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EAP - The Pacific Infrastructure Challenge - World Bank (2006).pdf

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Figure 7.1: Accountability in <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Services Provision<br />

Monopoly<br />

Environment<br />

Competitive<br />

Environment<br />

Government<br />

• Ownership<br />

• Contract<br />

• Regulation<br />

Political<br />

accountability<br />

<strong>Infrastructure</strong><br />

Competition<br />

Service Provider<br />

• Payment for<br />

Services<br />

• Regulation<br />

Consumers<br />

Competition<br />

Competing<br />

<strong>Infrastructure</strong><br />

Service Providers<br />

Source: Castalia<br />

Poor accountability has contributed towards poor infrastructure provision in <strong>Pacific</strong><br />

countries. <strong>Pacific</strong> countries have few institutional arrangements or governance<br />

processes that encourage accountability in a transparent manner.<br />

In general there is very little competition for services, in part because of size and<br />

geography, but also because the underlying infrastructure policy design is poor.<br />

Papua New Guinea and Samoa have competition in Internet Service Provision, and<br />

Tonga has a duopoly in mobile telecommunications. Samoa and Lae and Port<br />

Moresby ports in Papua New Guinea have competing port service providers and<br />

airport terminal services at Port Vila in Vanuatu and Koror in Palau are procured<br />

competitively.<br />

<strong>The</strong> absence of competing service providers means that effective oversight<br />

mechanisms are essential to ensure monopoly providers operate efficiently, to price<br />

effectively and in a sustainable way, and to extend services. However, most<br />

infrastructure services are provided and sanctioned by the same entity, the<br />

government. Government departments are often financially constrained, inefficient<br />

and have limited specialist or technical human resources capacity. <strong>The</strong>y also have<br />

little control over investment decisions and staffing. This is a weak model for<br />

accountability and has failed to provide incentives for good performance.<br />

For example in Fiji, the Ministry of Public Works Department is responsible for<br />

providing water and sewerage services. <strong>The</strong> utility has no control over its budget, and<br />

the existing allocations from Government do not allow for system improvements<br />

and general maintenance. <strong>The</strong> utility’s performance has been poor on most<br />

indicators, and worse than that of countries with fewer natural, financial and human<br />

resources.<br />

Where there is lack of accountability and transparency in ownership structures, the<br />

problem is sometimes compounded by weak Court systems that provide little<br />

protection for infrastructure investors and operators. An important feature of any<br />

framework to allow infrastructure assets to be managed for the benefit of consumers<br />

and investors/operators, is access to truly independent courts which can protect<br />

contractual arrangements or interpret the law affecting infrastructure transparently<br />

and independent of any political or bureaucratic influence.<br />

Some progress has been made in some <strong>Pacific</strong> nations where judges operating at<br />

Superior Court level are appointed from outside of the country. <strong>The</strong>se judges bring<br />

40

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