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6: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE IRON CURTAIN inherent in the material itself that is valuable and uses the provocative example of Stonehenge to make her point that it “is basically a collection of rocks in a field” (Smith 2006:3). Criticism of this statement from archaeologist Brit Solli on the other hand counterclaims that “Stonehenge’s essence is its durable ‘stoniness’” and that there is something inherent in its materiality and permanence (Solli 2011:45). What is missed in this discussion, as shown by Pétursdóttir, is to recognise the hierarchy that is implied within these discussions of tangible or intangible, with one seen as better than the other. Pétursdóttir agrees with Smith that Stonehenge is exactly that, a collection of rocks in a field but what she disagrees with is Smith’s way of seeing this to be meaningless and instead she claims that the ‘stoniness’ should be seen as valuable and important (Pétursdóttir 2013:47). She writes “Conversely though, it is not her [Smith’s] statement that ‘Stonehenge… is basically a collection of rocks in a field’… that is problematic; that is in fact exactly what it is. The problem, however, is to see that as meaningless. What characterizes the intangible heritage discourse (or even heritage discourses in general), as well as much of interpretative archaeology, is not only that meaning, value and significance are seen as inevitably subjective, but also that meaning is confused with or restricted, rather to symbolical or other modes of derivative meanings… is it so that Stonehenge itself, in its simple ‘stoniness’… brings nothing of value to the encounters with the subjective experiences that for centuries have circulated around it” (Pétursdóttir 2013:47, emphasis in original). Although the example of Stonehenge may appear exaggerated it is exactly because of its status as a monumental heritage that it becomes interesting and brings several questions forward. Most of all, I believe, it makes it clear that the discussions in which we place tangible and intangible against each other are not really going to bring the discussion of heritage forward. Similarly to discussions of the different sources we deal with in our research we have to be open to the different types of heritage we are faced with, tangible or intangible, and recognise the value in both. It is here that I fear this material turn is slipping over into the wrong type of focus in which strengthening the value and status of physical objects also means intensifying the divide between objects and other sources even further and with that we risk falling down in Andrén’s in-betweeness even further. I believe this material turn has its strength in the way it helps us interpret our sources in order not to load them with cultural and social values they are unfit to hold. It can help us to have an open and holistic methodology towards our sources so that we do not subject our narratives and metaphors to the mater- 191

AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE IRON CURTAIN ial that we study and by making sure we do not make objects mere props in our history writing. Moving in memories In a story where we start at the materials themselves time is less relevant. We can see in the landscape today how the materials from all periods are intermingled and mixed, all there in the present. Archaeologist Laurent Olivier highlights archaeology’s close and problematic affiliation with history and that through this affiliation we are used to seeing time as unilinear. He suggests that the objects that archaeologists study are “memory recorded in materials” (Olivier 2004:211) and should be understood rather for their similarity to memory rather than to narrative history writing. This follows the Freudian idea of memory as fragmented and constantly created and recreated in the past and in the present. He means that the past exists in the present as “fragments of the past […] embedded in the physical reality of the present” (Olivier 2004:209) as well as the present exists in the past as we read it through our own horizon and our own behaviour (Olivier 2004:210). This idea of the present as multitemporal has also been expressed by archaeologist Gavin Lucas as he moves the attention of prehistory from its chronological emphasis to an ontological one and suggests that “prehistory was, above all, history studied through material culture, not through texts” with the consequence that “even archaeologists studying the material culture of the historic past … are doing prehistory, not history” (Lucas 2004:111). This is true to some extent and an important observation within historical archaeologies that are often so highly dependent on historical sources and narratives. At the same time we cannot, and neither should we want to, escape from the fact that in a period closer to our own we will always be affected by other sources apart from the physical ones. It is not in the distinction between the different sources that the problem lays but rather it is in our way of valuing them differently that the issues arise. We have to appreciate our past as fragmented, that all its pieces does not match up, and that sometimes it creates constellations that we do not expect. In the Podyji Park time intermingles. The monument to Felicia was constructed as a memorial by Countess of Mniszek and has stood there ever since but it has acted in different situations since its inception: as a memorial in the 1800s, reborn to become the target of the border guards’ shooting practice linking two parts of the park’s history that are otherwise unlikely to be connected, since reborn again in our present following a 192

6: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE IRON CURTAIN<br />

inherent in the material itself that is valuable and uses the provocative<br />

example of Stonehenge to make her point that it “is basically a collection of<br />

rocks in a field” (Smith 2006:3). Criticism of this statement from archaeologist<br />

Brit Solli on the other hand counterclaims that “Stonehenge’s essence<br />

is its durable ‘stoniness’” and that there is something inherent in its<br />

materiality and permanence (Solli 2011:45). What is missed in this discussion,<br />

as shown by Pétursdóttir, is to recognise the hierarchy that is implied within<br />

these discussions of tangible or intangible, with one seen as better than the<br />

other. Pétursdóttir agrees with Smith that Stonehenge is exactly that, a<br />

collection of rocks in a field but what she disagrees with is Smith’s way of<br />

seeing this to be meaningless and instead she claims that the ‘stoniness’<br />

should be seen as valuable and important (Pétursdóttir 2013:47). She writes<br />

“Conversely though, it is not her [Smith’s] statement that ‘Stonehenge… is<br />

basically a collection of rocks in a field’… that is problematic; that is in fact<br />

exactly what it is. The problem, however, is to see that as meaningless. What<br />

characterizes the intangible heritage discourse (or even heritage discourses in<br />

general), as well as much of interpretative archaeology, is not only that meaning,<br />

value and significance are seen as inevitably subjective, but also that<br />

meaning is confused with or restricted, rather to symbolical or other modes of<br />

derivative meanings… is it so that Stonehenge itself, in its simple<br />

‘stoniness’… brings nothing of value to the encounters with the subjective<br />

experiences that for centuries have circulated around it” (Pétursdóttir<br />

2013:47, emphasis in original). Although the example of Stonehenge may<br />

appear exaggerated it is exactly because of its status as a monumental heritage<br />

that it becomes interesting and brings several questions forward. Most of all, I<br />

believe, it makes it clear that the discussions in which we place tangible and<br />

intangible against each other are not really going to bring the discussion of<br />

heritage forward. Similarly to discussions of the different sources we deal with<br />

in our research we have to be open to the different types of heritage we are<br />

faced with, tangible or intangible, and recognise the value in both. It is here<br />

that I fear this material turn is slipping over into the wrong type of focus in<br />

which strengthening the value and status of physical objects also means<br />

intensifying the divide between objects and other sources even further and<br />

with that we risk falling down in Andrén’s in-betweeness even further. I<br />

believe this material turn has its strength in the way it helps us interpret our<br />

sources in order not to load them with cultural and social values they are unfit<br />

to hold. It can help us to have an open and holistic methodology towards our<br />

sources so that we do not subject our narratives and metaphors to the mater-<br />

191

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