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EAP - The Pacific Infrastructure Challenge - World Bank (2006).pdf

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Box 7.1: <strong>The</strong> Impact of Good Coordination on <strong>Infrastructure</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> East Asia <strong>Pacific</strong> Flagship Study highlights examples of where coordination<br />

has helped to achieve improved infrastructure performance in six East Asian<br />

economies: Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore.<br />

Key features of coordination in these countries include:<br />

Political leaders and senior policy makers created a long term development<br />

vision, and sector strategies that flowed from this vision. <strong>The</strong>re was a broad<br />

consensus between policy makers<br />

<strong>The</strong>se economies emphasized infrastructure strategies that focused on<br />

achieving export-led growth, high savings and investment levels, and balanced<br />

social development<br />

In general infrastructure reacted to development constraints when they<br />

emerged, rather than anticipating demand. <strong>The</strong>se reactions were rapid and<br />

strategic, and sector strategies adapted as production strategies changed<br />

Strong planning agencies drove infrastructure development at a central or<br />

sector level. <strong>The</strong>se agencies had significant political influence<br />

<strong>Infrastructure</strong> service delivery was mainly carried out by a monopoly<br />

corporation, often publicly owned. A strong planning agency provided clear<br />

incentives for improved performance. Cost recovery policies were encouraged<br />

and operational subsidies were limited.<br />

In each of these countries infrastructure performance improved substantially<br />

between 1950 and 1990, until financial crisis and economic slowdown began to<br />

impede development.<br />

Source: Connecting East Asia: A New Framework for <strong>Infrastructure</strong>, ADB, JBIC, <strong>World</strong><br />

<strong>Bank</strong>, March 2005<br />

Successful infrastructure development also requires institutions and systems that<br />

reward good performance and punish poor performance. This will ensure all<br />

stakeholders remain focused on the ‘big picture’, and contribute to development, rather<br />

than seek to maximize their own short term gains. This comes under the general<br />

heading of Accountability.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are various institutions that provide accountability, by encouraging oversight of<br />

infrastructure development, service provision and maintenance. <strong>The</strong>se include<br />

competition, regulation or other oversight functions, such as monitoring service<br />

contracts. In most <strong>Pacific</strong> countries, community leaders also play an important oversight<br />

role. For example, in Samoa, the village chief or the church leader is consulted before a<br />

telecommunications company can decide to expand service into their village. In Kiribati<br />

and other Micronesian countries, village chiefs on small remote islands exercise a form of<br />

regulation by overseeing the operation of electricity generators.<br />

Risk Management is closely related to accountability. In essence, this element of the<br />

framework focuses our attention on the need to ensure that the risks and rewards in<br />

the provision of infrastructure services are aligned.<br />

<strong>The</strong> key conclusion of the Flagship Study is that improvements in coordination and<br />

accountability are the key elements in ensuring that infrastructure projects and policies<br />

contribute to the overarching goal of development. We have applied this framework to<br />

analyze the reasons for underperformance in infrastructure in the <strong>Pacific</strong>.<br />

We suggest that there are two principle causes of poor infrastructure outcomes in the<br />

<strong>Pacific</strong>:<br />

Poor policy design and coordination, and<br />

Lack of good governance and accountability.<br />

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