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176 112. Reinhard Drifte, ‘‘Japanese-Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea—between military confrontation and economic cooperation,’’ Working paper, Asia Research Centre (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK: August 2008). http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/asiaResearchCentre/pdf/Working Paper/ARCWorkingPaper24Drifte2008.pdf. 113. Reinhard Drifte, ‘‘Japanese-Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea—between military confrontation and economic cooperation,’’ Working paper, Asia Research Centre (London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK: August 2008). http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/asiaResearchCentre/pdf/Working Paper/ARCWorkingPaper24Drifte2008.pdf. 114. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, ‘‘CNOOC Pledges to Share Investment, Risk with Japan on Joint Development of East China Sea,’’ June 27, 2008. http://win.mofcom.gov.cn/en/topics/topicldetail.aspid=4324. 115. CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] World Factbook, ‘‘Paracel Islands.’’ https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pf.html. Last updated on October 23, 2008. 116. CIA World Factbook, ‘‘Spratly Islands.’’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg. html. Last updated on October 23, 2008. 117. U.S. Institute of Peace, ‘‘The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy,’’ Special Report no. 18, August 1996. http://www.usip.org/pubs/ specialreports/early/snyder/SouthlChinalSea1.html. 118. ‘‘Whale and Spratlys,’’ Economist, December 13, 2007. http://www.economist. com/world/asia/displaystory.cfmstorylid=10286863; CIA World Factbook, ‘‘Spratly Islands.’’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.html. 119. Cai Fengzhen et al., Kongtian Yiti Zuozhan Xue [Integrated Aerospace Operations] (PLA Press, Beijing: 2006), pp. 90–91. 120. Baker Spring, ‘‘An Inchoate Process for the International Regulation of Military Activities in Space,’’ Space and Defense, Fall 2006, 7. 121. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. Department of State, Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm#signatory. 122. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. Department of State, Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm#signatory. 123. John Sheldon et al., ‘‘Forum on National Security Space: Space Issues in 2007,’’ Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy (George Marshall Institute, Washington, DC: January 22, 2007), p. 14. 124. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008. 125. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008. 126. Ren Xiaofeng, ‘‘Zhuanyu jingjiqu Junshi Liyong de Falu Wenti: Zhongguode Guanjiao’’ [Legal Issues Regarding Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ and Adjacent Airspace: A Chinese Perspective]. Chinalawinfo.com. 127. Statement by the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Debate on Outer Space at the First Committee of the 62nd Session of the UNGA (New York, October 22, 2007. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t374868.htm. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hu Xiaodai at the Plenary of the 2003 Session of the Conference on Disarmament on PAROS. Geneva, July 31, 2003. http://www.nti.org/db/china/ chindocs/huxiaodil073103.htm. The PAROS initiative is a response by some countries to the fact that there is no multilateral agreement banning the deployment of weapons (except WMD [weapons of mass destruction] in the Outer Space Treaty) in outer space. The initial goals of member states to the PAROS initiative are confidence-building and transparency measures. 128. Statement by Head of Chinese Delegation Ambassador Hu Xiaodi at the Thematic Debate of 1st Committee of UNGA 60th Session on Outer Space, October 12, 2005. http://www.china-un.org/eng/xnyfgk/t216359.htm. 129. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008. 130. Chen Qiang, Chinese Practice in Public International Law, Chinese Journal of International Law, 3, 2003, 17–28. 131. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: March 2008), pp. 18–21.
177 132. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, (Washington, DC: March 2008), p. 21. 133. John Sheldon et al., ‘‘Forum on National Security Space: Space Issues in 2007,’’ Washington Roundtable on Science & Public Policy (George Marshall Institute, Washington, DC: January 22, 2007), pp. 15–16. 134. China’s National Defense in 2006, Section II: National Defense Policy. http:// english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/defense2006/defense2006(2).html. 135. ‘‘PRC: PLA Strategist Chen Zhou Explains Active Defense Strategy in ‘New Era’,’’ Xuexi Shibao Online, March 18, 2008. OSC ID: CPP20080818436001; Daniel M. Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese Military: The ‘Historic Missions’ of the Chinese Armed Forces’’ (CAN Corporation, Alexandria, VA: June 2008), p. 1. OSC ID: CPP2008060632500. 136. Comprehensive national power is a concept that was developed by Chinese scholars in the early 1980s as a multidimensional measure of a nation’s international influence and standing. In contrast to Cold War era measurements of national power that mainly judged a nation’s military capability, this concept, as proposed by Chinese scholars Wu Chunqiu and Yan Xuetong, includes in its assessment a country’s military power, access to strategic materials and technologies, diplomatic influence, and economic power, among other factors. Other factors could include industrial power; scientific and technological power; strength of foreign, international activities; ability to articulate interests in the international community; geography; population; strength of nationalism (nationalist sentiment); and international alliances and friendships. Wu Chunqiu, ‘‘Da ZhuanlueLun [Grand Strategy: A Chinese View]’’ (Military Science Press, Beijing: 1998), pp. 55–58; Yan Xuetong, ‘‘Zhongguo Jueqi de Shili Diwei’’ [‘‘China’s Overall Strength and Its Peaceful Rise’’], Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue [Science of International Politics], Vol. 2, 2005, 1–25. See also ‘‘China and Southeast Asia: Building Influence, Addressing Fears,’’ in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA: October 2006), p. 291. 137. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Roy D. Kamphausen, February 27, 2008. 138. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Roy D. Kamphausen, February 27, 2008. 139. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Roy D. Kamphausen, February 27, 2008. 140. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Roy D. Kamphausen, February 27, 2008. 141. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Roy D. Kamphausen, February 27, 2008. 142. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Peter A. Dutton, February 27, 2008. 143. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Robert G. Sutter, February 27, 2008. 144. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008; Cai Fengzhen et al., KongtianYiti Zuozhan Xue, 58. Cai Fengzhen et al., Kongtian Zhanchang yu Zhongguo Kongjun [The Aerospace Battlefield and China’s Air Force] (PLA Press, Beijing: 2004). 145. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008. 146. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, testimony of Philip Meek, February 27, 2008. 147. Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, ‘‘Fazhizhan de Hanyi yu Yunyong [The Utility and Implications of Legal Warfare],’’ in Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, eds. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, pp. 428–434. 148. ‘‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law,’’ People’s Daily online, updated March 14, 2005. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314–176746.html.
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USCC 2008 ANNUAL REPORT
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1 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS of the U.
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U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY RE
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CONTENTS Page TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO
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INDEX OF TABLES AND FIGURES 2008 RE
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2 economic, security, diplomatic, a
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4 China’s Capital Investment Vehi
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6 • Antidumping penalties imposed
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8 rities of other nations and cause
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10 Conclusions China’s Current En
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12 other countries that rely on Chi
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14 vein, there appears to be a stro
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16 lator of all financial services
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18 • Identifying substandard ship
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20 During the year, China continued
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22 U.S. inspections of prisons to e
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24 to the uncertainty during the su
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26 U.S. exports to China were 20 pe
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28 currency for RMB to obtain forei
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30 of supply and demand in the fore
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32 troversial is whether the treaty
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34 erty (IP) rights holders from en
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36 New Currency Rules China’s und
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38 brought in 2006 by the United St
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40 sectoral talks on farm trade. In
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42 tinue buying foreign exchange, t
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44 difference between temporary, th
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46 The Administrative Structure and
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48 U.S. dollar and has appreciated
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50 Development Committee and other
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52 drawn some fairly conventional l
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54 demonstrates the great length to
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56 cent revelations of the activiti
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58 of China by way of the investmen
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60 Ltd. attempted to acquire the U.
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62 not be applied necessarily in th
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64 economy—from ports and telecom
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66 asset allocations, benchmarks, a
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68 the investments, viewing them as
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70 and printed circuits in order to
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72 2006, R&D spending in China from
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74 tios—two of Asia’s technolog
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76 The last time the United States
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78 pendent players. However, this m
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80 aviation industry and has a role
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SECTION 4: A CASE STUDY OF THE LOCA
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85 The rise of industrial fish farm
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87 According to the Southern Shrimp
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89 the increasing import base. The
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91 nated fish are discovered after
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93 At the time this Report was comp
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95 port with the hope it will be ad
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97 Restaurants also are exempted by
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99 entire dusted product is from Ch
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101 written and approved, which is
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RECOMMENDATIONS The U.S.-China Trad
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105 gress could enable consumers to
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107 26. ‘‘China Central Bank to
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109 82. USTR, ‘‘2008 National T
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111 121. U.S.-China Economic and Se
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113 173. ‘‘China’s Stake in B
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117 282. International Working Grou
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121 361. Food & Water Watch, ‘‘
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123 Louisiana and the U.S. Gulf Coa
Page 136 and 137: 126 While witnesses concluded that
Page 138 and 139: 128 China’s Nonproliferation Comm
Page 140 and 141: 130 State during the interdiction o
Page 142 and 143: 132 Northwest National Laboratory
Page 144 and 145: 134 UN Security Council resolutions
Page 146 and 147: 136 ployment, this change would inf
Page 148 and 149: 138 ing Iran’s missile program on
Page 150 and 151: SECTION 2: CHINA’S VIEWS OF SOVER
Page 152 and 153: 142 ficing the principle behind it.
Page 154 and 155: 144 baseline. Other states enjoy ov
Page 156 and 157: 146 India, Vietnam, Taiwan, and oth
Page 158 and 159: 148 as, ‘‘What constitutes a sp
Page 160 and 161: 150 The proposed PAROS treaty itsel
Page 162 and 163: 152 enhance China’s assertions of
Page 164 and 165: 154 Media and Public Opinion Warfar
Page 166 and 167: SECTION 3: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF
Page 168 and 169: 158 Today, China’s space program
Page 170 and 171: 160 The Management Structure for Ch
Page 172 and 173: 162 • Launching geostationary orb
Page 174 and 175: 164 bility to conduct cyber operati
Page 176 and 177: 166 tions between the NIPRNet and t
Page 178 and 179: RECOMMENDATIONS China’s Prolifera
Page 180 and 181: 170 ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 2 1. U.S.-
Page 182 and 183: 172 41. U.S.-China Economic and Sec
Page 184 and 185: 174 80. Janice E. Thomson, ‘‘St
Page 188 and 189: 178 149. U.S.-China Economic and Se
Page 190 and 191: 180 198. U.S.-China Economic and Se
Page 193 and 194: CHAPTER 3 CHINA’S ENERGY AND ENVI
Page 195 and 196: 185 A growing share of energy deman
Page 197 and 198: 187 pleted. Without the discovery a
Page 199 and 200: 189 A Survey of China’s Interests
Page 201 and 202: 191 projects that imports of natura
Page 203 and 204: 193 and design of the units. 71 Chi
Page 205 and 206: 195 dioxide, nitrous oxide, mercury
Page 207 and 208: 197 sions are realized and producti
Page 209 and 210: 199 ferent interests that motivate
Page 211 and 212: 201 the oil, gas, coal, and power i
Page 213 and 214: 203 fluential figures in business a
Page 215 and 216: 205 The Terminology Used to Describ
Page 217 and 218: 207 velop international and domesti
Page 219 and 220: 209 that growth must occur in an en
Page 221 and 222: 211 servation. Officials highlighte
Page 223 and 224: 213 grated Gasification Combined Cy
Page 225 and 226: 215 Obtaining sufficient movement f
Page 227 and 228: 217 nology and finding ways to make
Page 229 and 230: 219 • As the negotiations for a p
Page 231 and 232: 221 ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 1. U.S.-
Page 233 and 234: 223 tent.aspxdata=EmergingMktlconte
Page 235 and 236: 225 13, 2008. These tools include s
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Page 239 and 240:
229 ergy Group, Environmental Energ
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CHAPTER 4 CHINA’S FOREIGN ACTIVIT
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233 China will seek to displace the
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235 China to help resolve them. 22
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237 presenting itself as an accepta
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239 China’s infrastructure invest
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241 IMF. The Angolan government exp
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243 China’s Conventional Arms Sal
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245 Kurlantzick testified that Chin
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247 pendent of their legislatures a
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249 diplomacy and in the internatio
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SECTION 2: CHINA’S RELATIONSHIPS
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PART 1: TAIWAN The Significance of
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255 PRC pressure directed against T
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257 this end. 150 (Additional infor
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259 Discussions Regarding Arms Sale
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261 ernment is committed to set ann
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263 • Arms purchases from the Uni
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265 China, appreciation of the RMB,
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267 Days later, although they did n
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Introduction PART 3: THE REPUBLIC O
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271 South Korean officials emphasiz
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273 mount among the ROK’s diploma
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275 Even after approving these grad
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277 exercising undue influence—be
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RECOMMENDATIONS China’s Expanding
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281 ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4 1. U.S.-
Page 293 and 294:
283 42. UN Conference on Trade and
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285 87. U.S.-China Economic and Sec
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287 134. Calculation performed by C
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289 184. ‘‘Factbox: Key facts o
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CHAPTER 5 CHINA’S MEDIA AND INFOR
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293 The central role of the Propaga
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295 thoritarian post-Soviet governm
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297 Some of the measures taken by C
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299 Images of ‘‘Jing-Jing’’
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301 Legislation was introduced duri
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303 In addition to promoting a powe
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305 Chinese Government Restrictions
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307 search engine and the servers s
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309 media, the Internet, popular en
Page 321 and 322:
311 ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 5 1. David
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313 image-of-internet-police-jingji
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315 90. U.S.-China Economic and Sec
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318 China’s prison labor system,
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320 most literal sense, the term la
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322 treatment of Falun Gong practit
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324 lowing its signing. According t
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326 granted just three of 18 prison
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328 Mr. Marck, who is the partial o
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330 complaints involving internatio
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RECOMMENDATIONS • The Commission
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334 28. U.S. Department of Homeland
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COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE COMMISSIO
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339 gram. By expanding this volunta
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341 27. The Commission recommends t
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343 43. The Commission recommends t
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345 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONE
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347 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONE
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APPENDIX I UNITED STATES-CHINA ECON
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351 (iii) make all subsequent appoi
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353 (2) Information. The Commission
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355 In each Section and Subsection
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357 ecutive Schedule under section
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360 member of the Academic Advisory
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362 nomic, defense, and foreign pol
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364 formulated by the Committee suc
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366 Commissioner Shea is an attorne
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368 than twenty years, leaving his
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APPENDIX III PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE
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373 May 20, 2008: Public Hearing on
Page 385 and 386:
APPENDIX IIIA LIST OF WITNESSES TES
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377 Alphabetical Listing of Panelis
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379 Alphabetical Listing of Panelis
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382 REPUBLIC OF KOREA, JAPAN AND TA
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APPENDIX V LIST OF U.S. SANCTIONS I
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387 Date Imposed Entity/Person Cont
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APPENDIX VII ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRO
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393 UNGA UN PKO USD USDA USITC USTR
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