Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
Cultural Identity Politics in the (Post-)Transitional Societies
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<strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Identity</strong> <strong>Politics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> (<strong>Post</strong>-)<strong>Transitional</strong> <strong>Societies</strong><br />
The historical cut-off po<strong>in</strong>t of 1991 is <strong>the</strong> start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of our discourse. The dissolution<br />
of Yugoslavia provoked new geopolitical, social and national orientations among <strong>the</strong><br />
different communities and regions with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> European order and questions were also asked<br />
from a cultural po<strong>in</strong>t of view. New identities were looked for and discovered. This “identity<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g” followed <strong>in</strong>ternal and external logics and pressures, all of <strong>the</strong>m underl<strong>in</strong>ed by<br />
historical reason<strong>in</strong>g try<strong>in</strong>g to prove <strong>the</strong> validity of a s<strong>in</strong>gle ethnic, national identity.<br />
The process of dissolution and destruction of Yugoslavia was driven by local elites<br />
look<strong>in</strong>g for a means to escape <strong>the</strong> consequences of an economic breakdown. These<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternal forces were present <strong>in</strong> virtually all six Yugoslav republics. Some of <strong>the</strong>m were<br />
supported by external <strong>in</strong>terests and this accelerated <strong>the</strong> crisis towards a catastrophe.<br />
The more and stronger a united Germany (backed by Austria) supported <strong>the</strong> Catholic<br />
and, later, <strong>the</strong> Muslim secessionist movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective republics, <strong>the</strong> more <strong>the</strong><br />
economic and geopolitical logic of this external force entered <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner processes<br />
of “identity build<strong>in</strong>g” with<strong>in</strong> Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. The term “nation build<strong>in</strong>g”,<br />
as it was (re)<strong>in</strong>vented at <strong>the</strong> beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> 1990s follow<strong>in</strong>g historical patterns<br />
from <strong>the</strong> second half of <strong>the</strong> 19 th century, already expla<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong> direction <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong><br />
planned cultural foundation of <strong>the</strong> respective societies was head<strong>in</strong>g: national identity<br />
based on ethnic def<strong>in</strong>itions was required <strong>in</strong>stead of social and political identity. In this<br />
respect <strong>the</strong> nationalist movements <strong>in</strong> Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Kosovo<br />
Albanian population), Bosnia and Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its Bosnian, Serbian<br />
and Croatian populations) and Macedonia became <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong> all ethnic groups,<br />
while later even Montenegro followed once aga<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> model of “identity build<strong>in</strong>g”<br />
as has been prescribed by <strong>the</strong> bourgeois societies s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> French and <strong>the</strong> German<br />
revolutions and copied by national liberation movements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Balkans <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />
half of <strong>the</strong> 19 th century.<br />
Space and nam<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> region<br />
The geography of <strong>the</strong> region we are deal<strong>in</strong>g with is def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> circumstances<br />
mentioned above. Historically this space can be roughly described <strong>in</strong> an ethnic and<br />
language sense as south-Slavic, at least as far as <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> people were concerned.<br />
Besides this south-Slavic majority <strong>the</strong> region is (or was) populated by Albanians,<br />
Germans, Italians, Magyars and Turks, as well as some smaller m<strong>in</strong>orities.<br />
The nam<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> region we deal with resembles <strong>in</strong> itself a political confession.<br />
“Yugoslavia” no longer exists as a state and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> use of <strong>the</strong> term would be<br />
politically nostalgic and is no longer practical. “Sou<strong>the</strong>astern Europe” is a frequently used<br />
term nowadays for <strong>the</strong> region, and this was <strong>in</strong>vented <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 19th century to replace <strong>the</strong><br />
term “European Turkey” (Geier, 2006). Today it is aga<strong>in</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g implemented by Western<br />
political scientists and predom<strong>in</strong>antly used by <strong>the</strong> West European political class and its<br />
allies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region. This term should serve to make people forget <strong>the</strong> ethnic, national and<br />
religious wars on distribution and deployment of economic means <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990 s .<br />
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