Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

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Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies place and put in the park surrounding the Museum of Contemporary Arts. Municipalities in Serbia also removed Tito’s monuments and streets named by Tito returned to previous names (except in Sarajevo and Skopje). All eight cities of Yugoslavia which added Tito’s name (Velenje, Korenica, Drvar, Vrbas, Užice, Mitrovica, Titograd and Velenje) have dropped its prefix or returned to the old name (Titograd – Podgorica). The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was and is still complex. In cities and regions where one ethnic army had dominated, the codes and symbols of the “mother-nation” were adopted and local historical figures, if from a minority ethnic group, removed from their pedestals, such as the Aleksa Šantić monument in Mostar. Aleksa Šantić was a poet who already in the 19th century celebrated multiculturalism, and whose poems, Emina and Stay her, have been celebrated throughout the socialist period as promoting intercultural sensitivity and understanding. On the other hand, names of streets in Banja Luka reflect medieval and heroic Serbian history, while traces of Croatian or Bosnian (Muslim) presence have disappeared from the city (Horozović, 1994). In Serbia, schizophrenic Milošević policies, praising at the same time socialism and nationalism, reflected a semblance of continuity, while, in reality, they conquered and colonized the collective subconsciousness with an idealized past and started to search for new roots of Serbianhood and new features of identity. So, although the Milošević government did not create any memory policy, by liberating the field for nationalism and “giving wings” to nationalism in cultural institutions, they created a platform for anti-cultural behaviour (Slapšak, 2009 and Kodrnja et al., 2010), where local politicians or opinion-makers celebrated even fascism (for example Ljotić in Smederevo) or rehabilitated controversial soldier-politicians like Draža Mihajlović, claiming that they were “judged and killed by communists just for being Serbian patriots”. Unfortunately, this policy of oblivion regarding war crimes of Chetniks or the Nedić collaborator forces during the Second World War has continued after political changes in 2001. The cities wanting to show their patriotism, started “ordering” monuments from the sculptor Drinka Radovanović, whose name in artistic circles was unknown, but who was known among nationalists as a good (realistic) sculptor of historical figures such as Karađorđe, leader of the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in 1804. So, monuments to “people’s heroes” from the Second World War disappeared, replaced by sculptures of heroes from the First and Second Serbian Uprising against the Turks, and this was especially reflected by schools, who started quickly, without any outside pressure, to change their names. Consequently, through annihilation and appropriation strategies the landscapes in cities and regions throughout former Yugoslavia changed – new types of monuments, colours representing the emblem of a nation, flags and names of the streets, squares and institutions appeared and colonized the collective consciousness and collective memory, thus contributing to ethnicization of community memories and behaviour. 36
Cultural policies, identities and monument building in Southeastern Europe Model of “culturalization” in heritage policy The other (rarer) model of memory policy and the relationship towards heritage and history could be called the model of “culturalization”, which in fact represented decontextualization through univerzalization or musealization. Examples of this were the move of the Boris Kidrič Belgrade statue (sculptor Nikola Janković) from the centre of the city to the Sculpture Park of the Museum of Contemporary Arts, or the removal of the Tito monumental sculpture from the Main Square in Užice to the back of the Užice City Museum. In this sense sculpture lost its political and ideological meaning and became a “piece of art” with no context and thus emptied of any sense. The other possible strategy of the “culturalization” model – respect of the heritage of “the other” – has not yet been applied in Southeastern Europe. In modern European cultural policies there are efforts by Polish cultural operators to integrate lost and forgotten Jewish culture in contemporary cultural life, mostly through festivals. In Latvia there are attempts to safeguard Liiv culture. In both cases, the culture of “the other” is seen as a threat to national cultural identity except for those other communities who have disappeared. In Southeastern Europe only under the influence of the international community or international donors are monuments “of others” rebuilt or protected. Phase II – Nation (re)building: models of culturalization and anti-culture Strategy of monument building within new identity policies The second phase in monument building policy as part of a memory and identity policy was the phase of creation of new monuments to express the changes in national identity and values. In countries which celebrated their independence and freedom it was clear that monuments to those who are pillars of national identity or to those who contributed to the achievement of independence had to be erected. Through a lot of private initiatives, monuments to Ustashi leaders, such as Mile Budak and Jura Francetić, were created in their native villages, but in 2004 the Croatian Government decided to destroy them, in order not to endanger its democratic and antifascist image. 3 Monuments or memorial plaques to Tuđman started quickly to be created in both Croatia (Selce, Kaštel Lukšić, Pitomača, Škabrnja, Slavonski brod 2006, Bibinje 2007, 4 Benkovac 2008, Podbablje 2009, Pleternica 2009) and Herzegovina (Široki brijeg 3 http://forum.b92.net/index.phpshowtopic=13861&st=90 4 This was 2.70 metres high, with a pedestal of 4 metres, donated by the state and the municipality. http://www.ezadar.hr/clanak/bibinjci-otkrili-spomenik-franji-tudmanu, accessed 12 April 2010. 37
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Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

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