EAP - The Pacific Infrastructure Challenge - World Bank (2006).pdf
EAP - The Pacific Infrastructure Challenge - World Bank (2006).pdf
EAP - The Pacific Infrastructure Challenge - World Bank (2006).pdf
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Figure 7.1: Accountability in <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Services Provision<br />
Monopoly<br />
Environment<br />
Competitive<br />
Environment<br />
Government<br />
• Ownership<br />
• Contract<br />
• Regulation<br />
Political<br />
accountability<br />
<strong>Infrastructure</strong><br />
Competition<br />
Service Provider<br />
• Payment for<br />
Services<br />
• Regulation<br />
Consumers<br />
Competition<br />
Competing<br />
<strong>Infrastructure</strong><br />
Service Providers<br />
Source: Castalia<br />
Poor accountability has contributed towards poor infrastructure provision in <strong>Pacific</strong><br />
countries. <strong>Pacific</strong> countries have few institutional arrangements or governance<br />
processes that encourage accountability in a transparent manner.<br />
In general there is very little competition for services, in part because of size and<br />
geography, but also because the underlying infrastructure policy design is poor.<br />
Papua New Guinea and Samoa have competition in Internet Service Provision, and<br />
Tonga has a duopoly in mobile telecommunications. Samoa and Lae and Port<br />
Moresby ports in Papua New Guinea have competing port service providers and<br />
airport terminal services at Port Vila in Vanuatu and Koror in Palau are procured<br />
competitively.<br />
<strong>The</strong> absence of competing service providers means that effective oversight<br />
mechanisms are essential to ensure monopoly providers operate efficiently, to price<br />
effectively and in a sustainable way, and to extend services. However, most<br />
infrastructure services are provided and sanctioned by the same entity, the<br />
government. Government departments are often financially constrained, inefficient<br />
and have limited specialist or technical human resources capacity. <strong>The</strong>y also have<br />
little control over investment decisions and staffing. This is a weak model for<br />
accountability and has failed to provide incentives for good performance.<br />
For example in Fiji, the Ministry of Public Works Department is responsible for<br />
providing water and sewerage services. <strong>The</strong> utility has no control over its budget, and<br />
the existing allocations from Government do not allow for system improvements<br />
and general maintenance. <strong>The</strong> utility’s performance has been poor on most<br />
indicators, and worse than that of countries with fewer natural, financial and human<br />
resources.<br />
Where there is lack of accountability and transparency in ownership structures, the<br />
problem is sometimes compounded by weak Court systems that provide little<br />
protection for infrastructure investors and operators. An important feature of any<br />
framework to allow infrastructure assets to be managed for the benefit of consumers<br />
and investors/operators, is access to truly independent courts which can protect<br />
contractual arrangements or interpret the law affecting infrastructure transparently<br />
and independent of any political or bureaucratic influence.<br />
Some progress has been made in some <strong>Pacific</strong> nations where judges operating at<br />
Superior Court level are appointed from outside of the country. <strong>The</strong>se judges bring<br />
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