Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
<strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Identity</strong> <strong>Politics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> (<strong>Post</strong>-)<strong>Transitional</strong> <strong>Societies</strong><br />
2003, 5 Čaplj<strong>in</strong>a 2007). Dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> presidential campaign <strong>in</strong> 2009 <strong>in</strong> Croatia, <strong>the</strong> major<br />
promise of <strong>the</strong> (non-elected) presidential candidate of HDZ (A. Hebrang) was to<br />
erect a monument to Tuđman <strong>in</strong> Zagreb. Željko Kerum, mayor of Split, promised to<br />
erect a Tuđman monument on <strong>the</strong> seafront promenade, contrary to <strong>the</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion of city<br />
urbanists. There are numerous examples of sculptural or name memorialization (a bust<br />
of Tuđman placed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Croatian Parliament, <strong>the</strong> bridge at Osjek, etc.).<br />
The importance of monument policy can be seen <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision of Split city council<br />
(October 2007) to erect 21 monuments to important figures <strong>in</strong> Croatian and Split<br />
history, which provoked a huge debate around Miljenko Smoje, a deceased humorist<br />
writer accused of pro-Yugoslavian and leftist statements, as be<strong>in</strong>g unworthy of hav<strong>in</strong>g a<br />
monument <strong>in</strong> Split. 6<br />
To what extent monument policy was l<strong>in</strong>ked to ethnic identity could be seen through<br />
demands for “ethnic purity” <strong>in</strong> construct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> monuments. When <strong>the</strong> monument to<br />
<strong>the</strong> defenders of Makarska (Croatia) was created <strong>the</strong> rumour was spread that <strong>the</strong> grass<br />
around <strong>the</strong> monument had been brought from <strong>the</strong> Republika Srpska. The mayor had to<br />
address <strong>the</strong> media and guarantee on his honour that it was not <strong>the</strong> case. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
side, <strong>the</strong> Serbian Church <strong>in</strong> Kosovo argued that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> reconstruction of <strong>the</strong> sacral<br />
objects destroyed after <strong>the</strong> riots <strong>in</strong> 2004 <strong>the</strong> participation of non-Orthodox workers<br />
should not be allowed.<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>in</strong> Serbia, monuments had been created to fulfil several tasks:<br />
- Monuments to Nikola Pašić contribute to <strong>the</strong> Serbianization of history, as Pašić<br />
was a Serbian political leader oppos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Yugoslavian idea. Nationalists wanted<br />
to promote him as a role-model for today’s politicians. He also had to be a l<strong>in</strong>k<br />
towards <strong>the</strong> “glorious” Serbian past, which had been erased from history books<br />
and <strong>the</strong> collective memory of <strong>the</strong> people.<br />
- The Draža Mihajlović monument challenged <strong>the</strong> official history of <strong>the</strong> communist<br />
anti-fascist partisan movement. It is a monument br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g a completely new<br />
narrative to <strong>the</strong> collective memory, as well as monuments to Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava, 7<br />
Karađorđe and Nikola Tesla.<br />
At first sight it might seem strange why <strong>the</strong>se personalities have been regarded <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
same category. It is important to underl<strong>in</strong>e that <strong>the</strong> monument policy beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>the</strong>se<br />
projects was <strong>the</strong> same. This policy wanted to <strong>in</strong>scribe Serbianhood on <strong>the</strong> face of <strong>the</strong><br />
5<br />
This was 3.20 metres high, donated by <strong>the</strong> Diaspora.<br />
6<br />
http://www.glasdalmacije.hr/show=0&article=4777, 15 October 2007, accessed 27 May<br />
2010.<br />
7<br />
The desecularization process was followed by <strong>the</strong> return of Sa<strong>in</strong>t Sava as a public figure<br />
(created by <strong>the</strong> autonomous Serbian Orthodox Church) and celebrated with a great number<br />
of his monuments erected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990 s .<br />
38