a comparative study of a Roman frontier province. - Historia Antigua

-402-
5: 1
22. Augustus, Res Gestae, 31, recorded embassies from India, the Bastar-
nians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Albanians, Iberians and Medes. Vergil
(ten, VI, 791-97) clearly believed that the Indians and Garamantes,
having accepted Roman hegemony, were part of her Imperium. Similarly
Suetonius, Aug, 48, referred to the reges socii as integral parts of
the empire (membra partesque imperii).
23. Luttwak 1976,55-80, makes essential reading on this question.
24. Brunt 1963,170-76.
25. Syme 1939 and Millar 1977; 1982, are fundamental studies of the position
and power of the Princeps. The award of the ornamenta triumphalis was
carefully rationed and the acclamation of imperator was not granted to
a private citizen after Junius Blaesus, the uncle of Sejanus. Dolabella
who succeeded Blaesus in Africa and ended the Tacfarinan war was
denied the ornamenta so as not to diminish Blaesus' achievement, Tacitus,
Ann, IV, 25. Under Claudius the ornamenta were awarded to two generals
for unorthodox achievements; Corbulo for digging a canal and Curtius
Rufus for prospecting for silver, Tacitus, Ann, II, 18-20. See also
note
26 below.
26. The legions were generally located in provinces governed by Imperial
legates or prefects. After Marcus Primus, governor of Macedonia, was
condemned for treason fdr making an unauthorised campaign, even the
senatorial provinces were made de facto subject to the control of the
Princeps, Dio LIV, 3,2. Only in Africa was a legion left under the
command of a governor in a senatorial province and this situation was
remedied by the reform of Gaius in A. D. 39-40, Tacitus, Ann, IV, 48;
Dio LIX, 20,7. From the second century it became increasingly
necessary for the Princeps himself to be involved in all major
warfare, Millar 1982,12-15.
27. Birley 1974a, 15-19; Millar 1982,13.
28. Tacitus, Agri c., 39-42; Luttwak 1976,124-6; Grant 1974,46-51.
29. Luttwak 1976,100-04,108-11, prefers to interpret these as "frontier
rectification" wars rather than as merely expansionist adventures
by indicidual emperors. The truth probably lay between these two
view-points. The annexation of Dacia was ultimately necessary because
of Decebalus' refusal to serve as a reliable client and the destabilisa-
tion he was causing along the entire Danube sector. The Parthian war
is less easy to justify on strategic grounds, since, having gained a
strategic success in Armenia, Trajan seems to have become carried away
with his own success.
30. Birley 1974a, 115-19, suggests that the Antonine advance north of
Hadrian's Wall was deliberately conceived as a "sop to the militares
virf" and a snub to Hadrian's memory.
31. Tacitus, Ann, II, 18-20; Millar 1982,7-11, for further examples.
32. Magie 1950,550-61; Mitford 1980,1175-179, for a detailed account
of the military and political struggles over Armenia under Nero.
33. See, for instance, Breeze 1982,42-72, for a study of frontier
developments in northern Britain and Scotland prior to the construc-
tion of the two walls.
34. Frontinus, Strategemata and the lost De re militari; Caesar, Wars
(Gallic, Civil, Alexandrian, African and Spanish - whether or not
written by Caesar himself, they reflect the military views of the
establishment); pseudo-Hyginus, de munitionibus castrorum; Vegetius,
Epitome rei militaris. The military detail given by other Latin
writers such as Tacitus, Sallust, Vitruvius and Livy or Greek
authors such as Arrian, Dio and Josephus reinforce this impression.
35. On the officer ranks, see Webster 1979,116-22; Watson 1969,77-88.