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US-China Commission Report - Fatal System Error

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218<br />

Barriers to the Transfer of Environmental Goods—Cont.<br />

During the Doha negotiations in November 2007, the United<br />

States and the European Union proposed a list of 43 goods, including<br />

solar panels, boilers, and thermostats, but <strong>China</strong> and<br />

other developing countries advocated a project-based approach<br />

under which individual countries could identify goods as ‘‘environmental<br />

goods’’ when included in a national project with an<br />

environmental objective. 213 In addition to this disagreement,<br />

Brazil desires to include biofuels (considered to be an agricultural<br />

product) as an environmental good, although the other<br />

goods on the proposed tariff lists are all industrial goods. The<br />

United States and the European Union oppose this suggestion. It<br />

appears that <strong>China</strong> may find this deadlock convenient for delaying<br />

movement on this issue.<br />

<strong>China</strong> is investing heavily in developing its own clean energy<br />

technologies and may decide that protecting these nascent operations<br />

is more important than opening its market to new technologies.<br />

214<br />

Conclusions<br />

• <strong>China</strong>’s energy and environmental policy institutions are weak,<br />

and without significant support and strengthening by the PRC<br />

leadership, these institutions will be incapable of reversing the<br />

trends of <strong>China</strong>’s energy consumption and environmental pollution.<br />

• The most obvious explanation for the weakness of <strong>China</strong>’s energy<br />

and environmental institutions is the government’s lack of commitment<br />

to devote the necessary resources to achieving substantial<br />

progress in these arenas. The government demonstrated in<br />

its preparations for the Beijing Olympic Games that it has the<br />

ability to use governmental mechanisms to develop and enforce<br />

environmental policies to achieve its objectives—specifically improving<br />

the quality of Beijing’s air.<br />

• Given the transboundary environmental impact of <strong>China</strong>’s unbridled<br />

energy consumption, the United States has a keen interest<br />

in supporting <strong>China</strong>’s energy and environmental bureaucracy to<br />

improve its transparency, expertise, and capacity to promulgate<br />

and enforce regulations designed to reduce emissions and increase<br />

energy efficiency.<br />

• Chinese leaders are aware of the need to moderate the growth<br />

of energy consumption and to improve energy efficiency but to<br />

date they have not made a commitment to reduce carbon dioxide<br />

emissions at the cost of economic development.<br />

• <strong>China</strong> participates in multilateral negotiations to address climate<br />

change but has major difficulty supporting an agreement that requires<br />

it to reduce its net emissions. Chinese negotiating efforts<br />

attempt to shift the burden to reduce emissions to developed, industrialized<br />

nations and to escape being placed in this group.

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