A4_PHEN-MIND_n7
A4_PHEN-MIND_n7
A4_PHEN-MIND_n7
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ESSION<br />
2<br />
SESSION 2<br />
contributed papers<br />
Alfredo Tomasetta (Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori, Pavia)<br />
We are Not, Fundamentally, Persons<br />
Marc Andree Weber (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg)<br />
Baker’s First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem<br />
Sofia Bonicalzi (Università di Pavia)<br />
Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything out Lynne Baker’s<br />
Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility<br />
Alan McKay (The Queen's University of Belfast, Northern Ireland)<br />
Constitution, Mechanism, and Downward Causation<br />
Treasa Campbell (New Europe College, Bucharest)<br />
A Humean Insight into the Epistemic Normativity of the Belief in the Self<br />
Bianca Bellini (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)<br />
Towards a Faithful Description of the First-Person Perspective Phenomenon:<br />
Embodiment in a Body That Happens to Be Mine<br />
Patrick Eldridge (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)<br />
Observer Memories and Phenomenology<br />
Gaetano Albergo (Università di Catania)<br />
The First-Person Perspective Requirement in Pretense<br />
Giuseppe Lo Dico (Università Cattolica, Milano)<br />
Introspection Illusion and the Methodological Denial of the First-Person Perspective<br />
Valentina Cuccio (Università di Palermo)<br />
The Notion of Representation and the Brain
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