Final Environmental Impact Report - Whittier Bridge/I-95 ...

6. The U.S. Department of Transportation and the Massachusetts Department of Transportation cannot
prudently assume that the risks of an accident affecting the Seabrook Nuclear Station No.1 would be
non-consequential during the concurrent reconstruction of the Interstate 95 John Greenleaf Whittier
Bridge (2013-2016), and the period of peak risks for solar geomagnetic storms, 2012-2016.
7. At a public hearing on the environmental mitigation of the John Greenleaf Whittier Bridge
Replacement Project / Interstate 95 Widening Project held in Amesbury, Massachusetts on December 7,
2011, Whittier Bridge Project Managers indicated a plan to utilize Staging Areas North and South of the
Merrimack River and to minimize the closure of existing 1-95 lanes or the placement of constructionrelated
equipment on the existing Whittier Bridge driving lanes or the other to-be-reconstructed 1-95
bridges during the four years of construction, years 2013 through2016.
8. Nevertheless, it is reasonably foreseeable that there will be extensive lane closures on the existing 1­
95 corridor, on the Whittier Bridge, and four other 1-95 bridges being reconstructed within this Projed
during a four year interval. Lane closures may be planned during times of day (or night) during which
high traffic density is not anticipated. However, the exact time of day (or night) of severe geomagnetic
induced currents, loss of extra high voltage transformers (with above average risks of blackouts in New
Hampshire and the Northeast), or declaration of a Seabrook Station evacuation emergency cannot be
reliably anticipated.
9. Studies on the efficacy of emergency evacuations anticipating hurricanes in Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas since the year 1998 demonstrate that one ofthe primary impediments to reliable
regional evacuation involves the abandonment of construction equipment and the blockage of lanes on
interstate highways. 4
These interstate highways are relied upon as emergency evacuation corridors
for contraflow evacuations during emergencies.
It is essential that highway and bridge contractors and
their employees, and subcontractors and their employees, receive training in the reliable clearance of all
closed Interstate 95 lanes, the removal of all obstructing equipment, and the reopening of all Interstate
95 lanes so they are effective as emergency evacuation corridors throughout this Project. 5
10. In the event of a sustained regional electric blackout, without on-station electric power capabilities
beyond those now existing at Seabrook Station, there is an increased risk of zirconium fires with
radioactive material dispersals that depend upon variable wind patterns.
The risks of a severe
geomagnetic storm that would be likely to affect the North American electric grid are roughly one
percent per year. 6 Without improved on station capabilities to protect spent fuel pools, the risk of
zirconium fires at Seabrook Station are estimated to be approximately 2 percent over the 10.5 year solar
geomagnetic storm cycle. 2 A substantial component of this risk is projected to occur in the four years of
4. See a set of publications on U.S. Emergency Transportation Operations at U.S. Department ofTransportation,
FHWA: http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov!publications!p.ublications.htm#eto.
5 Paul Brian Wolshon, Transportation's role in emergency evacuation and reentry. Washington, D.C. National
Research Council, Transportation Research Board, NCHRP Synthesis 392,2009, Section on "Work Zones on
Evacuation Routes," pp. 28-29, at: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp syn 392.pdf.
6 "Electromagnetic Pulse: Effects on the U.S. Power Grid/' Oak Ridge National Laboratory, October 2010
3