Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies

Identity construction in the Balkan region - Austrian interests and involvement in a historical perspective
“Southeastern Europe” tries to use an external perception of a construction of the postwar
region within an internal reality. In a historical perspective this is perfidious. We must
not forget that it was German and Austrian politics in the 1990s arguing, with the concept
of “national self-determination”, in support of the north-western, richer republics in their
fight for secession and independence. The shift from the term “national self-determination”
towards “Southeastern Europe” says quite a lot about foreign interests in the region. To
destroy the multi-ethnic, south-Slavic construction of “Yugoslavia”, self-determination was
defined as “national” by the local elites and their German and Austrian supporters. After the
new “nation building” was completed, the term “national” acquired a negative image. To
now name the region using a geographic construction – “Southeastern Europe” – is to use
a (re)invented term, which nowadays connects the peripheral states in the south-east to the
project of the “European Union”. Its enlargement in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden),
2004 (Slovenia, Poland, Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, the three Baltic states,
(Greek) Cyprus and Malta) and 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria) led to a monopolization of
the term “Europe”, defining Europe as a part or a future part of the “European Union”. With
this in mind we find many reasons to reject this heavily ideologized term.
“Balkan” is a fuzzy word with a strong historical burden. Geographically it designates
a chain of mountains, but it has always meant more than that. The roots of the term are
Turkish and include the words “blood” (kan) and “honey” (bal) and thereby mystify
the name of the region in a way that the term is not understood by native speakers. An
exhibition curated by Harald Szeemann in an art museum near Vienna in 2003 played
with this ambiguity. “Balkan” had a negative connotation representing “backwardness”
and at the same time legitimizing those powers who intervened in the name of
modernization and civilization (Todorova, 1997). The term reminds one of Ottoman
interests in the region which may have some weak potential to be revived nowadays.
There are two factors that make us opposed to the use of this term in our context: firstly,
the fact that the “Bulgarian question”, which is at the centre of any definition of the
Balkans, is excluded from our debate and, secondly, the fact that Slovenia and Croatia
were neither geographically nor historically part of the “Balkan region” except in the
20th century when both regions took part in the Yugoslav state project. This alone
shows the importance of what cultural scientists call “mental mapping”, showing that
identity is always related to the historic, social, economic and geopolitical context.
What convinces us nevertheless to use the term “Balkan” to describe the space we are
dealing with is the historic continuity of external influence and interference throughout
the centuries. The Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empire (not to speak of Russian and
British interests in the region) both fought for centuries for influence in the Balkans, by
incorporating the region into their empires. “Balkan” qualifies as an appropriate term
precisely because of its fuzziness in a period of time where territorialities and identities are
not settled and new identities and territorialities are being sought. Therefore we decided
to use “Balkan” as a flexible term with its advantage of being a historical expression and
an actual counter-position towards the legitimization of new involvements in the region.
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