US-China Commission Report - Fatal System Error

143
The assertion of control over Taiwan also has strategic value for
China. In an article published in the Naval War College Review,
Chris Rahman writes,
Taiwan’s physical position complicates free access to the
Pacific from the mainland. The island does not block that
access entirely, but its possession by a maritime power inimical
to China might threaten both China and China’s
sea-lanes, both eastward to the Pacific and down through
the South China Sea. On the other hand, should Taiwan
fall into Beijing’s hands, China would be better able to
prosecute sea-denial operations and sea-lane disruption
against the other Northeast Asian states and their American
ally, should the need arise. Accordingly, the ‘recovery’
of Taiwan represents part of the rationale for the pursuit
of offshore active defense and greater defensive depth; in
the longer term, the island would play a leading role in the
execution of that very strategy. Chinese strategists well understand
the relevance of the island to the accomplishment
of China’s wider maritime goals and the development of a
successful national maritime strategy, as reflected by the
thoughts of two PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] officers:
‘‘China is semiconcealed by the first island chain. If
it wants to prosper, it has to advance into the Pacific, in
which China’s future lies. Taiwan, facing the Pacific in the
east, is the only unobstructed exit for China to move into
the ocean. If this gateway is opened for China, then it becomes
much easier for China to maneuver in the West Pacific.’’
90 [emphasis added]
With physical control over Taiwan, China has an opening
through the ‘‘first island chain’’ and therefore could position itself
for broader expansion into the Pacific region. China also could expand
its maritime boundaries by establishing its baseline from the
coast of Taiwan. This would significantly expand both its coastal
territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and thus
provide new waters for resource exploitation and fishing rights.
China’s Interpretation of the Law of the Sea Treaty
China has open disputes regarding the extent of its sovereignty
along its maritime borders, and these territorial claims affect key
U.S. allies and partners in the region, including Japan and Korea.
China became a party to the United Nations (UN) Convention on
the Law of the Sea (‘‘Law of the Sea Treaty’’) in 1996. 91 The Law
of the Sea Treaty defines territorial waters as ‘‘up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles’’ measured from a baseline defined as
the ‘‘low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal State.’’ 92 State sovereignty also
extends upward from those boundaries into airspace. The treaty
recognizes the right of coastal states to an EEZ, an area beyond
and adjacent to territorial waters in which states have ‘‘sovereign
rights,’’ including rights over living or nonliving natural resources
and the right to explore and exploit the resources in the zone. According
to the treaty, the EEZ extends 200 miles from the coastal