Contending Issues in the Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria - Journal of ...
Contending Issues in the Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria - Journal of ... Contending Issues in the Niger Delta Crisis of Nigeria - Journal of ...
Olawale Olaopa, Ibikunle Ogundari, Mike Awoleye, and Willie Siyanbola The response of the federal government to the agitation for more oil revenue by the oil producing states has being largely military. A few direct interventionist agencies, such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), funded directly by the federal government, have been established to promote the economic development of the region, still one of the most backward in Nigeria, despite its oil resources. But the NDDC, itself a cesspool of graft, has had very little impact on economic and social development in the region which, despite its oil wealth, has one of the worst infrastructure in Nigeria. The oil companies, for their part, set up several projects, including provision of basic infrastructure, scholarship schemes, and community-relation units through which community members could express their needs. Yet the oil companies have continued to deny responsibility for the ecological destruction. This is attested to by the assertion made by Brian Anderson, Shell's managing director at the time that "We totally reject accusations of devastation in Ogoni land or Niger Delta. This has been dramatized out of proportion." In any case, as far as the communities are concerned, these efforts are insignificant given the billions of petrodollars that are extracted from the soil. This assessment applies also to the civilian regime of President Obasanjo. The most significant step taken by his government, the establishment of a Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) has come under a hail of criticism. Ben Naanen, 221
Chapter IX: The Politics and Policies of Oil Deregulation in Nigeria: Implications and Policy Suggestions a leading Ogoni patriot and scholar, has referred to the NDDC as a monumental distraction, which may do no better than its institutional predecessor, OMPADEC, in achieving its development task. The current Ministry of Niger Delta, created by the President Sheu Musa Yar’adua’s administration, has equally generated hot criticism concerning its ability to solve the problem it was created to solve. Equally, the military efforts of the federal government to contain the conflicts have failed largely because the crisis is political, rather than military. What the militias, with the support of the people of the region, are asking for is the complete control of their resources or, at least, 50 per cent of it in the sharing of the oil revenue. At the political reform Conference in 2005 the oil producing states were offered 19 per cent of the oil revenue, up from 13 per cent, but their delegates turned this offer down as totally inadequate. That deadlock has remained unresolved. Currently the federal government gets over 51 per cent of the oil revenue, the 36 states some 35 per cent, and the over 700 local government less than 15 per cent, down from the 20 per cent previously allocated to them. Five per cent of the revenue due to the local governments was recently inexplicably deducted and added to the shares of both the federal and state governments. Over time, the struggle in the Niger Delta has become bound up with the overall struggle in Nigeria for demilitarization of governance and the expansion of political space. With the military's retreat to the barracks in May 1999, expectations have risen that the deprivation of 222
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Chapter IX: The Politics and Policies <strong>of</strong> Oil Deregulation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Niger</strong>ia:<br />
Implications and Policy Suggestions<br />
a lead<strong>in</strong>g Ogoni patriot and scholar, has referred to <strong>the</strong> NDDC as a<br />
monumental distraction, which may do no better than its <strong>in</strong>stitutional<br />
predecessor, OMPADEC, <strong>in</strong> achiev<strong>in</strong>g its development task. The<br />
current M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> <strong>Niger</strong> <strong>Delta</strong>, created by <strong>the</strong> President Sheu Musa<br />
Yar’adua’s adm<strong>in</strong>istration, has equally generated hot criticism<br />
concern<strong>in</strong>g its ability to solve <strong>the</strong> problem it was created to solve.<br />
Equally, <strong>the</strong> military efforts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> federal government to conta<strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> conflicts have failed largely because <strong>the</strong> crisis is political, ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />
than military. What <strong>the</strong> militias, with <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
region, are ask<strong>in</strong>g for is <strong>the</strong> complete control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir resources or, at<br />
least, 50 per cent <strong>of</strong> it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil revenue. At <strong>the</strong><br />
political reform Conference <strong>in</strong> 2005 <strong>the</strong> oil produc<strong>in</strong>g states were<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered 19 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil revenue, up from 13 per cent, but <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
delegates turned this <strong>of</strong>fer down as totally <strong>in</strong>adequate. That deadlock<br />
has rema<strong>in</strong>ed unresolved. Currently <strong>the</strong> federal government gets over<br />
51 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil revenue, <strong>the</strong> 36 states some 35 per cent, and <strong>the</strong><br />
over 700 local government less than 15 per cent, down from <strong>the</strong> 20<br />
per cent previously allocated to <strong>the</strong>m. Five per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue due<br />
to <strong>the</strong> local governments was recently <strong>in</strong>explicably deducted and<br />
added to <strong>the</strong> shares <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> federal and state governments.<br />
Over time, <strong>the</strong> struggle <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Niger</strong> <strong>Delta</strong> has become bound up<br />
with <strong>the</strong> overall struggle <strong>in</strong> <strong>Niger</strong>ia for demilitarization <strong>of</strong> governance<br />
and <strong>the</strong> expansion <strong>of</strong> political space. With <strong>the</strong> military's retreat to <strong>the</strong><br />
barracks <strong>in</strong> May 1999, expectations have risen that <strong>the</strong> deprivation <strong>of</strong><br />
222