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for the defense for the defense - Voice For The Defense Online

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Significant Decisions Report<br />

Please do not rely solely on <strong>the</strong> summaries set <strong>for</strong>th below. <strong>The</strong> reader is advised to read <strong>the</strong><br />

full text of each opinion in addition to <strong>the</strong> brief synopses provided.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Significant Decisions Report is published in <strong>Voice</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> thanks to a state<br />

grant from <strong>the</strong> Judicial and Court Personnel Training Fund, administered by <strong>the</strong> Texas Court of<br />

Criminal Appeals. Back issues online.<br />

Supreme Court<br />

Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (U.S. 2011); Vacated in part, affirmed in part &<br />

remanded: Sotomayor (6–2)<br />

Jason Pepper pleaded guilty in a federal district court to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or<br />

more of a substance containing meth. In <strong>the</strong> latest of a series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned<br />

Iowa federal district court sentenced Pepper to 77 months in prison and 12 months supervised release—a<br />

20 percent downgrade from <strong>the</strong> Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. <strong>The</strong>reafter,<br />

<strong>the</strong> district court granted <strong>the</strong> government’s motion to reduce Pepper’s sentence fur<strong>the</strong>r to 65 months<br />

because of assistance Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Pepper appealed, arguing in<br />

part that <strong>the</strong> district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his<br />

sentence fur<strong>the</strong>r. <strong>The</strong> Eighth Circuit affirmed Pepper’s sentence, holding in part that evidence of a<br />

defendant’s post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing.<br />

HELD: When <strong>the</strong> defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, a district court at resentencing<br />

may consider evidence of <strong>the</strong> defendant’s rehabilitation after <strong>the</strong> initial sentences; and that evidence<br />

may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from <strong>the</strong> sentencing guidelines. Because <strong>the</strong><br />

Eighth Circuit set aside Pepper’s entire sentence and remanded <strong>for</strong> de novo resentencing, <strong>the</strong> district<br />

court was not bound by <strong>the</strong> law of <strong>the</strong> case doctrine to apply <strong>the</strong> same 40 percent departure applied<br />

by <strong>the</strong> original sentencing judge. To avoid undermining a district court’s original sentencing intent,<br />

an appellate court when reversing one part of a sentence may vacate <strong>the</strong> entire sentence so that, on<br />

remand, <strong>the</strong> trial court can reconfigure <strong>the</strong> sentencing plan to satisfy 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a)’s sentencing<br />

factors. That is what <strong>the</strong> Eighth Circuit did here.<br />

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (U.S. 2011); Reversed & remanded: Sotomayor (6–2)<br />

A trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second-degree murder, being a felon in possession<br />

of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Bryant<br />

challenged <strong>the</strong> admission of <strong>the</strong> victim’s statements at trial <strong>for</strong> violating his Sixth Amendment right<br />

of confrontation. <strong>The</strong> victim stated that Bryant shot him, but died shortly <strong>the</strong>reafter. <strong>The</strong> Michigan<br />

Supreme Court reversed, holding that <strong>the</strong> statements that <strong>the</strong> victim made to police be<strong>for</strong>e his death<br />

were testimonial and <strong>the</strong>ir admission violated Bryant’s right to confrontation. <strong>The</strong> court reasoned<br />

that <strong>the</strong> victim’s statements were made in <strong>the</strong> course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose<br />

was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing<br />

emergency. <strong>The</strong>re<strong>for</strong>e, <strong>the</strong> statements were “testimonial” <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> purposes of <strong>the</strong> enhanced confrontation<br />

protections set <strong>for</strong>th in Craw<strong>for</strong>d v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and should not have been<br />

admitted against Bryant because he did not have <strong>the</strong> opportunity to cross-examine <strong>the</strong> victim prior<br />

to his death.<br />

HELD: Inquiries of wounded victims concerning <strong>the</strong> perpetrator are non-testimonial if <strong>the</strong>y<br />

ob jectively indicate that <strong>the</strong> purpose of <strong>the</strong> interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an<br />

ongoing emergency, and, thus, not af<strong>for</strong>ded heightened protection under Craw<strong>for</strong>d. <strong>The</strong> identification<br />

and description of <strong>the</strong> shooter and <strong>the</strong> location of <strong>the</strong> shooting were “not testimonial statements<br />

because <strong>the</strong>y had a ‘primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’

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