Underneath the Golden Boy - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

76 Underneath the Golden Boy
(b) Such display is unnecessary for the expression of any ideas or for any
other legitimate purpose. 146
14.(2) In this section “hate materials” are materials which advocate, promote, or
express hatred against any identifiable group.
Calling for Boycott
15.(1) It is an unlawful act to publicly advocate, promote, or express hatred
against any identifiable group while calling for a boycott against such group or its
members;
15.(2) In this section “calling for” includes:
(a) Urging the initiation or commencement of a boycott irrespective of
whether or not the boycott materializes;
(b) Urging the continuation or participation in a boycott that has
commenced;
(c) Pressuring people to participate in a boycott by methods such as
picketing, threats of retaliation, or recording and revelation of the names of
participants or non-participants.
15.(3) In this section “boycott” includes
(a) Refusing to conduct business with or to maintain a business,
professional, or academic relationship with members of such group;
(b) Refusing to conduct business with or to maintain a business,
professional, or academic relationship with an enterprise or institution
affront to dignity against any individual or group without more. Furthermore, this provision is
substantially narrower in scope than the general prohibition against hate speech or materials
“indicating discrimination” as that term has been interpreted in the cases which I criticized in
the article referred to in Lipsett 1983, supra note 10.
The types of materials that I have in mind for this section includes extraordinarily large and
widely visible billboards, or neon or other electrical signs of that nature that light up the night
and are visible from a great distance. I am not referring to ordinary methods of
communication—such as books, articles, newspapers, pamphlets, letters, signs, buttons, or
placards. Perhaps a provision such as this is unnecessary or unworkable, or in need of major
redrafting. However, I am suggesting considering such a provision out of an abundance of
caution to avoid any lacuna in the law that might be created by the elimination of general
“hate” provisions and of wide-ranging provisions dealing with signs “indicating discrimination.”
146
Clause (1)(b) may actually be redundant as it is hard to see how such materials could be
necessary for expression of ideas. Indeed such methods of communication may be inimical to
rational consideration and analysis of ideas, and could resemble (or even overlap) material or
circumstances referred to in section 10 or 12. The clause is only added as a precaution against
over-broad interpretation or overzealous application of this section.