
same or controlling issues is an appropriate means of avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort<br />
and waste of judicial resources. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th<br />
Cir. 1973) (recognizing that “duplicate litigation in federal and state courts abrades <strong>to</strong> some<br />
extent the spirit of federal-state comity . . . [and] concurrent litigation of the same controversy is<br />
perceived as interference”).<br />
For abstention <strong>to</strong> be warranted, the state and federal lawsuits must be parallel. Exact<br />
parallelism, however, is not required. MidTexas Int’l Ctr., Inc. v. Myronowicz, Civil Action No.<br />
3:05-CV-1957-R, 2006 WL 2285581, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2006) (citing Republicbank<br />
1<br />
Even if Judge McBryde were <strong>to</strong> deny the City’s Motion <strong>to</strong> Remand the State Court Action, there would be<br />
two parallel federal actions involving the same issues and substantially the same parties. Unlike parallel state and<br />
federal proceedings, if two federal cases involving the same controversy are pending at the same time, one of the<br />
two should be dismissed. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Generally, the<br />
“first-<strong>to</strong>-file rule” determines which case should be dismissed. Cadle Co. v. Whataburger, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603<br />
(5th Cir. 1999).<br />
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Dallas, Nat’l Assoc. v. McIn<strong>to</strong>sh, 828 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that<br />
precise identity of parties and issues is unnecessary)); Melo v. Gardere Wynne Sewell, No. 3-04-<br />
CV-2238-BD, 2005 WL 991600, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2005) (citing Romine v. Compuserve<br />
Corp., 160 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1998)). Instead, courts consider whether the actions involve<br />
“substantially the same parties” litigating “substantially the same issues.” Melo, 2005 WL<br />
991600, at *1 (citing Caminiti & Iatarola, Ltd. v. Behnke Warehousing, Inc., 962 F.2d 698, 700<br />
(7th Cir. 1992)); Myronowicz, 2006 WL 2285581, at *3.<br />
Thus, two actions may involve<br />
different parties and different causes of action and still be parallel so long as there is a substantial<br />
similarity between the two actions. See Melo, 2005 WL 991600, at *1 (finding actions parallel<br />
despite lack of precise identity between the parties); Caminiti, 962 F.2d at 700 (finding<br />
difference in the parties insufficient <strong>to</strong> destroy the parallel nature of the two substantially similar<br />
proceedings); Myronowicz, 2006 WL 2285581, at *4 (finding parallelism where both cases are<br />
based upon the same factual predicate and purpose, and the dispute in the federal lawsuit would<br />
effectively be resolved by the disposition of the state court lawsuit).<br />
This case and the first-filed State Court Action involve similar parties and issues. The<br />
City is the plaintiff in the State Court Action and the defendant in this case. Moreover, the issues<br />
raised by affirmative defense in the State Court Action are identical <strong>to</strong> those asserted as<br />
affirmative claims in this federal lawsuit. Litigating in both forums would be inconvenient,<br />
burdensome, and costly for the City. More importantly, it would undermine judicial economy<br />
and risk inconsistent adjudication of the claims. Accordingly, abstention is appropriate, and this<br />
action should be dismissed or stayed pending the outcome of the State Court Action.<br />
Courts in the Fifth Circuit apply one of two tests in deciding whether <strong>to</strong> stay a case<br />
because of an ongoing parallel state proceeding. New Eng. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 561 F.3d 392,<br />
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395 (5th Cir. 2009). When considering whether <strong>to</strong> abstain from exercising jurisdiction a<br />
declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment action, courts apply the standard provided in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance<br />
Company of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942). Barnett, 561 F.3d at 395 (quoting Southwind<br />
Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc., 23 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). Under<br />
Brillhart, a district court has “broad discretion in determining whether <strong>to</strong> hear an action brought<br />
pursuant <strong>to</strong> the Declara<strong>to</strong>ry Judgment Act.” Id. In cases involving claims for coercive relief,<br />
courts analyze a defendant’s request for abstention pursuant <strong>to</strong> the standards set forth in<br />
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United<br />
Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 424 U.S. 800).<br />
1. The Brillhart Standard Governs this Court’s Abstention Analysis.<br />
The Declara<strong>to</strong>ry Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), “is an enabling act, which confers<br />
discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right on a litigant.” Sherwin-Williams Co. v.<br />
Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Wil<strong>to</strong>n v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,<br />
287 (1995)). Abstention from exercising jurisdiction over a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment action is<br />
appropriate when another suit is pending in state court in which all the matters in controversy<br />
between the parties could be fully adjudicated. See Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494-95. In other<br />
words, a district court “should ascertain whether the questions in controversy between the parties<br />
<strong>to</strong> the federal suit . . . can be better settled in the proceeding pending in the state court.”<br />
Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494.<br />
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages in this Court. In reality,<br />
however, Plaintiffs seek declara<strong>to</strong>ry relief. “The essential distinction between a declara<strong>to</strong>ry<br />
judgment action and an action seeking other relief is that in the former no actual wrong need<br />
have been committed or loss have occurred in order <strong>to</strong> sustain the action.” Horne v. Firemen’s<br />
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Ret. Sys. of St. Louis, 69 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing U.S. v. Fisher–Otis Co., 496 F.2d<br />
1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 1974)). In other words, a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment action “allows a party <strong>to</strong><br />
obtain an ‘early adjudication of an actual controversy’” and “helps the parties avoid damages that<br />
might otherwise accrue.” Rhodes, 2009 WL 1885620, at *5 (quoting Collin Cnty., Tex. v.<br />
Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential <strong>to</strong> Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1990) &<br />
citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950)). Here, Plaintiffs’<br />
claims relate <strong>to</strong> amendments that will not take effect until Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2013. [APP 094]. Although<br />
Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges <strong>to</strong> this ordinance could be asserted properly as claims for<br />
declara<strong>to</strong>ry relief, Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and damages are premature. 2<br />
See infra<br />
at sec. IV(D). Accordingly, this Court either should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive<br />
relief and damages as premature, see supra at sec. IV(B), or treat them as claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry<br />
judgment. 3<br />
If this Court decides <strong>to</strong> treat Plaintiffs’ claims as claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry relief, Brillhart<br />
controls the abstention analysis. In applying the Brillhart standard, Fifth Circuit courts consider<br />
the following seven non-exclusive fac<strong>to</strong>rs: (1) whether there is a pending state action in which all<br />
2<br />
It is obvious why Plaintiffs did not assert claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment—<strong>to</strong> avoid application of the<br />
Brillhart standard and the Anti-Injunction Act. The Brillhart standard, which governs the dismissal or stay of<br />
declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment actions on abstention grounds, is less rigorous than the “exceptional circumstances” test in<br />
Colorado River due <strong>to</strong> the discretionary nature of the Declara<strong>to</strong>ry Judgment Act. Wil<strong>to</strong>n v. Seven Falls Co., 515<br />
U.S. 277, 287 (1995). And the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides that a federal court may not grant an injunction<br />
<strong>to</strong> stay state court proceedings, applies <strong>to</strong> claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry relief because “when a state lawsuit is pending,<br />
more often than not, issuing a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment will be tantamount <strong>to</strong> issuing an injunction—providing the<br />
declara<strong>to</strong>ry plaintiff an end run around the requirements of the Anti-Injunction Act.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm<br />
Bureau Fed’n, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs’ ulterior motive is evidenced by the facts that the<br />
claims for injunctive relief and damages (1) are premature and (2) are identical in substance <strong>to</strong> the Fund’s defensive<br />
claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment in the State Court Action.<br />
3<br />
Several courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have demonstrated a willingness <strong>to</strong> treat requests for various<br />
other types of relief as declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment suits. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964)<br />
(“we may and do consider this complaint [for injunctive relief] as an application for a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment under 28<br />
U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202”); Horne v. U.S., 519 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1975) (barring suit “seeking [tax] refund and<br />
also requesting that the deficiency be declared void” because declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgments may not issue in tax cases and<br />
“plaintiff's request that the deficiency assessment be declared void is an attempt <strong>to</strong> have the Court issue a declara<strong>to</strong>ry<br />
judgment”).<br />
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the matters in controversy may be fully litigated; (2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in<br />
anticipation of or in reaction <strong>to</strong> a lawsuit filed by the defendant; (3) whether the plaintiff engaged<br />
in forum shopping in bringing the suit; (4) whether possible inequities in allowing the<br />
declara<strong>to</strong>ry plaintiff <strong>to</strong> gain precedence in time or <strong>to</strong> change forums exist; (5) whether the federal<br />
court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses; (6) whether retaining the lawsuit in<br />
federal court would serve the purposes of judicial economy; and (7) whether the federal court is<br />
being called on <strong>to</strong> construe a state judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the<br />
court before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is pending. St. Paul Ins. Co.<br />
v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994). In applying these fac<strong>to</strong>rs, it is not necessary that<br />
all fac<strong>to</strong>rs weigh in favor of abstention for the Court <strong>to</strong> find that abstention is appropriate.<br />
Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 390. The Court must simply balance the fac<strong>to</strong>rs, keeping the<br />
basic principles of federalism, fairness and efficiency in mind. Id. The following fac<strong>to</strong>rs heavily<br />
favor abstention in the instant action.<br />
a. All of the Matters in Controversy May Be Fully Litigated in the State<br />
Court Action.<br />
“Abstention from a declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment action is ordinarily appropriate when the state<br />
offers an adequate alternative forum in which <strong>to</strong> resolve the particular dispute.” Southwind<br />
Aviation, 23 F.3d at 950. The State Court Action is currently pending in Tarrant County District<br />
Court—a court in which all of Plaintiffs’ claims may be fully litigated. In fact, prior <strong>to</strong> removing<br />
the State Court Action, the Fund asserted affirmative defenses that are substantively identical <strong>to</strong><br />
the claims asserted by Plaintiffs herein. It is a well-established principle of federalism that<br />
litigants may assert their federal defenses in state court because state courts are capable of<br />
adjudicating those defenses, subject always <strong>to</strong> final review by the United States Supreme Court.<br />
Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). Because the<br />
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State Court Action offers an adequate alternative forum for resolving Plaintiffs’ claims, this<br />
fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs in favor of abstention.<br />
b. Plaintiffs Filed This Lawsuit in Reaction <strong>to</strong> the State Court Action.<br />
This is a reactive lawsuit filed for the sole purpose of avoiding state court jurisdiction.<br />
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit instead of intervening in the State Court Action because they<br />
knew that the requirements for removal jurisdiction could not be satisfied as a result of the City’s<br />
well-pleaded complaint. Indeed, the affirmative defenses asserted by the Fund in the State Court<br />
Action are substantively identical <strong>to</strong> the claims asserted by Plaintiffs herein. Because “federal<br />
courts should generally decline <strong>to</strong> entertain reactive declara<strong>to</strong>ry actions[,]” this fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs in<br />
favor of abstention. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998).<br />
c. Plaintiffs Engaged in Forum Shopping in Bringing this Action.<br />
At the time Plaintiffs filed the instant action, they were fully apprised of the State Court<br />
Action and the issues involved therein. Yet, Plaintiffs chose <strong>to</strong> ignore the ongoing proceedings<br />
and involve an entirely different court <strong>to</strong> resolve the same issues. Because plaintiffs normally<br />
are entitled <strong>to</strong> select the federal forum, this abstention fac<strong>to</strong>r does not require proof of an<br />
improper motive in selectively shopping the forum. See USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dydek, No.<br />
Civ.A. SA-05-333-OG, 2006 WL 3068890, at *3 (W.D. Tex.. 2006) (“While its choice of forum<br />
was not improper or ill-motivated, [the third] Trejo fac<strong>to</strong>r is met in this case.”); Fireman’s Fund<br />
Ins. Co. v. Hlavinka Equip. Co., No. Civ.A.H-05-2515, 2005 WL 2792383, at *3 (S.D. Tex.<br />
2005) (“Notwithstanding the absence of any improper motives . . . the first three Trejo fac<strong>to</strong>rs<br />
favor dismissing this case in favor of the state court lawsuit”). Rather, the mere fact that<br />
Plaintiffs chose <strong>to</strong> bring this lawsuit with full awareness of the State Court Action means that it<br />
engaged in forum shopping—a fact that weighs in favor of abstention.<br />
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d. Plaintiffs Will Not Be Harmed If This Court <strong>Dismiss</strong>es Their Claims.<br />
Plaintiffs will not be harmed if the federal court dismisses this case in favor of the State<br />
Court Action. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint less than thirty days ago, and no additional actions<br />
have been taken, other than this Motion <strong>to</strong> <strong>Dismiss</strong>. Conversely, the City will be severely<br />
burdened if it is forced <strong>to</strong> litigate the same underlying issues in two different forums. Moreover,<br />
if this Court dismisses the instant action and Plaintiffs would like <strong>to</strong> be involved in the State<br />
Court Action, they can seek <strong>to</strong> intervene. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60. Because Plaintiffs will not be<br />
harmed if this Court dismisses their claims, this fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs in favor of abstention.<br />
e. Allowing This Action <strong>to</strong> Proceed in This Court Would Not Serve the<br />
Purposes of Judicial Economy.<br />
Judicial economy requires abstention in this case. It is clear that this action and the State<br />
Court Action involve substantially the same parties litigating substantially the same issues.<br />
Allowing this action <strong>to</strong> proceed will force the City <strong>to</strong> spend a substantial amount of time, money,<br />
and resources adjudicating roughly the same issues presented in the State Court Action. More<br />
importantly, this Court will have <strong>to</strong> allocate some of its limited judicial resources <strong>to</strong> adjudicate<br />
claims and disputes that will be addressed in the State Court Action. Finally, allowing this case<br />
<strong>to</strong> proceed presents a risk that the state and federal court proceedings could produce inconsistent<br />
adjudications. See Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 391 (“[a] federal court should be less<br />
inclined <strong>to</strong> hear a case if necessary parties are missing from the federal forum, because that leads<br />
<strong>to</strong> piecemeal litigation and duplication of effort in state and federal courts.”)<br />
Inconsistent<br />
adjudication is the ultimate waste of judicial resources.<br />
Therefore, this action should be<br />
dismissed in favor of the State Court Action, where there would be no risk of inconsistent<br />
adjudications and where the parties could focus their time, money, and efforts <strong>to</strong> more efficiently<br />
proceed <strong>to</strong> a final resolution of their disputes.<br />
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Because all of the applicable Trejo fac<strong>to</strong>rs weigh in favor of abstention, this Court should<br />
dismiss or stay this case pending the outcome of the State Court Action.<br />
2. Alternatively, the Abstention Fac<strong>to</strong>rs Set Forth in Colorado River Apply.<br />
If this Court disagrees that Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and damages should be<br />
treated as claims for declara<strong>to</strong>ry judgment, the Colorado River abstention doctrine applies and<br />
supports either dismissing or staying this lawsuit. Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine,<br />
a district court must consider whether a parallel federal court case presents exceptional<br />
circumstances in which considerations of wise judicial administration—in particular, the need <strong>to</strong><br />
conserve judicial resources and promote comprehensive disposition of litigation—counsel<br />
against exercising jurisdiction. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S.<br />
1, 15 (1983); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.<br />
The Supreme Court has set forth six instructive fac<strong>to</strong>rs, emphasizing that no single fac<strong>to</strong>r<br />
is determinative: (1) assumption by either court of jurisdiction over a res; (2) the relative<br />
inconvenience of the forums; (3) the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which<br />
jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; (5) whether and <strong>to</strong> what extent federal law<br />
provides the rules of decision on the merits; and (6) the adequacy of the state proceedings in<br />
protecting the rights of the parties invoking federal jurisdiction. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16; Colorado<br />
River, 424 U.S. at 818. While not a per se fac<strong>to</strong>r delineated in the Colorado River abstention<br />
doctrine, “the vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may<br />
influence the decision whether <strong>to</strong> defer <strong>to</strong> a parallel state litigation under Colorado River.” Allen<br />
v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 105 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Cone, 460 U.S. at 18<br />
n.20); Walker Centrifuge Servs., L.L.C. v. D & D Power, L.L.C., 550 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624-25<br />
(N.D. Tex. 2008).<br />
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The Colorado River abstention doctrine is not subject <strong>to</strong> precise rules, but rather should<br />
“be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view <strong>to</strong> the realities at hand,” taking in<strong>to</strong><br />
account “both the obligation <strong>to</strong> exercise jurisdiction and the combination of fac<strong>to</strong>rs counseling<br />
against that exercise.” See Cone, 460 U.S. at 16; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19. “The<br />
weight <strong>to</strong> be given <strong>to</strong> any one fac<strong>to</strong>r may vary greatly from case <strong>to</strong> case, depending on the<br />
particular setting of the case.” Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. The following fac<strong>to</strong>rs overwhelmingly<br />
support abstention in this case.<br />
a. State-Law Issues Predominate Over Federal Questions in This Action.<br />
Taking in<strong>to</strong> account the relevant facts of this case, the most significant Colorado River<br />
abstention fac<strong>to</strong>r is whether and <strong>to</strong> what extent federal law provides the rules of decision on the<br />
merits. See Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. Although the presence of a federal law issue normally weighs<br />
against the surrender of federal jurisdiction, the unique circumstances of this case dictate<br />
otherwise. Black Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 651 (quoting Cone, 460 U.S. at 26) (“[O]ur task . . . is <strong>to</strong><br />
ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional circumstances,’ the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that can<br />
suffice under Colorado River <strong>to</strong> justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.”). The core issue in<br />
both this action and the State Court Action is the proper construction of Article XVI, Section<br />
66(d) of the Texas Constitution. That provision creates Plaintiffs’ alleged right <strong>to</strong> receive<br />
“benefits accrued” and provides the necessary predicate for all of Plaintiffs’ other claims, both<br />
state and federal. See supra at sec. IV(A). Because “the fundamental issue underpinning this<br />
dispute turns wholly on a question of state law,” this fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs heavily in favor of abstention.<br />
Mourik Int’l B.V. v. Reac<strong>to</strong>r Servs. Int’l, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604-05 (S.D. Tex. 2002)<br />
(recognizing that when the fundamental issue underlying a dispute turns wholly on a question of<br />
state law, then the exercise of federal jurisdiction will not be supported).<br />
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b. This Action Poses a Threat of Piecemeal and Inconsistent<br />
Adjudication.<br />
Maintaining this federal action would present a danger of piecemeal and inconsistent<br />
adjudication between the state and federal actions. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. Identifying<br />
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation as a pertinent fac<strong>to</strong>r in Colorado River, the<br />
Supreme Court cited Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America:<br />
Gratui<strong>to</strong>us interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state<br />
court litigation should be avoided. Where a district court is presented with a<br />
claim such as was made here, it should ascertain whether the questions in<br />
controversy between the parties <strong>to</strong> the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed<br />
under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the proceeding<br />
pending in the state court. This may entail inquiry in<strong>to</strong> the scope of the pending<br />
state court proceeding and the nature of defenses open there. The federal court<br />
may have <strong>to</strong> consider whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfac<strong>to</strong>rily<br />
be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined,<br />
whether such parties are amenable <strong>to</strong> process in that proceeding, etc.<br />
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818 (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). The Fifth Circuit recently<br />
held that, “[i]f the state court action is able <strong>to</strong> resolve all of the claims involved in a dispute with<br />
respect <strong>to</strong> all of the parties involved while the federal court action is able <strong>to</strong> resolve the dispute<br />
only partially, this would weigh in favor of abstention.” Saucier v. Aviva Life & Annuity Co.,<br />
No. 11-60503, 2012 WL 5658711, at *4 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012).<br />
Under these standards, it is clear that the issues raised in this lawsuit can better be settled<br />
in the State Court Action. In order <strong>to</strong> resolve any of Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court would be<br />
required <strong>to</strong> construe the phrase “benefits accrued” in Article XVI, Section 66(d) of the Texas<br />
Constitution before any Texas court has had the opportunity <strong>to</strong> do so. See supra at sec. IV(A).<br />
Moreover, if this Court declines <strong>to</strong> exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law<br />
claims pursuant <strong>to</strong> 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), this Court will be able <strong>to</strong> resolve the dispute only<br />
partially. Id. This fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs heavily in favor of abstention.<br />
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c. The Tarrant County District Court Obtained Jurisdiction Prior <strong>to</strong><br />
This Court.<br />
The order in which jurisdiction was obtained also supports abstention in this case.<br />
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. This fac<strong>to</strong>r involves more than a determination of which<br />
complaint was filed first; instead, it concerns how far the two actions have progressed. Black<br />
Sea Inv., 204 F.3d at 651 (quoting Cone, 460 U.S. at 21). Here, neither action has progressed<br />
very far. In the State Court Action, the Fund filed its Original Answer prior <strong>to</strong> removing the<br />
action <strong>to</strong> federal court. Had the Fund not wrongfully removed the State Court Action on the<br />
same day that the City received a copy of the Fund’s Original Answer, the City promptly would<br />
have sent discovery requests and proceeded <strong>to</strong>ward summary judgment <strong>to</strong> resolve the legal issues<br />
in an expeditious fashion. Regardless, the developments in the State Court Action exceed those<br />
in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Court less than thirty days ago, and no<br />
additional actions have been taken, other than this Motion. The City has yet <strong>to</strong> file a responsive<br />
pleading and need not do so until this Court considers this Motion. Because the Tarrant County<br />
District Court obtained jurisdiction first and this federal action has not progressed as far as the<br />
State Court Action, this fac<strong>to</strong>r weighs in favor of dismissing or staying this case. See Colorado<br />
River, 424 U.S. at 820 (finding the absence of any proceedings in the federal district court, other<br />
than the filing of the complaint, significant in affirming abstention); Mourik Int’l, 182 F. Supp.<br />
2d at 604 (weighing this fac<strong>to</strong>r in favor of abstention even though the earlier-filed state court<br />
case sat dormant for many years).<br />
d. Plaintiffs Filed This Lawsuit in Reaction <strong>to</strong> the State Court Action.<br />
The vexatious and reactive nature of this federal lawsuit heavily supports abstention in<br />
this case. See Allen, 835 F.2d at 105 (quoting Cone, 460 U.S. at 18 n.20); Walker Centrifuge<br />
Servs., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 624-25; Garber v. Sir Speedy, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 267, 271 (N.D. Tex.<br />
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1995) (staying the federal lawsuit because “[l]itigants should be discouraged from filing suits in<br />
courts with concurrent jurisdiction for the purpose of avoiding adverse rulings in the court in<br />
which the action was originally filed.”). The complaint by which the instant action was initiated<br />
quite clearly was a reactive filing made for the purpose of avoiding state court jurisdiction.<br />
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit instead of intervening in the State Court Action because they<br />
knew that the requirements for removal jurisdiction could not be satisfied as a result of the City’s<br />
well-pleaded complaint. There is no question that Plaintiffs were fully aware of the State Court<br />
Action at the time they filed their Complaint. Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Robert Klausner, has<br />
served as outside counsel for the Fund for many years. It is no coincidence that the affirmative<br />
defenses asserted by the Fund in the State Court Action are substantively identical <strong>to</strong> the claims<br />
asserted by Plaintiffs herein. Lest there be any question whether the Colorado River abstention<br />
fac<strong>to</strong>rs favor dismissing or staying this case, the vexatious and reactive nature of Plaintiffs’<br />
federal lawsuit clearly tips the balance in favor of dismissal or stay. See Microsource, Inc. v.<br />
Superior Signs, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-2733-G, 1998 WL 119537, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1998).<br />
Based on the foregoing fac<strong>to</strong>rs and taking in<strong>to</strong> account the relevant facts of this case, this<br />
action should be dismissed or stayed pending final disposition of the State Court Action.<br />
D. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> or Stay This Lawsuit Pursuant <strong>to</strong> Its Inherent Power.<br />
A federal court also has the inherent power <strong>to</strong> stay or dismiss proceedings “<strong>to</strong> control the<br />
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and<br />
for litigants.” Itel Corp. v. M/S Vic<strong>to</strong>ria U. (Ex Pishtaz Iran), 710 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1983)<br />
(quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936)); Melo, 2005 WL 991600, at *3 n.3. “This<br />
power is necessarily incident <strong>to</strong> the judicial power granted under Article III of the Constitution.”<br />
Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit specifically has<br />
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recognized that, even when other standards for abstention are not satisfied, a district court<br />
maintains the inherent power <strong>to</strong> stay or dismiss a federal action. Primerica Life Ins. Co. v.<br />
Twyman, No. 3-01-CV-1659-BD, 2002 WL 83750, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2002); Melo, 2005<br />
WL 991600, at *3 n.3; see PPG Indus., 478 F.2d at 679-82.<br />
In Primerica, this Court recognized that a federal action could be stayed even if such a<br />
stay was not specifically supported by the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Primerica, 2002<br />
WL 83750, at *3. In so recognizing, the Court noted that “[s]uch a stay should not be granted<br />
unless the other tribunal has the power <strong>to</strong> render an effective judgment on issues that are<br />
necessary <strong>to</strong> the disposition of the stayed litigation.” Id. (citing Itel Corp., 710 F.2d at 203).<br />
Furthermore, in granting such a stay “[t]he court should also consider whether the federal action<br />
serves some purpose beyond mere duplication of effort.” Id. (citing PPG Indus., 478 F.2d at<br />
682). After considering these fac<strong>to</strong>rs, the Court indicated that it was inclined <strong>to</strong> stay the federal<br />
case in favor of the state court action. Id.<br />
This Court retains the inherent power <strong>to</strong> stay or dismiss this action, and, indeed, it should.<br />
Much like the state court in Primerica, the Tarrant County District Court clearly has the<br />
authority <strong>to</strong> render an effective judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant action. Furthermore,<br />
this action—which does not serve any meaningful purpose—will result in duplication of effort<br />
and, most certainly, will waste the time and resources of the courts, at<strong>to</strong>rneys, and litigants. See<br />
id. A dismissal or stay of this case is clearly warranted.<br />
E. This Court Should <strong>Dismiss</strong> This Lawsuit for Failure <strong>to</strong> State a Claim Upon Which<br />
Relief Can Be Granted.<br />
This Court also could dismiss this lawsuit for failure <strong>to</strong> state a claim upon which relief<br />
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Where a plaintiff has failed <strong>to</strong> allege facts sufficient <strong>to</strong><br />
recover on a claim that is recognized under controlling law, the claim is subject <strong>to</strong> dismissal.<br />
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Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.<br />
1992), rev’d on other grounds & remanded, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Alvarado Guerva v. INS, 902<br />
F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages. [Dkt.<br />
No. 1]. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged—nor can they allege—any damages or a real and<br />
immediate threat of harm. The amendments <strong>to</strong> the City’s retirement ordinance will not affect<br />
current members of the Fund, like Plaintiffs, until Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 2013 at the earliest. [APP 094]. Until<br />
Plaintiffs have been harmed, there is no “status quo ante” for this Court <strong>to</strong> “res<strong>to</strong>re,” and unless<br />
Plaintiffs can demonstrate a real and immediate threat of harm, this Court cannot “enjoin the City<br />
from any attempt <strong>to</strong> enforce the provisions of the subject Ordinance as it relates <strong>to</strong> vested and<br />
retired members of the Fund.” [Dkt. No. 1 51(C)-(D)]; Gladden v. Roach, 864 F.2d 1196,<br />
1198 (5th Cir. 1989). Because Plaintiffs cannot recover on any of the claims asserted, Plaintiffs<br />
have failed <strong>to</strong> state a claim upon which relief can be granted.<br />
F. This Court Should Order Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> Make a More Definite Statement.<br />
If the Court determines that Plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be<br />
granted, the City alternatively requests that Plaintiffs be ordered <strong>to</strong> make a more definite<br />
statement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Where a complaint is ambiguous or does not contain sufficient<br />
information <strong>to</strong> allow a responsive pleading <strong>to</strong> be framed, a <strong>motion</strong> for more definite statement is<br />
appropriate. Sisk v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t., 644 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).<br />
First, Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he provisions of the Fund in effect on Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 22, 2012<br />
constitute a binding contract for retirement benefits between the City and the Plaintiffs.” [Dkt.<br />
No. 1 31]. Throughout this Motion, the City assumes that Plaintiffs’ alleged “property and<br />
contract rights” arise from Article XVI, Section 66(d) of the Texas Constitution. To the extent<br />
that these rights arise from some other source, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient information<br />
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<strong>to</strong> allow the City <strong>to</strong> frame a responsive pleading.<br />
Second, Plaintiffs never explain their<br />
allegation that, “[t]he Ordinance is not, despite the City’s pronouncements <strong>to</strong> the contrary, a<br />
‘prospective’ alteration of the Fund’s benefits.” [Id. at 39]. Without any factual basis<br />
supporting this allegation, the City cannot respond appropriately.<br />
The City is entitled <strong>to</strong> full and fair notice of the bases for Plaintiffs’ claims. Because<br />
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not contain sufficient information <strong>to</strong> allow a responsive pleading <strong>to</strong> be<br />
framed, this Court should order Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> make a more definite statement.<br />
V.<br />
PRAYER FOR RELIEF<br />
WHEREFORE, the City respectfully requests that this Court dismiss or stay this case in<br />
favor of the State Court Action and grant any further relief <strong>to</strong> which the City is justly entitled.<br />
Alternatively, the City respectfully requests that this Court order Plaintiffs <strong>to</strong> make a more<br />
definite statement.<br />
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Respectfully submitted,<br />
/s/ Dee J. Kelly<br />
Dee J. Kelly<br />
State Bar No. 11217000<br />
Dee J. Kelly, Jr.<br />
State Bar No. 11217250<br />
Mary H. Smith<br />
State Bar No. 24075093<br />
KELLY HART & HALLMAN LLP<br />
201 Main Street, Suite 2500<br />
Fort Worth, Texas 76102<br />
Telephone: (817) 332-2500<br />
Facsimile: (817) 878-9280<br />
Gerald Pruitt<br />
State Bar. No. 16369200<br />
FORT WORTH CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE<br />
1000 Throckmor<strong>to</strong>n Street<br />
Fort Worth, Texas 76102<br />
Telephone: (817) 392-7616<br />
Facsimile: (817) 392-8359<br />
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT<br />
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE<br />
I certify that I conferred with Ray N. Hosack, counsel for Plaintiff, regarding the relief<br />
requested in this Motion on December 6, 2012, via telephone. Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that<br />
he opposed the Motion. Therefore, it is submitted <strong>to</strong> the Court for consideration.<br />
/s/ Dee J. Kelly, Jr.<br />
Dee K. Kelly, Jr.<br />
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE<br />
I electronically filed the foregoing document on December 6, 2012 with the Clerk of<br />
Court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the CM/ECF system of the<br />
Court which will send a “Notice of Electronic Filing” <strong>to</strong> the following at<strong>to</strong>rneys of record:<br />
Robert D. Klausner<br />
KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN & LEVINSON<br />
10059 N.W. 1st Court<br />
Plantation, Florida 33324<br />
Telephone: (954) 916-1202<br />
Facsimile: (954) 916-1232<br />
Ray N. Hosack<br />
HOSACK LAW FIRM<br />
904 Collier Street<br />
Fort Worth, Texas 76102<br />
Telephone: (817) 882-9548<br />
Facsimile: (817) 882-9586<br />
/s/ Dee J. Kelly<br />
Dee J. Kelly<br />
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