JENNIFER HORNSBY VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Truth: The Identity ...
JENNIFER HORNSBY VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Truth: The Identity ...
JENNIFER HORNSBY VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Truth: The Identity ...
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Jennifer Hornsby <strong>The</strong> Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 1<br />
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Percepts and particle distributions, then, are supposed to be items which<br />
we can specify independently of an account of thinkables, items which<br />
may confer truth upon a thinkable. When they are introduced, however,<br />
we cannot hold onto the truism that inspires the identity theory. <strong>The</strong> fact<br />
(as it is) that autumn has begun, if it were to be a cosmic distribution of<br />
particles, would not be the same as what I think when I think (truly) that<br />
autumn has begun.<br />
It is evident now that the words 'corresponds with' do not have to be<br />
in play for an ontological gap between thought and the world to open<br />
up. This is something that we see in formulations used over the years by<br />
Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright in stating the semantic antirealist's<br />
case. <strong>The</strong>ir formulations often appear to invoke a conception of<br />
a truth-maker which will suit a correspondence theorist but which an<br />
identity theorist cannot allow. 9 Dummett asked 'If it were impossible to<br />
know the truth of some true statement, how could there be anything<br />
which made that statement true'. Wright spoke of 'a truth-conferrer for<br />
a sentence': in the case where the truth of the sentence cannot be known,<br />
he said that this is something that 'the world fails to deliver up'. And he<br />
spoke of 'the states of affairs' that are in question when a sentence is<br />
undecidable as things that 'could not be encountered'. <strong>The</strong>se ways of<br />
speaking give rise to an image of something with which a thinkable<br />
might have connected up, but a something which we are expected to<br />
think of the world as taking sole responsibility for. This is the image that<br />
an identity theory may help to rid us of. For when the conditions for the<br />
truth of a sentence are supplied by an identity theorist, nothing is<br />
brought in besides the thinkable that is expressed by the sentence itself.<br />
By introducing 'sources of truth', 'truth conferrers' and 'states of affairs',<br />
Dummett and Wright drive a wedge between what is demanded by a<br />
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9 See Dummett 1976, at p. 61 in the version reprinted in Dummett 1993.<br />
A different sort of illustration may be got from Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy and<br />
Michael Smith 1994. <strong>The</strong>y argue for the compatibility of versions of non-cognitivism<br />
(in ethics, say) with minimalism about truth. <strong>The</strong>y follow Michael Devitt in<br />
characterizing minimalism as holding that 'terms for truth and falsity are linguistic<br />
devices for talking about reality by appending the truth predicate'. <strong>The</strong>ir claim then is<br />
that it might not be that any old sentence is such as to talk about reality: noncognitivists,<br />
they say, 'precisely deny that (e.g.) ethical sentences talk about reality'. But<br />
someone who is opposed to correspondence theories in all their versions will not allow<br />
this 'talking about reality'. Suppose that Devitt had characterized minimalism by saying<br />
that truth and falsity are terms for going on talking while adding a word or two.<br />
Would Jackson et al. then have said 'Non-cognitivists precisely deny that (e.g.) ethical<br />
sentences are used in talking'<br />
This example may serve to show how easily ideas of correspondence get in through<br />
the back door.<br />
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