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Mogadishu Conflict and Security Assessment Report<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong><br />

June, 2014<br />

1


AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS<br />

Ahmed Musa (Lead Researcher, OCVP)<br />

Asiya Osman (Researcher, OCVP)<br />

Kenneth Mutinda (Researcher, OCVP)<br />

Omar Abshir (Data Analyst, OCVP)<br />

Disclaimer<br />

This report is not a legally binding document; it is an assessment document and does not necessarily reflect the views of the institution in all its<br />

contents. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.<br />

©The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention<br />

All rights are reserved. Requests for permission to reproduce or translate OCVP’s publications – whether for sale or for non-commercial<br />

distribution – should be addressed to the OCVP via (email: info@ocvp.org). Publications of OCVP can be obtained from our offices in Mogadishu,<br />

Somalia, or could be downloaded from our website www.ocvp.org.<br />

i


ACKNOWLEDGMENT<br />

The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) would like to thank the interviewees and survey participants who gave us their<br />

precious time and shared their thoughts on such sensitive issues.<br />

We also thank the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, for providing us with financial support needed to<br />

undertake this survey through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Somalia<br />

We are deeply indebted to the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) for their generous support of availing us Mogadishu’s districts<br />

household estimates without which designing of the study sample size would have been impractical.<br />

Finally, we are grateful to the former Mayor and Governor of Banadir region Mayor Mohamoud Ahmed Nur (Tarsan) whose office granted a<br />

letter of endorsement for the mission and directed all the District Commissioners (DCs) to support the mission despite the impending handover<br />

to his successor.<br />

ii


Abbreviations<br />

AMISOM<br />

DCC<br />

<strong>DCSA</strong><br />

DFID<br />

FGD<br />

HIPS<br />

IDP<br />

KII<br />

NGOs<br />

NISA<br />

OCVP<br />

SRM<br />

UNDP<br />

African Union Mission in Somalia<br />

District Court Commission<br />

District Conflict and Security Assessment<br />

Department for International Development<br />

Focus Group Discussion<br />

Heritage Institute for Policy Studies<br />

Internally Displaced Persons<br />

Key Informant Interview<br />

Non-Governmental Organisations<br />

National Intelligence and Security Agency<br />

Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention<br />

Simple Random Sampling<br />

United Nations Development Programme<br />

iii


Contents<br />

ACKNOWLEDGMENT .............................................................................................................................................................................................. ii<br />

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ iii<br />

The Study Area Map ............................................................................................................................................................................................ viii<br />

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ix<br />

Divergences ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... ix<br />

Conflict and violence .......................................................................................................................................................................................... x<br />

Security .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. x<br />

Justice ............................................................................................................................................................................................................... xi<br />

Governance ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... xi<br />

1. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1<br />

1.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1<br />

1.2. Sampling Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1<br />

1.3. Household Survey ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 2<br />

1.4. Focus Groups Discussions ........................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />

1.5. Key Informant Interviews ............................................................................................................................................................................ 3<br />

1.6. Limitations .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 4<br />

2. PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS ................................................................................................................................................................................ 6<br />

3. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE, SECURITY, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS .................................................................................................. 8<br />

3.1. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE ............................................................................................................................................................................ 8<br />

3.1.1. Dynamics of Conflict and Violence ........................................................................................................................................................ 8<br />

3.1.2. Level of Experience .............................................................................................................................................................................. 9<br />

3.1.3. Perception of Safety ............................................................................................................................................................................11<br />

iv


3.2. SECURITY PROVIDERS .................................................................................................................................................................................14<br />

3.2.1. Level of Deployment ...........................................................................................................................................................................14<br />

3.2.2. Preference of the Security Providers ...................................................................................................................................................15<br />

3.2.3. Perception towards Security Providers ..........................................................................................................................................17<br />

3.2.4. Perception of AMISOM ..................................................................................................................................................................19<br />

3.3. JUSTICE PROVIDERS ...................................................................................................................................................................................20<br />

3.3.1. Level of Deployment ...........................................................................................................................................................................20<br />

3.3.2. Performance of the Justice Providers ..................................................................................................................................................21<br />

3.3.3. Perception of Justice Providers ............................................................................................................................................................26<br />

3.4. GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS .........................................................................................................................................................................30<br />

3.4.1. Level of Deployment ...........................................................................................................................................................................30<br />

3.4.2. Performance of the Governance providers ..........................................................................................................................................31<br />

3.4.3. Perception of Governance Providers ...................................................................................................................................................32<br />

4. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................................................................35<br />

5. ANNEXES ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................36<br />

Annex 5.1: Sample size .....................................................................................................................................................................................36<br />

Annex 5.2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS ......................................................................................................................................................................37<br />

v


Table of Figures<br />

Figure 1: Number of male and female respondents within districts ........................................................................................................................ 3<br />

Figure 2: Percentage of respondents within districts (by gender) ........................................................................................................................... 3<br />

Figure 3: Respondents by gender ........................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />

Figure 4: Respondents’ age groups (by gender) ..................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />

Figure 5: Respondents’ marital status .................................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />

Figure: 6: Respondents’ level of education (by gender) .......................................................................................................................................... 7<br />

Figure 7: Respondents’ awareness of conflict occurrence ...................................................................................................................................... 8<br />

Figure 8: Respondents’ awareness of conflict occurrence ...................................................................................................................................... 9<br />

Figure 9: Respondents’ estimation of the level of conflict (by gender) ................................................................................................................... 9<br />

Figure 10: Respondents’ account of the causes of conflict ....................................................................................................................................10<br />

Figure 11: Respondents’ account of witnessing a crime against someone outside the homestead ........................................................................11<br />

Figure 12: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area .....................................................................................................................................11<br />

Figure 13: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (by gender) ...................................................................................................................12<br />

Figure 14: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (Year on year trend by gender) .....................................................................................12<br />

Figure 15: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (year on year trend by locality) .....................................................................................13<br />

Figure 16: Respondents’ awareness of police presence .........................................................................................................................................14<br />

Figure 17: Respondents’ estimation of the number of police stations ...................................................................................................................14<br />

Figure 18: Respondents’ estimation of distance to police station ..........................................................................................................................15<br />

Figure 19: Respondents’ preference of reporting civil matters: land disputes, divorce etc… (by gender) ...............................................................16<br />

Figure 20: Respondents’ preference of reporting on petty crimes: robbery, household violence (by gender) ........................................................16<br />

Figure 21: Respondents’ preference of reporting on serious crimes: grave assaults, rape and murder (by gender) ...............................................16<br />

Figure 22: Most trusted security provider in responding to crime (by gender) ......................................................................................................17<br />

Figure 23: Reason for choice of traditional elders as the most trusted informal security provider .........................................................................18<br />

Figure 24: Respondents’ level of trust in the formal security provider (Police) (by gender) ...................................................................................18<br />

Figure 25: Respondents' perception of the performance of the police - yearly trend (by gender) ..........................................................................19<br />

Figure 26: Respondents' awareness of courts .......................................................................................................................................................20<br />

Figure 27: Respondents’ estimation of the number of courts ................................................................................................................................21<br />

Figure 28: Walking distance to the court ...............................................................................................................................................................21<br />

Figure 29: Respondents’ usage of courts ...............................................................................................................................................................22<br />

vi


Figure 30: Respondents’ usage of courts (by gender) ............................................................................................................................................22<br />

Figure 31: Respondents’ usage of traditional elders ..............................................................................................................................................23<br />

Figure 32: Respondents’ usage of traditional elders (by gender) ...........................................................................................................................23<br />

Figure 33: Respondents’ account of referral to the traditional elders (by gender) .................................................................................................23<br />

Figure 34: Respondents’ account of the issues taken to traditional elders ............................................................................................................24<br />

Figure 35: Respondents' account of issues taken to traditional elders (by gender) ................................................................................................24<br />

Figure 36: Respondents’ account on issuance of judgments ..................................................................................................................................25<br />

Figure 37: Respondents’ account on the enforcement of judgments .....................................................................................................................25<br />

Figure 38: Respondents’ usage of religious leaders (by gender) ............................................................................................................................26<br />

Figure 39: Respondents’ trust of justice providers ................................................................................................................................................27<br />

Figure 40: Respondents’ trust of justice providers (by gender) ..............................................................................................................................27<br />

Figure 41: Respondents’ reason of choice (by gender) ..........................................................................................................................................28<br />

Figure 42: Respondents’ level of confidence in the formal justice system .............................................................................................................28<br />

Figure 43: Respondents' perception of the performance of the formal court (yearly trend0 .................................................................................29<br />

Figure 44: Respondents’ awareness of local council ..............................................................................................................................................30<br />

Figure 45: Respondents’ awareness of the services provided by the district administrations (by gender) ..............................................................30<br />

Figure 46: Respondents’ awareness of communication channels ..........................................................................................................................31<br />

Figure 47: Respondents’ awareness of communication channels (by gender) .......................................................................................................32<br />

Figure 48: Respondents’ participation in local government consultations .............................................................................................................32<br />

Figure 49: Respondents’ perception towards the importance of elected representatives .....................................................................................33<br />

Figure 50: Respondents’ opinion about important services provided by the local council .....................................................................................33<br />

Figure 51: Respondents’ opinions about the most pressing local issues ................................................................................................................34<br />

vii


The Study Area Map<br />

Map of Mogadishu (<strong>Eastern</strong> zone districts): Adopted from UN OCHA 2009<br />

viii


Executive Summary<br />

Mogadishu is the nation’s capital and the largest city in Somalia, known locally as Hamar; it is located in the costal Banadir Region. The <strong>Eastern</strong><br />

<strong>Zone</strong> is one of the four zones in Mogadishu (delineation made by the security institutions) and consists of four districts 1 : Karaan, Yakshiid,<br />

Heliwaa and Shibis. Mogadishu has experienced an immense amount of political instability in the past three decades, the collapse of the Siyad<br />

Barre regime in 1991 plunged the country, and the capital city in particular, into a state of anarchy. In 2006 the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized<br />

control of Mogadishu from various warring clan militias; subsequently the ICU were then defeated by a combination of the Transitional Federal<br />

Government (TFG), Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers in late 2006 – early 2007. The ICU splintered into various different factions<br />

after their defeat: with Al-Shabaab, the military wing of the ICU, the most prominent. From 2008 Al-Shabaab remained a prominent threat to<br />

the ruling powers of Mogadishu and engaged the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)<br />

allies in a prolonged period of conflict, however, in 2010 the TFG and its military allies succeeded in expelling Al-Shabaab forces from the city.<br />

Since that juncture Mogadishu has remained in the control of the government, however, Al-Shabaab has continued to target the newly formed<br />

Somali Federal Government and its allies with sporadic, but sustained, episodes of violence – notably - targeted suicide bombings and guerrillastyle<br />

attacks. Many of the national institutions are based in the Mogadishu with the three main government pillars: the executive, legislatives<br />

and judiciary all based in the city.<br />

Continual assessment of issues directly affecting community safety and security is critical to effective evidence based programming, informed<br />

decision making and measuring the impact of related programmatic interventions: it enables a better understanding of what works and doesn’t<br />

work at the community level. With this in mind district level assessments map out and provide a better understanding of issues that affect<br />

targeted communities across the Somali regions. By using key indicators for selected thematic areas, this report provides an assessment on the<br />

state of conflict, governance, justice as well as safety and security in the <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> of Mogadishu. This assessment was conducted from 19th<br />

to 23rd March 2014; the FGDs were conducted from 3rd to 5th March, while the KIIs were conducted from 14<br />

th to 24 th March.<br />

Divergences<br />

There is a possibility for qualitative and quantitative data to diverge in mixed method research approaches - combining methods cannot always<br />

be used for cross-validation purposes as they may not always produce one picture. Discrepancies were witnessed during both the data collection<br />

and analysis phase. According to the quantitative data, respondents were witnessing very little or no crimes and their level of confidence in the<br />

1 Mogadishu zones: provided by HIPS and later cross checked with the regional authorities<br />

ix


police was very high. The qualitative data, however, revealed a number of alarming incidents related to crime and violence; moreover, the focus<br />

group participants harshly criticized the police and disparaged their effectiveness.<br />

The divergences were reconciled with the context of the study site, the unstable environment and fear of existing insurgencies had resulted in a<br />

climate of fear with people being very cautious to whom they give information to - research participants were reticent to speak of, or report,<br />

crimes for fear of being victimised themselves.<br />

Researchers witnessed a sense of reluctance from the household survey respondents in answering questions due to the pervasive wariness of<br />

speaking to outsiders. The level of mistrust and fear apparent within the districts engendered superficial responses from respondents across a<br />

number of thematic areas, but were most notable in questions related to security, conflict and violence. Unfortunately this was to the detriment<br />

of the assessment and affected both accuracy and efficacy. Researchers also noticed that focus group participants tended to withhold<br />

information; however the moderator was able to engage with them and alleviate their mistrust, resulting in highly informative discussions.<br />

The following summarises the key findings of the assessment:<br />

Conflict and violence<br />

Although episodes of widespread systemic group/clan related violence have reduced dramatically, reports of a proliferation of small arms<br />

continue to exacerbate the volatile security situation. There were allegations that militants of unascertained status erect roadblocks at night and<br />

extort civilians. This is an issue that calls for further investigation and action by the properly mandated security apparatus. Additionally, land<br />

disputes were reported as the most common cause of conflict and family disputes were reported as the most common incidences of violence.<br />

Land disputes derived from a lack of stable central governance and a land administration system according to participants; while family disputes<br />

were attributed to the dire socio-economic situation apparent in the district.<br />

Security<br />

While there is a police station in every district the number of police officers was perceived to be insufficient and the subsequent coverage and<br />

visibility of the police was minimal (only respondents from neighbourhoods near the stations reported an awareness of police presence). The<br />

police were not only understaffed but also underfunded, underpaid and lacking in many facilities that has rendered them vulnerable to<br />

corruption. Besides the police force there were other security providers operating in the district including: African Union Mission in Somalia<br />

(AMISOM), the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence Services Agency (NISA) and numerous armed factions whose status could<br />

not be determined by respondents. The efforts of the various security providers were not well coordinated. In the absence of a well-functioning<br />

x


police force, the community relied on traditional elders and other informal security providers such as informal clan militia, neighbourhood<br />

watches and private security companies for protection.<br />

Justice<br />

There is a court in every district, however, the usage of these courts was very low and they lack necessary resources for the efficient provision of<br />

justice. Usage of the courts was largely limited to civil matters – specifically family disputes and it was also found that religious leaders are rarely<br />

used for justice provision – there are no registered Shari’ah offices in Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>. Traditional elders appear to be the most<br />

commonly utilised justice provider as the community perceives them to grant fair judgements that are less costly and more capable of<br />

enforcement than the formal courts. The traditional elders also solved disputes of a predominantly civil nature although they were occasionally<br />

involved in the arbitration of more serious issues, including criminal cases.<br />

Governance<br />

The Banadir region hosts the capital of Somalia and is also the seat of the Municipality of Mogadishu which encompasses all 16 districts in the<br />

region. Unlike other regions of Somalia, in Banadir the provision of services at the district level is overseen by the Municipal Authority working<br />

through the respective District Administrations. The districts in Mogadishu are (at the time of writing) unique because they do not have local<br />

councils that may be responsible for service delivery (as is the case in other regions). A majority of the respondents were nonetheless unaware<br />

of the existence of the District Administrations - and those that were had little interaction with their representatives. The provision of local<br />

governance has suffered under prolonged periods of insecurity and a prevailing absence of stable central governance. The high levels of socioeconomic<br />

strife have only served to make matters worse, with respondents citing high levels of unemployment, poor education, poor health and<br />

sanitation and a lack of infrastructure as most pressing needs in the community.<br />

xi


1.1. Overview<br />

As part of its continual assessment of issues directly affecting<br />

community security and safety, OCVP conducted extensive primary<br />

data collection in several districts of Mogadishu: Karaan, Yakshiid,<br />

Heliwaa and Shibis districts which comprise the EASTERN ZONE.<br />

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the thematic<br />

areas under investigation a mixed method approach was employed<br />

in order to allow the research team to triangulate information<br />

uncovered in both the data collection phase and subsequent<br />

analysis. The household surveys aimed to obtain a representative<br />

picture of the thematic areas under study and Key Informant<br />

Interviews were used to probe deeper into, and cross-validate,<br />

issues that emerged from the Focus Group Discussions.<br />

1. METHODOLOGY<br />

enabled the application of a sampling formula 2 to determine a<br />

representative sample size for each district. Taking into account<br />

certain statistical parameters such as the level of confidence desired<br />

(95%), sample design effect (1.5), margin of error (+ or – 5%) and<br />

the assumption that some security correlation of (0.3) existed<br />

within the sub-divisions.<br />

The p-value of 0.3 in the formula assumes security correlation<br />

above a random normal distribution of 0.5 within the district<br />

clusters. This is a reasonable assumption based on the topic of the<br />

survey – respondents within the districts of Mogadishu are likely to<br />

possess a correlating relationship between their perceptions based<br />

of the surrounding security environment. This is further backed on<br />

OCVP’s past experience in which those from the same area tend to<br />

exhibit similar perceptions on security, justice, governance and<br />

conflict and violence.<br />

The quantitative data was analysed by the OCVP Research and<br />

Analysis team using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)<br />

version 21, after the data had been collated and cleaned by<br />

Swisspeaks - an independent quality control firm. The qualitative<br />

data was subjected to thematic analysis, using a largely inductive<br />

process. The main themes of coding were developed before the<br />

mission in line with the hypothesis but further coding was<br />

inductively included during analysis.<br />

Finally a total of 483 household questionnaires were calculated for<br />

the zone (although not all responses were collected, see qualitative<br />

limitations at section 1.6), and then a calculated ratio (number of<br />

households in the district over the total number of households in<br />

the zone multiplied by the calculated sample size for the zone) was<br />

employed to come up with the number of households that should<br />

represent each district.<br />

1.2. Sampling Methodology<br />

A district household survey provided by Heritage Institute for Policy<br />

Studies (HIPS) and later cross-checked with the regional authorities<br />

2 See Annex 5.1<br />

1


1.3. Household Survey<br />

A face-to-face quantitative survey was conducted in which<br />

questions relating to personal demographics, security, justice and<br />

governance provision, and conflict and violence were asked. OCVP<br />

researchers trained eight data enumerators (4 male and 4 female)<br />

on the questionnaire methodology and the use of smart-phones for<br />

data collection from February 24 th to 25 th 2014. During the training<br />

the enumerators and OCVP researchers discussed the use of smartphones<br />

for data collection and the potential risks involved and<br />

finally agreed on measures to mitigate the identified risks (including<br />

an explanation on the use of the device and the request for the<br />

respondent’s prior consent).<br />

The <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> is comprised of the eastern districts of Mogadishu<br />

and was observed to be relatively peaceful at the time of the data<br />

collection - except Heliwaa district which was deemed to be very<br />

insecure. Based on previous experience and data collection<br />

exercises in the other zones of Mogadishu, researchers were aware<br />

of the possible existence of ‘hot spots’ – areas where the security<br />

situation was particularly volatile and data collection was deemed<br />

to be higher risk. Adhering to the Systematic Random principle<br />

(SRM) employed in the central zone would have been impractical<br />

and potentially dangerous; therefore researchers were obliged to<br />

recruit local facilitators from the district to avoid hot spots and<br />

potentially violent elements of the community. These facilitators<br />

possessed a profound knowledge of the district and a pre-existing<br />

relationship with the local population. The local facilitators advised<br />

on the enumerators’ movements and personal security. In addition<br />

to that, they facilitate the collection of some household<br />

questionnaires based on their personal connections and<br />

acquaintances. This has resulted, however, in the random<br />

systematic selection of the households being compromised and<br />

somewhat undermined the validity of the data collected.<br />

The eight trained enumerators supported by the two local<br />

facilitators (recruited from the district administrations) under the<br />

supervision of two OCVP researchers were able to identify the<br />

divisions, subdivisions and neighbourhoods in each of the districts<br />

and then agreed on a starting point for each of the enumerators.<br />

The local facilitators were also able to identify boundaries between<br />

the subdivisions and neighbourhoods. Where appropriate,<br />

enumerators randomly selected any 5th household and interviewed<br />

one respondent above the age of 18 or would interview the<br />

household respondents based on the local facilitator’s identification<br />

and/or advice. A gender balance was emphasised across the entire<br />

survey. The data collection was carried out until the pre-calculated<br />

number of households in the district were covered (though 20 out<br />

304 households in Yakshiid and the whole of Heliwaa district - 83<br />

households - were not surveyed). Compromising the sampling<br />

probability method was seen as a necessary trade-off for successful<br />

data collection and the safety of the enumerators.<br />

The 8 enumerators collected 380 household observations in three<br />

districts: Karaan, Yakshiid and Shibis from 19th to 23rd March 2014.<br />

The data was collected in Somali language with the use of smartphones<br />

which was subsequently uploaded onto the SwissPeaks<br />

database when an internet connection was available.<br />

2


Figure 1: Number of male and female respondents within districts<br />

Figure 2: Percentage of respondents within districts (by gender)<br />

1.4. Focus Groups Discussions<br />

The second research tool utilized was a series of Focus Group<br />

Discussions (FGDs) aimed at capturing participants’ perception on<br />

security and justice providers (formal and informal), governance<br />

providers and the dynamics and experiences of conflict and<br />

violence. The FGDs were conducted from the 3rd to 5th March at<br />

the OCVP’s office in Mogadishu and Ramaada Hotel; each discussion<br />

group lasted for about an hour.<br />

A total of eight groups were involved in the FGDs: Women, Men,<br />

Youth, Business Persons, Internally Displaced Persons, Religious<br />

Leaders, Traditional Elders and District Peace Committees with each<br />

group roughly consisting of 10 participants. Qualitative research<br />

participants were recruited from all districts including Heliwaa<br />

district.<br />

Four group discussions were moderated per day by 2 OCVP<br />

researchers over the course of 2 days. The moderators used FGD<br />

questionnaires to guide, but not limit, the scope of the discussion<br />

with the help of trained note takers who recorded both consensus<br />

and dissenting views in order to increase understanding of the<br />

subject under discussion.<br />

OCVP’s Mogadishu office recruited local organisers to assist in the<br />

recruitment of the participants, using criteria based on clan-lines,<br />

geographic coverage, social class, gender and age group.<br />

1.5. Key Informant Interviews<br />

The third tool utilised for data collection was personal interviews<br />

with key informants who possessed experiential knowledge about<br />

3


the themes under investigation. The aim was to go deeper into the<br />

subject areas and cross-validate the issues raised in the FGDs.<br />

The interviews were conducted from 14th to 24th March 2014 at<br />

the respective offices of the interviewees, Ramaada hotel and OCVP<br />

offices in Mogadishu. Each interview lasted for about half an hour,<br />

although some interviews with the local authorities were shortened<br />

due to their busy schedules. Eleven key informants were<br />

interviewed, including: District Commissioner, Deputy District<br />

Commissioner, District Administration Secretary, District Court<br />

Commissioner, Religious Leaders, Key Business Persons, Traditional<br />

Elders, Regional Court Chairperson, District Police Commissioner<br />

and Legal Expert.<br />

The local organiser assisted in the scheduling of the interviews<br />

which were conducted by OCVP researchers beginning with<br />

questions that were tailored to the interviewee and then generally<br />

cut-across the thematic areas of governance, justice, security and<br />

conflict and violence. Police officers declined to be interviewed.<br />

1.6. Limitations<br />

Collecting data from conflict-zones is problematic, and collecting<br />

data from Mogadishu was no different despite it being in a nascent,<br />

albeit fragile, post-conflict stage of recovery. There were numerous<br />

limitations and challenges faced during the data collection with a<br />

general misgiving and distrust of any data collection reflected in the<br />

participants.<br />

Below are the most notable limitations that could affect the value of<br />

the findings.<br />

Sample Size<br />

With the lack of accurate population statistics, it was difficult to<br />

calculate a representative sample size for each zone with the use of<br />

conventional sampling formulas. To manage this, OCVP employed a<br />

sample size formula that is not heavily dependent on accurate<br />

population statistics and leant on the data provided by HIPS.<br />

Secondly, it was difficult to spread the required number of<br />

questionnaires according to the different possible sampling<br />

locations. This in turn could possibly have compromised the<br />

representativeness of the data, and despite mitigating measures to<br />

address this being limited the OCVP tried to ensure data was as<br />

geographically representative as possible.<br />

Quantitative limitations<br />

A representative sample size of 483 households was calculated for<br />

the eastern zone, of this sample the research team managed to<br />

collect 380 household surveys in the zone. The initial plan was to<br />

collect data from all 4 pre-identified districts of the zone but 2<br />

districts were affected by a volatile security situation: Yakshiid<br />

District was partially affected while Heliwaa District was entirely<br />

inaccessible to the data enumerators.<br />

Yakshiid district consists of 6 smaller subdivisions and it is one of the<br />

largest and most recently liberated districts of Mogadishu, secondly,<br />

it borders with Dayniile which still contains some active insurgent<br />

elements. District administration authorities advised that at least 3<br />

out of 6 subdivisions of the district (Tawkal, Towfiiq and 1 da Luulyo) -<br />

neighbouring with Jidka Warshadaha - were also very volatile.<br />

Consequently researchers did not enter the subdivisions and 19<br />

4


household observations were lost. Heliwaa was a major hot spot<br />

and particularly volatile at the time of the data collection. On 18 th<br />

February, 2014 the District Commissioner stated in a press<br />

conference that they were losing ground to Al-Shabaab - insurgent<br />

groups were taking full control of the district at night (during the<br />

initial days of the data collection people were still fleeing from this<br />

district to other more secure areas of Mogadishu).<br />

With this in mind and after thorough consultations with local actors,<br />

including other research institutes, the team was advised not to<br />

collect data from this district as the probability of coming into<br />

harm’s way was deemed too high. This resulted in the team being<br />

unable to collect data from 83 households as planned for this<br />

district.<br />

Across all the districts in the <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> many of the research<br />

participants gave superficial answers to security, conflict and<br />

violence related questions that did not seem to reflect the reality on<br />

the ground – as previously mentioned many respondents were<br />

cautious of providing a truer picture of the district. Researchers<br />

have emphasised the qualitative data in the analysis phases to<br />

mitigate against potentially inaccurate findings in the quantitative<br />

data collection.<br />

Qualitative Limitations<br />

Most of the local authorities did not have enough time to be<br />

interviewed due to their busy schedules and the researchers could<br />

not probe deeper into issues raised. Secondly, some groups were<br />

not willing to engage openly in the discussion and were slightly<br />

dubious of speaking freely amongst the FGDs, though discussion<br />

moderators tried to mitigate this by making the discussion more<br />

informal and friendly. Focus Group Discussion participants would,<br />

after a time, open up about the true situation in their district and<br />

provide the data collectors with what was deemed to be a more<br />

accurate picture of the areas under discussion.<br />

Finally, researchers used a mixed method approach in order for the<br />

qualitative and quantitative data to allow for research<br />

complementarity. The two datasets were not captured without<br />

some challenges, especially inconsistencies between the data<br />

provided by the survey respondents and the information captured<br />

during focus group discussions and key informant interviews -<br />

particularly the questions related to safety.<br />

Lastly, most household respondents could not easily understand or<br />

differentiate roles played by different public institutions such as the<br />

courts, police, military, regional authority and district authority and<br />

most of the respondents were speculating on roles and<br />

responsibilities - adversely impacting on the accuracy of the<br />

information being provided.<br />

5


The total number of female respondents from the three districts<br />

represented 54% of the entire sample (n=205) and the male 46%<br />

(n=175) (Fig 3). An equal representation of gender as possible is<br />

crucial in identifying the findings of those research areas<br />

disaggregated into male and female; this allows researchers to have<br />

a clear depiction of the differences in experience between the two<br />

genders throughout the entire report.<br />

Figure 3: Respondents by gender<br />

2. PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS<br />

Figure 4: Respondents’ age groups (by gender)<br />

Due to the nature of the study, only respondents above the age of<br />

18 were interviewed. Most of the respondents were between 20<br />

and 49 years of age (n=281) and made up a cumulative 73% of the<br />

sampled population (Fig 4).<br />

6


Most of the respondents (74%) (n=280) in <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> were<br />

married. Single and widowed respondents made up 12% (n=45) and<br />

8% (n=31) respectively, while divorced respondents formed 6% of<br />

the population sample (n= 24) (Fig 5).<br />

Figure 5: Respondents’ marital status<br />

Secondary school education formed 13% and 10% respectively while<br />

only 4% had tertiary education. Additionally, 5% of the sampled<br />

population were self-schooled (Fig 6).<br />

Figure: 6: Respondents’ level of education (by gender)<br />

When disaggregated by level of education, it was observed that the<br />

largest category of respondents (35%) (n=134) had no form of<br />

education, with the female quota being notably greater; forming<br />

25% of the total population compared to 10% males. Of the<br />

respondents with some level of education, most had attended<br />

Madrassa (Quranic School) (29%) while those who had attained an<br />

intermediate level of education made up 14% of the sampled<br />

population. Respondents with Primary School education and<br />

7


3. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE, SECURITY, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS<br />

3.1. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE<br />

3.1.1. Dynamics of Conflict and Violence<br />

While a state of general insecurity had been persisting in the<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> there were very few recalled instances of outright<br />

conflict between clans or groups reported in the past 12 months.<br />

Almost all the respondents (97%) stated that they had not<br />

witnessed clan/group related conflict (Fig 7).<br />

Figure 7: Respondents’ awareness of conflict occurrence<br />

Focus group discussions made it clear that clan conflicts had<br />

dramatically reduced and, currently, the most common types of<br />

disputes had underlying socioeconomic causes- the examples<br />

provided were a large number of land disputes due to the<br />

prolonged absence of a stable central government 3 and family<br />

disputes due to extreme levels of poverty 4 . A business group<br />

discussion participant remarked that “acute poverty and economic<br />

privations in the community are pushing the youth to crimes”,<br />

similarly, the Danynar IDP camp chairperson stated that “the<br />

hardening living conditions and the urban life which is becoming too<br />

demanding are the root causes of the family destruction in the<br />

IDPs”.<br />

3 Religious Leader, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23 March 2014<br />

4 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

8


Figure 8: Respondents’ awareness of conflict occurrence<br />

Figure 9: Respondents’ estimation of the level of conflict (by<br />

gender)<br />

As stated before, the level of conflicts between clans or groups was<br />

remarkably low; none of the respondents interviewed in Kaaraan<br />

District had witnessed this type of conflict in the past 12 months (Fig<br />

8). According to one business group discussion participant “the clan<br />

conflict that Mogadishu was notorious for in the last two decades<br />

have become less obvious” 5 .<br />

3.1.2. Level of Experience<br />

The low levels of inter-group conflict were reported in almost equal<br />

measure by the male and female respondents in the household<br />

survey (Fig 9).<br />

The reported absence of clan conflict did not mean total peace for<br />

the residents in the eastern zone: the emergence of indiscriminate<br />

suicide attacks, hand grenade attacks, targeted killings and mortar<br />

attacks resulted in people living in mortal fear 6 . Additionally,<br />

participants argued that security officers shoot arbitrarily after<br />

suicide attacks, which creates mayhem and sometimes more<br />

victims 7 . Suicide attacks had mainly targeted government buildings,<br />

officers and hotels frequented by government officers or visitors<br />

and were generally located outside the eastern zone; participants<br />

still feel the effects of these attacks - either directly or indirectly<br />

5 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

6 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

7 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

9


through their family members. The prevailing sense of fear emerged<br />

in one focus group discussion 8 where participants requested that<br />

the moderator shorten the discussion 9 in order for them to reach<br />

their homes earlier: participants reported that they came from<br />

remote districts (Karaan, Shibis, Heliwaa and Yakshiid), and did not<br />

feel safe on the way to their homes 10 .<br />

Thugs and local militias mainly targeted shanty houses in the city<br />

and the victims feared reporting the perpetrators (some victims<br />

knew the offenders), due to a fear of retribution and abuse if they<br />

upset the offender(s).<br />

11 Those who reported the perpetrators to the<br />

police claimed that police asked them to bring food for the<br />

suspects, since the victim caused the arrest and the police would<br />

not keep them in their custody otherwise 12 . One of the participants<br />

who lived in a shanty house in Heliwaa district reported an incident<br />

where a man entered their house looking for a young girl who lived,<br />

the girl was not home so the man started to harm the girl’s female<br />

family members 13 . The woman recounting the incident stated that<br />

she suffered a broken arm in the incident (she revealed a crooked,<br />

but healed, broken arm to the discussion participants).<br />

In regard to the causes of conflict; the most commonly cited in the<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> was family disputes (Fig 10).<br />

8 Traditional elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

9 The discussion lasted less than thirty minutes<br />

10 Traditional elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

11 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

12 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

13 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

Figure 10: Respondents’ account of the causes of conflict<br />

By observation, respondents in the household survey were hesitant<br />

to divulge in-depth information on victimisation perhaps for fear of<br />

recrimination. Only 3% of the household survey respondents<br />

admitted having witnessed a crime or incident of violence<br />

committed against someone outside their homestead (Fig 11).<br />

Qualitative participants, on the other hand, reported more<br />

numerous and frequent incidences of crime occurring. In the<br />

women’s focus group discussion a participant stated, “there is a<br />

high possibility that we can be killed after this ‘Workshop’ as there<br />

are those who target people who come for such meetings, we are<br />

going to go under cover after leaving here” 14 .<br />

14 Women Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

10


Figure 11: Respondents’ account of witnessing a crime against<br />

someone outside the homestead<br />

in the qualitative discussions 15 . On the other hand respondents in<br />

the household survey reported fairly high levels of safety (Fig 12).<br />

Figure 12: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area<br />

Many of the suicide attacks in Mogadishu tended to be<br />

indiscriminate and civilians had been caught in explosions or<br />

ensuing crossfire. According to the women discussion participants,<br />

victims from poor backgrounds were more adversely affected since<br />

they could not afford to seek medical care or the victim might have<br />

been the only breadwinner in a large family.<br />

3.1.3. Perception of Safety<br />

There were contradicting reports regarding the perception of safety<br />

in Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>. There were concerns about<br />

extrajudicial killings and haphazard branding of the innocent<br />

bystanders or victims as insurgents along with petty street theft,<br />

extortion by militants and a failing security apparatus - all identified<br />

This apparent contradiction might allude to the high level of<br />

mistrust amongst the community and fear of recriminations<br />

mentioned earlier. Male and female respondents also mentioned<br />

these fairly high levels of safety at nearly equal rates (Fig 13).<br />

15 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

11


Figure 13: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (by<br />

gender)<br />

Figure 14: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (Year on<br />

year trend by gender)<br />

In terms of the change in levels of safety compared to the previous<br />

year, more than half (59%) of the respondents stated that despite<br />

the low levels of security, the situation had improved (Fig 14, 15).<br />

12


Figure 15: Respondents’ perception of safety in the area (year on<br />

year trend by locality)<br />

Participants recounted a lot of varied personal narrations of<br />

violence; however, they were in agreement that serious violent<br />

conflicts, the control of the city by opposing forces, killing of<br />

innocent people, and the soldiers who used to rob the civilians no<br />

longer existed 17 .<br />

Lack of full investigation of incidents and the tendency to blame<br />

every crime and incident in the city on Al-Shabaab without<br />

providing clear evidence and local militias who sometimes set-up<br />

checkpoints at night with the aim of extorting vehicles and<br />

commuters were security concerns raised by Traditional elders<br />

18 ;<br />

with one claiming that “men with government uniforms extorted<br />

commuters at night” 19. According to the elders’ group discussion<br />

participants the Government has [failed] to disarm clan militias.<br />

Although the security situation has apparently improved, according<br />

to the FGD participants some participants still considered<br />

Mogadishu as a non-liveable city “If there is a safe place outside<br />

Somalia that I could reach with my own feet I would not mind going<br />

there so that I can have peace of mind, I am tired of this prolonged<br />

and chronic fear” reported one women’s discussion participant 16.<br />

16 Women Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

17 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

18 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

19 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

13


3.2. SECURITY PROVIDERS<br />

There have been numerous categories of security providers visibly<br />

operating in the various districts of Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>.<br />

There is a formal presence of the Somali National Army, the African<br />

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Police. Informal<br />

security providers, such as traditional elder, play a role in providing<br />

protection to their clan members.<br />

Figure 16: Respondents’ awareness of police presence<br />

3.2.1. Level of Deployment<br />

Unfortunately, the presence of many categories of security<br />

providers has not translated into a corresponding increase in<br />

security provision for all members of the community. There was a<br />

police station in each district but most were in disrepair and barely<br />

functioning. More than half (57%) of the respondents in the<br />

household survey were unaware of the presence of police in their<br />

community (Fig 16). A further 6% were unsure, making the quota of<br />

those who were certain that there were police in their community<br />

36% (n=140). Of those who were aware of the presence of police<br />

within their community, 77% were aware of only one police station<br />

(Fig 17).<br />

Figure 17: Respondents’ estimation of the number of police<br />

stations<br />

14


The Karaan District Deputy Commissioner for Social Affairs stated<br />

that there is a need for a proper police station in the district as the<br />

current facilities have not been renovated in a long time and have<br />

only a single room that serves as a holding cell 20 . According to the<br />

Police Commissioner in Shibis District, not only is the number of<br />

police officers in his district insufficient, but some of them have<br />

health complications that require them to retire 21 . Sentiments<br />

regarding the insufficiency of police officers were also expressed in<br />

several focus group discussions along with observations on the<br />

numerous challenges facing the police such as low and delayed<br />

salaries, lack of sufficient equipment and training 22 .<br />

Figure 18: Respondents’ estimation of distance to police station<br />

It would seem that awareness of police presence is related to<br />

proximity to police stations; because it was observed that of the 140<br />

respondents of the household survey who were aware of police<br />

presence, 91% (n=127) reported that it takes them less than an hour<br />

to get to the closest station (Fig 18). Additionally, 77% of the<br />

respondents who had stated that they were aware of a police<br />

station in their district were aware of only one station (Fig 17).The<br />

Karaan District Police Commissioner highlighted that one police<br />

station was not enough to provide security to the district and<br />

recommended the establishment of police outposts in different<br />

district’s subdivisions 23 .<br />

3.2.2. Preference of the Security Providers<br />

Two thirds (66%) of the sampled population picked traditional<br />

elders as their most preferred security provider in terms of<br />

reporting civil matters. This was a clear majority as compared to<br />

those who named the local authority (13%, with the majority being<br />

male), police (7%) and religious leaders (5%) (Fig 19).<br />

20 Deputy District Commissioner: Social Affairs, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, Key Informant<br />

Interview, Kaaraan, 13 March 2014<br />

21 Police Commissioner, Shibis District, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong><br />

<strong>Zone</strong>, 13 March 2014<br />

22 Religious Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, 4 March 2014 and Youth<br />

Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> , 3 March 2014<br />

23 Karaan District Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong><br />

<strong>Zone</strong>, 16 March 2014<br />

15


Figure 19: Respondents’ preference of reporting civil matters: land<br />

disputes, divorce etc… (by gender)<br />

The same trend was exhibited with regard to the preference of the<br />

respondents in reporting petty crimes. Traditional elders led with<br />

more than half of the respondents (52%); followed by the local<br />

authority (17%), the police (14%) and the religious leaders (5%) (Fig<br />

20).<br />

Figure 21: Respondents’ preference of reporting on serious crimes:<br />

grave assaults, rape and murder (by gender)<br />

Figure 20: Respondents’ preference of reporting on petty crimes:<br />

robbery, household violence (by gender)<br />

Qualitative research participants presumed that police officers were<br />

not committed to their work. Police officers did not respond when<br />

they were called for help unless they were paid and this had<br />

discouraged the poor from using the police service unless the case<br />

was very serious 24 .<br />

Correlations can be surmised between the limited number of police<br />

officers, challenges facing the police and respondents’ perception of<br />

the police, and the preference of reporting crimes. Limited police<br />

24 Women Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

16


stations, outposts, police officers and poor community-police<br />

relations were some of the most notable challenges facing the<br />

police according to the zone Police Commissioner 25 .<br />

Police preference slightly increased when reporting serious crimes;<br />

the police were mentioned by the second largest proportion of<br />

respondents (25%) though the quota of respondents naming<br />

traditional elders as the preferred security provider remained high<br />

(41%) (Fig 21).<br />

business group discussion participants claimed that police feared for<br />

their lives and were reluctant to face criminals 27 : “I witnessed an<br />

incident where perpetrators murdered someone and bystanders<br />

[including an armed police officer] ran for their lives” recalled one<br />

participant.<br />

Figure 22: Most trusted security provider in responding to crime<br />

(by gender)<br />

Survey findings had shown that crimes were not reported to<br />

religious leaders (Fig 19, 20, 21), and qualitative findings revealed<br />

that, although religious leaders were highly respected, their role in<br />

conflict resolution was not prominent. Moreover, the districts did<br />

not have registered Shari’ah offices 26 .<br />

3.2.3. Perception towards Security Providers<br />

The traditional elders were also clear favourites when the<br />

respondents were asked which of the security providers (formal and<br />

informal) they trusted the most to respond to crimes. More than a<br />

third (40%) of the sampled population named traditional elders (Fig<br />

22).<br />

Police insufficiency and poor working conditions are deemed to<br />

affect their performance (hence influencing respondents’<br />

perception), there were reports that police officers in the district<br />

stations did not respond to crime and violence after 9:00 P.M –<br />

25 <strong>Zone</strong> Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23<br />

March 2014<br />

26 Religious leader, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23 March 2014<br />

The most common reasons offered by those who trusted traditional<br />

elders most were that they were respected (46%) and easy to<br />

access (30%) (Fig 23). When the respondents’ low trust in police was<br />

investigated further, the <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> Police Commissioner stated<br />

27 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

17


that “massive arbitrary arrests have damaged citizens’ relations<br />

with the police” and recommended that police operations become<br />

more targeted 28 .<br />

Figure 23: Reason for choice of traditional elders as the most<br />

trusted informal security provider<br />

This suggests that the high levels of preference for traditional elders<br />

as informal security providers were informed more by the ease of<br />

access than by the community’s prejudice against the police.<br />

Many of the qualitative research participants sympathised with the<br />

Police and Somali National Army (SNA) claiming that the national<br />

security providers are not taken care of compared to their<br />

counterparts (AMISOM) 29 . The elders’ group discussion participants<br />

noted, “Somali security providers neither receive enough or regular<br />

salary nor medical care or compensation when they are injured or<br />

die in service 30 .<br />

Figure 24: Respondents’ level of trust in the formal security<br />

provider (Police) (by gender)<br />

Despite the low levels of preference, the formal security providers<br />

still scored generally well in terms of trust, with 80% of the<br />

respondents citing fairly high and very high levels of trust (Fig 24).<br />

28 <strong>Zone</strong> Police Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23<br />

March 2014<br />

29 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

30 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

18


A proportion of respondents reported that the performance of the<br />

police had actually improved compared to the previous year. Almost<br />

half (48%) of the sampled population acknowledged improvement<br />

with a further 40% stating that there had been no change (Fig 25).<br />

Figure 25: Respondents' perception of the performance of the<br />

police - yearly trend (by gender)<br />

sustainable over a long time, the funding could be diverted to build,<br />

train and pay the Somali National Army (SNA) 31 .<br />

A Women’s focus group discussion participant surmised that the<br />

“Somali army can chase after the enemy and deal with them, but<br />

the AMISOM officers just protect senior government officers and<br />

[occupy] the country’s most strategic areas such as the airport,<br />

seaports, military bases and schools. They are never serious about<br />

32<br />

their fight against Al-Shabaab” .<br />

There is an assumption with the presence of AMISOM, peace is<br />

gradually being restored to Mogadishu; however, many (not all) of<br />

the qualitative research participants disagreed - arguing that the<br />

mission has had a deleterious effect on the security situation: “the<br />

emergence of suicide attacks and other atrocities is new and did not<br />

33<br />

precede AMISOM” .<br />

Those who supported AMISOM argued that the mission is successful<br />

and claimed that the gradual restoration of peace to the country<br />

would not have existed without this mission: “When there is a<br />

strong wind, one needs protection and AMISOM offers protection<br />

34.<br />

against insecurity” said one participant<br />

3.2.4. Perception of AMISOM<br />

Researchers sought participants’ perception of the African Union<br />

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); a proportion of the participants<br />

disparaged the mission. The reasons varied from the perceived huge<br />

sums spent on AMISOM operation that was not commensurate with<br />

performance, to the argument that since such operations are not<br />

One participant pointed out that if AMISOM withdraws from an<br />

35<br />

area, local residents move with AMISOM - though this indicates a<br />

lack of sustainability surrounding the security operations.<br />

31 Women Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

32 Women Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

33 Men’s Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

34 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

35 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

19


3.3. JUSTICE PROVIDERS<br />

3.3.1. Level of Deployment<br />

There are courts in all three districts, although the Shibis District<br />

Court was not functional at the time of data collection 36 . Many of<br />

the residents in Shibis district used the service of the neighbouring<br />

Shangaani district in the central zone 37 district – reflected in Figure<br />

26 where no respondents in Shibis reported an awareness of a<br />

court. In all, only 35% of all sampled respondents (n=134) answered<br />

that they were aware of the presence of courts with the majority<br />

(93%) of those further stating that they were aware of only one<br />

court (Fig 27).<br />

courts also lacked facilities necessary for effective operations - such<br />

as vehicles and office equipment 41 .<br />

Figure 26: Respondents' awareness of courts<br />

Even in those districts where District Courts were present, it was<br />

observed that they were not functioning at full capacity, handling<br />

mostly civil matters - specifically family disputes<br />

38 . In addition, the<br />

courts did not have their own premises and were housed under<br />

their respective District Administrations’ offices 39 . There were no<br />

stand-alone courtrooms and trials were held in the same rooms<br />

used as offices by the judicial staff, or district conference halls 40 .The<br />

36 Deputy District Commissioner, Shibis District, Key Informant Interview,<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 13 March 2014<br />

37<br />

Deputy District Commissioner, Shangaani District, Key Informant<br />

Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 17 March 2014<br />

38 District Court Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

39 Traditional elder, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16 March 2014<br />

40 District Court Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

41 District Court Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

20


Figure 27: Respondents’ estimation of the number of courts<br />

Figure 28: Walking distance to the court<br />

Of the 134 respondents who had indicated an awareness of the<br />

existence of courts in their respective districts, 75% stated that it<br />

would take them less than an hour to walk to the closest court (Fig<br />

28). Although courts were seemingly well distributed, survey<br />

respondents did not use their services - 93% of the respondents had<br />

not used a court in the last 12 months (Fig 29).<br />

3.3.2. Performance of the Justice Providers<br />

Many of the qualitative research participants reproached the formal<br />

justice system for incompetence and corruption. Additionally, the<br />

household survey data revealed a very low usage of formal justice<br />

providers (courts) for any issue of justice.<br />

21


Figure 29: Respondents’ usage of courts<br />

Figure 30: Respondents’ usage of courts (by gender)<br />

When the data on usage of courts was analysed along gender lines,<br />

no significant skew in the usage of courts was observed, meaning<br />

that as few women reported using courts for an issue of justice in<br />

the last year as men (Fig 30).<br />

The research revealed that simple cases were mostly taken to<br />

Traditional elders or any other perceived alternative justice provider<br />

to avoid costs (file opening fees, transport, lawyers fee) attached to<br />

the usage of the formal justice system 42 . Business group discussion<br />

participants argued that in the formal justice system, justice is for<br />

sale and decisions are awarded to those who can afford them 43 .<br />

42 Religious leader, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23 March 2014<br />

43 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

A larger proportion of the respondents interviewed in the<br />

household survey (16%) had used traditional elders for an issue of<br />

justice in the past year (Fig 31).There were no significant gender<br />

differences in usage of traditional elders (Fig 32). Qualitative<br />

findings, however, revealed that traditional elders were mostly<br />

referred to in small-scale and less contentious disputes which<br />

needed mediation, but serious disputes, such as land disputes were<br />

demonstrably taken to the formal courts since these institutions<br />

possess the authority of enforcement. The chairperson of the<br />

Regional Court confirmed that most of the civil cases referred to the<br />

court had been related to land disputes “you can see a plot of land<br />

disputed by 5 people with different land ownership documents,<br />

22


there are also buildings with five or more disputants, moreover,<br />

there are houses taken by force which get special consideration in<br />

the court” 44<br />

Figure 32: Respondents’ usage of traditional elders (by gender)<br />

Figure 31: Respondents’ usage of traditional elders<br />

Figure 33: Respondents’ account of referral to the traditional<br />

elders (by gender)<br />

44 Regional Court Chairperson, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

23


Most (80%), out of the 16% (48 out of 60 respondents) who<br />

reported having used traditional elders in the past year, stated that<br />

they had been referred by an elder or a family member (Fig 33).<br />

More than half (51%) of the respondents indicated that the cause of<br />

the dispute submitted to the traditional elders for adjudication had<br />

been household violence (Fig 34). During a Key Informant Interview,<br />

The District Court Commissioner also commented on household<br />

violence saying, “Poor living conditions and unemployment are<br />

contributing to the increase in family disputes” 45 .<br />

Respondents were asked what the issue they took to the elders was<br />

and not whether they were victims, male and female respondents<br />

reported household violence with almost identical frequency (Fig<br />

35); therefore this observation should not be used to infer<br />

victimisation rates.<br />

Figure 35: Respondents' account of issues taken to traditional<br />

elders (by gender)<br />

Figure 34: Respondents’ account of the issues taken to traditional<br />

elders<br />

45 District Court Commissioner, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

24


Figure 36: Respondents’ account on issuance of judgments<br />

Figure 37: Respondents’ account on the enforcement of judgments<br />

Of those who had used traditional elders for the provision of justice<br />

in the past year, 82% went on to state that a judgment had been<br />

issued (Fig 36). A futher 96% of those who had received a judgment<br />

recalled that judgements had been enforced (Fig 37).<br />

As discussed above, most of the land disputes were referred or<br />

taken to the courts, however, some participants claimed that courts<br />

have failed to deliver justice on land disputes. According to a District<br />

Police Commissioner whose name is withheld 46 land dispute cases<br />

were charged without even visiting the disputed land or involving<br />

the right witnesses and local authorities in the trial process “the<br />

police in the district were asked to enforce a land-related court<br />

judgement… when we reached the land under dispute we found a<br />

large family living there, we requested them to vacate the land<br />

,however, they did not know that their land had been transferred to<br />

another owner… currently there are many land related judgements<br />

which we do not want to enforce because the judgement is<br />

46 He consented to be used his name the report, but researchers found the<br />

information sensitive and have chosen that he remains anonymous<br />

25


faulty.” 47 The Regional Court Chairperson conceded that there could<br />

be errors since all government institutions are still weak and lacking<br />

capacity 48 . A point was made by a religious leader that “effective<br />

justice provision is a precursor to the stabilisation of the country” 49 .<br />

Figure 38: Respondents’ usage of religious leaders (by gender)<br />

As mentioned above, the usage of religious leaders in Mogadishu’s<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> was reported to be very low - only 3% of the sampled<br />

respondents had used religious leaders for an issue of justice in the<br />

past 12 months (Fig 38). A key informant stated that religious<br />

leaders are not commonly used in the districts because, as<br />

mentioned before, there are no registered Shari’ah offices in<br />

50<br />

Mogadishu .<br />

3.3.3. Perception of Justice Providers<br />

47 Police Commissioner, Shibis District, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong><br />

<strong>Zone</strong>, 13 March 2014<br />

48 Regional Court Chairperson, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 16<br />

March 2014<br />

49 Religious leader, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23 March 2014<br />

50 Religious leader, Key Informant Interview, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 23 March 2014<br />

Traditional elders as informal justice providers continued to show<br />

predominance over other providers when the survey respondents<br />

were asked who they trust the most to solve cases. With 48% of the<br />

total sampled population naming traditional leaders, 30% naming<br />

religious leaders and only 14% naming the formal courts, it was<br />

clear that the informal justice providers in Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong><br />

zone were more trusted than the formal justice system (Fig 39).<br />

26


Figure 39: Respondents’ trust of justice providers<br />

covertly involved in high profile cases and influence the decision of<br />

the court to the disadvantage of litigants without access to such<br />

connections 52 . Interestingly, even religious leaders stated that they<br />

trust traditional elders because of justice, honesty and lack of<br />

corruption and prejudice. 53<br />

Figure 40: Respondents’ trust of justice providers (by gender)<br />

The preference across the various justice providers was expressed<br />

at approximately equal rates for both male and female respondents,<br />

suggesting that gender considerations did not influence the<br />

preference of one justice provider over the other (Fig 40).<br />

It was revealed in qualitative interviews that most members of the<br />

community avoid the formal courts because they are costly and<br />

vulnerable to corruption and miscarriage of justice 51 . Particularly,<br />

traditional elders expressed the concern that prominent persons<br />

such as members of parliament, senior police officials, some<br />

traditional elders and military personnel often get overtly, or<br />

51 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

The household survey reflected those sentiments, showing that out<br />

of those who had said that they trust the traditional elders the<br />

most, more than half (51%) gave their reason as fair judgments (Fig<br />

41), again without any gender related distinctions.<br />

52 Traditional Elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

53 Religious Leaders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

27


Figure 41: Respondents’ reason of choice (by gender)<br />

Figure 42: Respondents’ level of confidence in the formal justice<br />

system<br />

In sum, it was observed that the level of confidence in the formal<br />

justice system was generally low with a cumulative 62% of the<br />

entire sampled population stating that they were either fairly<br />

confident or not confident at all (Fig 42). Additionally, 37% of<br />

respondents identified no change in the performance of formal<br />

courts which was marginally greater than those who stated that<br />

there had been an improvement at 32% (Fig 43)<br />

28


Figure 43: Respondents' perception of the performance of the<br />

formal court (yearly trend0<br />

29


3.4. GOVERNANCE PROVIDERS<br />

3.4.1. Level of Deployment<br />

The volatile security situation in Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> has<br />

hampered effective local governance and service provision. The<br />

findings revealed no evidence of the existence of local councils in<br />

Mogadishu districts as (91%) of the household survey respondents<br />

stated that they were not aware of the presence of a local council in<br />

their district (Fig 44). There were, however, District Administrations<br />

in each district headed by a District commissioner appointed by the<br />

Mayor and deputy Commissioners 54 . Those Administrations<br />

performed local services provision within the city, much like a local<br />

council would. Awareness of services provided by the district<br />

administration could be interpreted as awareness of its presence.<br />

Most of the respondents (81%) were aware of the services provided<br />

(Fig 45). Each of the districts in Mogadishu has several divisions<br />

(waax), each Waax is divided into sub-divisions (laan) and each<br />

Laan is split into neighbourhoods, with such a structure an effective<br />

district level governance system could be set in place had each<br />

(waax) been equally represented.<br />

Figure 45: Respondents’ awareness of the services provided by the<br />

district administrations (by gender)<br />

Figure 44: Respondents’ awareness of local council<br />

54 Business Group, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 3 March 2014<br />

30


3.4.2. Performance of the Governance providers<br />

Figure 46: Respondents’ awareness of communication channels<br />

Provision of social services had stagnated since the collapse of the<br />

former regime; many of the public schools had been demolished<br />

and were out of service, while others had been rehabilitated by<br />

either local and/or international NGOs and were still under their<br />

control. 55 Recently, a handful of schools across the districts had<br />

been rehabilitated by the Aada-Skoolada “go to schools” project - a<br />

free universal primary education initiative run by the Ministry of<br />

Education that aimed to send 1 million children to school – though<br />

the progress of this project seemed to be very slow.<br />

More than half (58%) of the respondents who were aware of the<br />

existence of local administration were also aware of the existence<br />

of channels of communication between the community and their<br />

administrators (Fig 46).<br />

Equal quotas of men and women expressed awareness of the<br />

existence of channels of communication (Fig 47) - 7 of which had<br />

participated in local administration consultations representing (Fig<br />

48).<br />

55 Deputy District Commissioner, Kaaraan District, Key Informant Interview,<br />

<strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 13 March 2014<br />

31


Figure 47: Respondents’ awareness of communication channels<br />

(by gender)<br />

Figure 48: Respondents’ participation in local government<br />

consultations<br />

Interestingly, none of the respondents from Yakshiid district, from<br />

where the largest sample of respondents had been drawn, had<br />

participated in local administration consultations in the past year<br />

(Fig 48).<br />

3.4.3. Perception of Governance Providers<br />

In spite of the low levels of awareness and interaction the majority<br />

of the respondents in <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong> still believed in the importance<br />

of having elected representatives at the local administration level<br />

(Fig 49).<br />

32


Figure 49: Respondents’ perception towards the importance of<br />

elected representatives<br />

Figure 50: Respondents’ opinion about important services<br />

provided by the local council<br />

There were relatively few responses when the respondents were<br />

questioned as to what the most important service offered by the<br />

local administration was. This may point towards low levels of<br />

service delivery or low levels of information provided about the<br />

services offered. Security was nonetheless cited as the most<br />

important service provided by the local administration, having<br />

been mentioned 16 times (Fig 50).<br />

Conversely however, the response rate was much higher when<br />

respondents were asked about the most pressing local issues.<br />

Unemployment, poor education and poor health were the top 3<br />

most cited problems, being attributed to 296, 267 and 209<br />

responses respectively. Poor sanitation, bad health centres, lack of<br />

infrastructure, lack of water, weak economy and shortage of<br />

electricity supply were also frequently mentioned (Fig 51).<br />

33


Figure 51: Respondents’ opinions about the most pressing local issues<br />

Most of the research participants were not familiar with the<br />

services provided by the district administrations, and if they were,<br />

they expressed a level of discontent: education and, sanitation and<br />

health (WASH) services were the most desirable services in each of<br />

the districts in the <strong>Eastern</strong> zone 56 . Most of the schools and hospitals<br />

in the districts (barring a few exceptions) were privately owned and<br />

poor families did not have access to these services due to their<br />

limited resources. According to the Traditional elders’ discussion<br />

participants “poor parents cannot send their children to school and<br />

children become idle which is very risky”.<br />

56 Traditional elders, Focus Group Discussion, <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, 4 March 2014<br />

34


4. CONCLUSION<br />

Though there has been a marked reduction in armed conflict in<br />

Mogadishu’s <strong>Eastern</strong> <strong>Zone</strong>, the state of security still remains<br />

volatile. There were reports indicating the proliferation of small<br />

arms and illegal operations carried out by unknown militia groups<br />

for the purposes of extortion. Petty theft and targeted killings were<br />

the most common security concerns put forward by the qualitative<br />

research participants.<br />

A largely ineffective security apparatus: lacking in facilities,<br />

equipment, resources and an effective coordination mechanism;<br />

only serves to exacerbate the volatile security problem. It was<br />

claimed that the police seldom respond to violent crimes. The<br />

presence of AMISOM troops did not effectively fill the security<br />

provision gap in the opinion of the research participants, perhaps<br />

because the participants were not well informed as to the extent of<br />

the mission’s mandate. AMISOM nonetheless was perceived to have<br />

had a deterrent effect on potential violent elements.<br />

The local administrations also suffer in terms of service delivery and<br />

outreach within the community. Most of the respondents were not<br />

aware that there is any form of local government and those who<br />

were, were not particularly knowledgeable about the sort of<br />

services provided.<br />

In sum, while there are indications that the holistic situation is<br />

improving in the districts there is still a long way to go in delivering<br />

adequate justice, security and governance services. There is a need<br />

for investment to strengthen the security apparatus, empowering<br />

the formal security and justice providers, as well as taking steps to<br />

tackle the proliferation of small arms.<br />

In addition to this, the justice system has suffered adversely from<br />

years of conflict and lacks the trust of the community. The courts<br />

have fallen into disrepair and are under-funded, and the judges fear<br />

that carrying out their mandate puts them in danger of reprisals.<br />

The void they leave is filled by traditional elders who, whilst<br />

managing to maintain some semblance of peace and order, are also<br />

accused by the police of interference and can be perceived to be<br />

undermining the formal justice system.<br />

35


5. ANNEXES<br />

Annex 5.1: Sample size<br />

z 2<br />

(P) (1-P) (f)<br />

e<br />

2<br />

Where:<br />

z= confidence interval (95%)<br />

P= P-Value which assumed some security correlation within the cluster (0.3)<br />

f= is the sample design effect (1.5)<br />

e= the margin of error to be attained (+ or – 5%)<br />

36


Annex 5.2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS<br />

Access to Justice<br />

Civil case<br />

Clan<br />

Conflict<br />

Criminal case<br />

District Safety Committee<br />

Enforcement<br />

Formal Justice System<br />

Gender<br />

Governance provider<br />

Informal Justice System<br />

Justice Provider<br />

Justice System<br />

People’s ability to solve disputes and reach adequate remedies for grievances, using formal or<br />

traditional justice systems. The justice process has qualitative dimensions, and it should be in<br />

accordance with human rights principles and standards.<br />

Non-criminal cases relating to civil wrongs and disputes between individuals, including generally<br />

property, business, personal domestic problems, divorces and such types where ones constitutional<br />

and personal rights are breached<br />

The clan is a system characterized by a chain of paternal ancestors reaching back to a perceived<br />

founding ancestor whose name all members of the clan share for identity<br />

State of disharmony between incompatible persons, ideas, or interests<br />

An action, suit, or cause instituted to punish an infraction of the criminal laws of a country<br />

A representative body comprised of a broad cross section of civil society that acts in an advisory<br />

capacity to the local government in issues of community security and safety<br />

Relates to the implementation of orders, decisions and settlements emerging from formal or informal<br />

adjudication. Enforcement bodies include police and prisons, and administrative bodies in particular<br />

cases.<br />

Traditional systems may also have specific mechanisms of enforcement. Enforcement systems are the<br />

key to ensuring accountability and minimize impunity, thus preventing further injustices.<br />

A codified system of laws and court proceedings enforced by recognized actors of lawyers, police and<br />

justice officials<br />

The formal justice system involves civil and criminal justice and includes formal state-based justice<br />

institutions and procedures, such as police, prosecution, courts (religious and secular) and custodial<br />

measures.<br />

"Gender" refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given<br />

society considers appropriate for men and women.<br />

Formal institutions or Individuals that act, process, or possess the authority of governing<br />

Dispute resolution mechanisms falling outside the scope of the formal justice system. The term<br />

informal justice system is used here to draw a distinction between state-administered formal justice<br />

systems and non-state administered informal justice systems.<br />

Formal or Informal Institutions or individuals that are responsible to provide fair and equitable<br />

treatment of all individuals under the law (customary, formal or Sharia)<br />

Includes formal justice institutions and procedures, such as police, prosecution, courts and prisons, as<br />

37


well as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and other informal and traditional systems (e.g. a council<br />

of elders).<br />

The justice system includes coordination and other arrangements among its different components that<br />

influence overall outcomes on access to justice<br />

Land/water disputes A state of debate or quarrel between/among persons, groups or communities over the property, the<br />

use, etc. of plots or swathes of land and water points<br />

Local Authority<br />

Those invested with formal power, especially a government or body of government officials at district<br />

level<br />

Petty Crimes<br />

Criminal offense that is less serious than a serious crime and generally punishable by a monetary fine,<br />

forfeiture or a jail term of up to a year, or a combination of both.<br />

Security Provider<br />

Formal or informal Institutions or individuals that are responsible for the protection of persons,<br />

dwellings, communities or the nation from harm<br />

Serious Crimes<br />

Criminal offense that is more serious than a petty crime and which can be punished by one or more<br />

years in prison<br />

Violence<br />

The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person,<br />

or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury,<br />

death, psychological harm, or deprivation<br />

Xeer<br />

A customary law system that has evolved from a basis of clan relations, with some influence of Islamic<br />

law (Sharia), that employs mediation and negotiation through the use of traditional elders.<br />

Youth Men and Women between the age of 15 and 30<br />

38

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