Arthur R. Butz – The Hoax Of The Twentieth Century

Chapter 6: Et Cetera
rounded Eichmann’s imprisonment in Israel allows the possibility that he was tortured
in some sense, but that he had tactical or other reasons for not charging torture
in his testimony. 336
In considering the problem of torture, it is important to observe that the efficacy
of torture in producing testimony having a desired content is rather questionable.
We cannot believe that the prosecuting authorities at Nuremberg had any
moral compunctions about using torture, but they most probably made the rather
obvious observation that, no matter how much you torture a man, you still cannot
be absolutely sure what he will say on the witness stand. Exceptions to this statement
are provided by the “Moscow trials” of the Thirties and other trials staged
by Communists, but the defendants in such cases are always “brainwashed” to the
extent that they utterly prostrate themselves before the court when on trial and denounce
themselves as the foulest beings on earth. 337 No such attitude is perceptible
in the Nuremberg defendants who, despite much untruthful testimony damaging
to the Nazi regime in general, always argued their personal innocence.
In examining the torture problem, we must be careful regarding what questions
one might ask and what inferences may be drawn from the answers. Obviously,
there is the question of whether or not a man was tortured. Second, there is the
question of whether or not he testified to the reality of exterminations. Assuming
that affirmative answers apply to both questions, it is a non sequitur to infer that
the former accounts for the latter. This is illustrated by the case of Kramer who,
despite torture, spoke the truth in his first statement, and evidently only changed
his story when his lawyer explained to him the logical implications of insisting on
a story that the court could not possibly accept. On the other hand, if a witness
had been tortured, we may infer that the authorities in charge are not to be trusted.
Moreover, one must not make assumptions too quickly in regard to the probable
motivations that the Nuremberg jailers might have had for employing torture;
the motivation need not have been to produce specific testimony, and may have
been either more or less thoughtfully conceived. First, torture might have been
employed purely to produce pleasure; the Jews in charge hated their German victims.
Second, torture may have been employed merely on the basis of the passing
observation that, while it was not guaranteed to be helpful, it also could not hurt
matters as long as the proceedings were kept suitably confidential.
A third possible motivation, a far more intelligent one, could have been that
torture, while not of much use in producing specific pieces of testimony, could be
of assistance in a less specific and more general sense. If my interrogator threatens
that he will take steps against my family if I do not cooperate, I may doubt
him on the basis that I see no evidence that he either has the necessary power or
the necessary cruelty or both. However, if he imprisons me for a year or more,
torturing at will, I will eventually believe that he is both powerful and cruel. Thus,
336
337
Eichmann, session 75, U1. For the fanatical measures taken to isolate Eichmann from the outside
world during his imprisonment in Israel see, e.g., the London Jewish Chronicle (Sep. 2, 1960),
15.
Solzhenitsyn has given the definitive account of the historical development of the Communist political
“trial.”. See also Conquest, 82-147.
235