Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

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Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies remnants of the Vojna Krajina lasted another 114 years, till the descendants of the “free Serbian peasant soldiers” were expelled from the Knin region and Slavonia in 1995. In historical times, the identity of the peasant soldiers was primarily a religious, Orthodox one. A Serbian national identity started to develop only in the 19th century, when Austrian authorities sympathized with the Serbian national awakening, including the codification of the language, as a means of interfering with the destabilization process of the Ottoman Empire and with the self-understanding and self-definition of Serbian nationalism. Retrospectively, in the light of the interethnic contradictions in Yugoslavia, the Austrian Military Border was interpreted from a national perspective, which overshadowed and determined conflicts between central and provincial authorities, as well as between the national identities of Serbs and Croats. In other words, old differences were redefined along actual lines of conflict. The second half of the 19th century was defined by multiple ethnic and language identities in the region, showing various combinations between religion, class, national identity and political loyalty (see Komlosy, 2006): - in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire (Carniola, Goerz-Gradisca, the littoral with Istria and Trieste, Dalmatia, the Military Border/Vojna Krajina until 1881): German Austrians and other representatives and administrators of the dynasty and the Viennese government, Slovenes, Italians, Magyars, Croats, Serbs and Romanians; - in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire: Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Germans and Muslims; since 1867, Hungarian representatives and administrators of the dynasty and the Budapest government; - in Bosnia after 1878: Serbs, Muslims, Croats; representatives/administrators of the occupants; - In Serbia: Serbs, Muslims; - In Montenegro: Serbs; - In the Ottoman Empire (with diminishing scope): representatives/administrators of the Ottoman dynasty and the authorities of Constantinople, Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians and Bulgarians. For Austrian politics the total change of political power relations in 1878/1881 (Bosnia was submitted to Austria and the Vojna Krajina dissapeared as an administrative body) had two implications. The occupation, conquest, pacification and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a certain extent symbolized strength and geopolitical gains. This strength relied on the chance offered by the Western powers to take over the rule of Bosnia, while, formally, Ottoman sovereignty was maintained (until annexation in 1908). Austrian occupation faced severe resistance from the provincial Muslim elites, who involved the Habsburg troops in a heavy, colonial war, leading to their subordination 16
Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective to Austrian rulers. After a short period the Habsburg colonial administration was able to present itself – at least at home and vis-à-vis the so-called international community – as a civilizing and modernizing force, gaining the support of Muslim elites not only by respecting their religion, but also by acknowledging their specific Bosniak nationality, combining Slavic language with Muslim belief. While Bosnia seemed to be a success story, the Compromise of 1867 with the Hungarian elites, who insisted on political autonomy for the lands of the Hungarian Crown, realized through the setting up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (also known as the Dual Monarchy or k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich) Monarchy), was a sign of internal weakness. After the settlement relating to the Dual Monarchy, the Hungarian government was free to pursue independent nationality policies within its sub-empire which contradicted the Austrian ones. While Austria relied on the multi-ethnic character of dynastic rule, Hungary aimed at national homogenization through Magyarization. In Croatia-Slavonia Hungarian centralization met Croatian resistance, opening the path to the Croatian Compromise (1868), which meant a strengthening of the Croatian elites. Austrian geopolitical strength demonstrated through its expansion into Bosnia soon turned into a trap in an economic and political sense. Expensive infrastructural projects did not pay socially and politically. A consensus could not be reached with the Serbian population in Bosnia as it was defined dynastically under Habsburg rule. Already the Compromise with Hungary, which had to be re-negotiated every ten years, as well as German-Czech tensions in Bohemia and Moravia, fuelled by Czech disappointment at being denied regional autonomy for the lands of the Bohemian Crown, showed that Vienna was not able to solve national questions within the dynastic concept. So the year 1878 can also be seen as the year of birth of a national Serbian resistance movement against Austria-Hungary. 1914-1918: from “Sarajevo” to the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the rise of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SHS) 1914 The name of Gavrilo Princip for generations was used as the shortest way to take a stand on the involvement of Austrian interests in the Balkan region. It took 70 years following the attempt on the Habsburg heir, till the memory of Princip had turned symbolically from hero into murderer in Sarajevo. Collective identity changed and again took the ideological and historic parameters of the official Austrian position in the early 1990 s . The attack on Crown Prince Ferdinand on 28 June 1914, and its effects on the Austrian perception of Balkan nationalities, cannot be understood without its pre-history, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) and its formal annexation in 1908. In spite of its doubtful economic benefit, Bosnia and Herzegovina was an important region for 17
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References Culture of trauma and id
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PART TWO Communication, media and c
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Cultural Identity Politics in the (
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Cultural identities in Southeastern
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Cultural identities from the bottom
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Repetition of difference - the sear
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Repetition of difference - the sear
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Report on the conference Peace Inst
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Report on the conference of ‘inde
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Notes on the authors PAŠKO BILIĆ
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Notes on the authors ANDREA KOMLOSY
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Culturelink Joint Publications Seri
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Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

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