Underneath the Golden Boy - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

Underneath the Golden Boy - Robson Hall Faculty of Law Underneath the Golden Boy - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

robsonhall.ca
from robsonhall.ca More from this publisher
30.01.2015 Views

22 Underneath the Golden Boy PART I The debate over the extent freedom of expression can legitimately be restricted in order to protect equality and social harmony continues. In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 4-3 majority, upheld the “wilfull promotion of hatred against any identifiable group” provision in s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code 3 in R. v. Keegstra. 4 That provision, through a definition in s. 318(4), then only covered “colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.” While acknowledging its interference with freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 5 , the Court held that it was a “reasonable limit” under s. 1. In so holding, it emphasized the importance of protecting the constitutionally and internationally protected values of equality and multiculturalism and our obligations to prohibit certain forms of hate messages under Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 6 and Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 7 It relied on the strict mens rea requirement derived from the word “wilfull”, its attempts to narrow the concept of “hatred”, and the defences in s. 319(3)—particularly those of “religious opinion” in (b) and “reasonable belief” in (c) 8 —to uphold the proportionality of the legislation. On the same day, that Court also upheld, by a 4–3 majority, s. 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 9 (to the extent that it dealt with race or religion, the other “prohibited grounds of discrimination” were not dealt with in that decision) in Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Taylor. 10 Section 13(1) reads: 3 Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code reads: “Everyone who, by communicating statements other than in private conversation, willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.” 4 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 5 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 schedule B [Charter]. 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.171. 7 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 8 Section 319(3)(b) then read “if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an opinion on a religious subject.” Section 319(3)(c) reads: “if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to be true;” 9 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S., 1985, c. H-6. 10 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892.

Hate Communication Restriction and Freedom of Expression 23 It is a discriminatory practice … to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly…any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. Unlike s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code, this provision does not contain a mens rea requirement. Being a human rights provision rather than a criminal provision, the effect of the material was ruled sufficient to engender liability; intention was deemed to be irrelevant. Furthermore, no “defences” akin to those in s. 319(3) of the Criminal Code are found in this provision. However, the restriction on freedom of expression was held to be proportional largely on the basis of the limited remedy then available for a violation of the section. At that time, the only sanction that a tribunal could impose was in effect a cease and desist order. Payment of compensation, available for other breaches of this Act, did not apply here. A respondent could not be liable to a fine or imprisonment unless he disobeyed such order. Disobedience would be deemed contempt of the Federal Court of Canada. Other Criminal Code “hate speech” related provisions whose constitutionality have not been ruled on by the Supreme Court of Canada are s. 318, prohibiting “advocating or promoting genocide”, s. 319(1) prohibiting inciting hatred in a public place “where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace”, s. 320 dealing with the seizure and forfeiture of “hate propaganda”, and s. 320.1 dealing with the deletion of “hate propaganda” from computer systems. 11 The Supreme Court, however, ruled the “false news” provisions of the Criminal Code, s. 181 to be unconstitutional 12 in a case involving a Holocaust denier. Other relevant provisions whose constitutionality have not been ruled on by the Supreme Court are provisions of the Customs Tariff 13 prohibiting importing “hate propaganda” into Canada 14 and the various regulations concerning radio and television prohibiting “abusive comment…likely to expose hatred or contempt… .” 15 11 Note also s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code which makes “bias, prejudice or hate…” as a motivation for a crime “aggravating circumstances” concerning sentence. This is a “hate crime” rather than a “hate speech” provision, and the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet ruled on its constitutionality. For an American case which upheld a scheme of “sentence enhancement” for “hate crimes” see Wisconsin v. Mitchell 113 S. Ct 2194 (1993). 12 R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731. 13 S.C. 1997, c. 36. 14 Section 136(1) Tariff Item 9899.00.00(b). 15 Radio Regulations 1986, S.O.R./86-982, s. 3(b) and s. 3(i).; Television Broadcasting Regulations 1987, S.O.R./87-49, s. 5(i)(b) and s. 5(1.1); Pay Television Regulations 1990, S.O.R./90-105, s. 3(2)(b) and s. 3(3); Specialty Services Regulations 1990, S.O.R. 90-106, s. 3; Broadcasting Distribution Regulations, S.O.R. 97/555, s. 8(1)(b) and s. 8(2).

Hate Communication Restriction and Freedom <strong>of</strong> Expression 23<br />

It is a discriminatory practice … to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so<br />

communicated, repeatedly…any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to<br />

hatred or contempt by reason <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that that person or those persons are identifiable<br />

on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> a prohibited ground <strong>of</strong> discrimination.<br />

Unlike s. 319(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Criminal Code, this provision does not contain a<br />

mens rea requirement. Being a human rights provision ra<strong>the</strong>r than a criminal<br />

provision, <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> material was ruled sufficient to engender liability;<br />

intention was deemed to be irrelevant. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, no “defences” akin to those<br />

in s. 319(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Criminal Code are found in this provision. However, <strong>the</strong><br />

restriction on freedom <strong>of</strong> expression was held to be proportional largely on <strong>the</strong><br />

basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> limited remedy <strong>the</strong>n available for a violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> section. At that<br />

time, <strong>the</strong> only sanction that a tribunal could impose was in effect a cease and<br />

desist order. Payment <strong>of</strong> compensation, available for o<strong>the</strong>r breaches <strong>of</strong> this Act,<br />

did not apply here. A respondent could not be liable to a fine or imprisonment<br />

unless he disobeyed such order. Disobedience would be deemed contempt <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Canada.<br />

O<strong>the</strong>r Criminal Code “hate speech” related provisions whose<br />

constitutionality have not been ruled on by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Canada are s.<br />

318, prohibiting “advocating or promoting genocide”, s. 319(1) prohibiting<br />

inciting hatred in a public place “where such incitement is likely to lead to a<br />

breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peace”, s. 320 dealing with <strong>the</strong> seizure and forfeiture <strong>of</strong> “hate<br />

propaganda”, and s. 320.1 dealing with <strong>the</strong> deletion <strong>of</strong> “hate propaganda” from<br />

computer systems. 11 The Supreme Court, however, ruled <strong>the</strong> “false news”<br />

provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Criminal Code, s. 181 to be unconstitutional 12 in a case<br />

involving a Holocaust denier. O<strong>the</strong>r relevant provisions whose constitutionality<br />

have not been ruled on by <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court are provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Customs<br />

Tariff 13 prohibiting importing “hate propaganda” into Canada 14 and <strong>the</strong> various<br />

regulations concerning radio and television prohibiting “abusive<br />

comment…likely to expose hatred or contempt… .” 15<br />

11<br />

Note also s. 718.2(a)(i) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Criminal Code which makes “bias, prejudice or hate…” as a<br />

motivation for a crime “aggravating circumstances” concerning sentence. This is a “hate crime”<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r than a “hate speech” provision, and <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Canada has not yet ruled on<br />

its constitutionality. For an American case which upheld a scheme <strong>of</strong> “sentence enhancement”<br />

for “hate crimes” see Wisconsin v. Mitchell 113 S. Ct 2194 (1993).<br />

12<br />

R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.<br />

13<br />

S.C. 1997, c. 36.<br />

14<br />

Section 136(1) Tariff Item 9899.00.00(b).<br />

15<br />

Radio Regulations 1986, S.O.R./86-982, s. 3(b) and s. 3(i).; Television Broadcasting<br />

Regulations 1987, S.O.R./87-49, s. 5(i)(b) and s. 5(1.1); Pay Television Regulations 1990,<br />

S.O.R./90-105, s. 3(2)(b) and s. 3(3); Specialty Services Regulations 1990, S.O.R. 90-106, s. 3;<br />

Broadcasting Distribution Regulations, S.O.R. 97/555, s. 8(1)(b) and s. 8(2).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!