Schriever Wargame 2010 - Air Force Space Command

In the confused aftermath of a coordinated cyber attack,
elected officials would have to weigh these economic considerations,
especially if they were working on suspicion, but it
would be the case even if we were certain of the culprit. As the
debate as to how to respond played out, one can be sure multinational
corporations would be active participants.
Regardless of what one’s opinion towards them might be,
multinational corporations have evolved into a true fifth estate,
and as our experience at the war games bore out, are extremely
averse to disruptions in the business cycle. By law, businesses
owe their allegiance to shareholders from around the world, and
global customers and offices around the globe will be subject
to different pressure points than we have witnessed in the past.
To some extent this is an uncharted area of 21 st century military
conflicts. In the past, businesses traditionally exerted influence
to resolve these conflicts or show loyalty to their home nation.
In the future, national interests become more difficult to discern
and could well be secondary to business interests. In any event,
we can be sure they will not hesitate to exert unprecedented
pressure on political leaders to end a conflict or limit a response.
As a result, countries that rely on economic growth to sustain
their political model will, understandably, show hesitancy toward
overt conflict and will influence their response to provocations
and attacks. Understanding the likely corporate reaction
in advance to likely scenarios should be a priority of military
and political leaders, specifically how it would translate into
political decision-making. A related component would be an
understanding of the global supply chain.
That is not to say mutual assured anything is reason enough
to assume another nation-state would not initiate a cyber attack.
First, the potential consequences are far too great. There is no
end to the mayhem and chaos a cyber “Pearl Harbor” would
unleash; the thought that the perpetrator is also suffering would
not provide much comfort.
Second, we already know the US is subject to thousands
of cyber attacks every day. While the scope of these attacks
is limited—often involving industrial espionage, intellectual
property theft, or cyber vandalism—the ramifications are still
significant in terms of keeping our military and commercial advantage.
This is reason enough to develop a robust defense in
cyberspace.
Third, potential cyber attackers come in many shapes and
sizes. The considerations discussed above assume a country
and government interested in remaining a part of the global
economy. A rogue nation like North Korea, on the other hand,
displays interests that are exactly the opposite. The government
of Kim Jong Il has been determined to do anything but interconnect
with the rest of the world. As satellite imagery has shown,
it seeks to literally keep its citizens in the dark as to the advancements
implemented by modern societies. Nevertheless,
such despotic regimes understand the importance of cyberspace
and can inflict large scale damage through cyber attacks. After
all, it is not so painful to disrupt the information superhighway
if you are riding a mule. Moreover, the low barrier to entry for
a cyber attack—no need for a standing army, no massive logistical
capability, relatively inexpensive training opens the door
to a host of bad actors beyond nation-states. Teenage punks,
organized crime, or terrorist organizations are all potential aggressors
capable of doing significant harm.
A final point—command and control is a significant challenge
for any military in response to conventional challenges.
A cyber attack adds an additional layer of complexity to the
task. In the wake of any kind of attack or disaster, the public—
and politicians—want to know who is in charge. A cyber attack
will affect many different segments of the economy and society,
and a mélange of federal, state, and local officials will be
involved in the response. In order to avoid confusion, it is vital
that a cross-governmental chain of command be established.
In closing, SW 10 illustrated that cyber warfare continues
the march towards unconventional warfare. Indeed, conflicts
between nations are seldom the cut-and-dry affairs of blue
versus red, with tanks and airplanes boldly proclaiming their
owner’s flags. Increasingly, a no-holds-barred approach is simply
not an option. Just as counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan
have displayed the political difficulties of fighting a
limited engagement, so too will conflicts in cyberspace present
political and military leaders with a complex array of considerations.
The games were an important reminder that military,
political, and economic leaders must work in concert to adapt
to this evolving battle space.
Hon. Thomas M. Davis (BA Political
Science and Economics,
Amherst College; JD, University
of Virginia) joined Deloitte in
November 2008 after serving 14
years in the US House of Representatives.
In his current capacity
as director of federal relations, he
serves as a subject matter expert
on political, policy, and procurement
matters for Deloitte practitioners
and clients.
During his tenure in Congress, which included six years as the
chair and ranking Republican member of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Mr. Davis compiled an impressive
record of legislative accomplishments. Among these were the
Federal Information Security Management Act, which established
an information security framework for the federal government; the
District of Columbia Control Board Act, which is credited with restoring
DC’s financial credibility; the National Capital Transportation
Amendments, which authorized $1.5 billion for the Washington
Metro system; the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act, which authorized the Food and Drug Administration to regulate
tobacco products; and the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act
of 2006, which marked the first comprehensive overhaul of the Postal
Service since 1971.
Mr. Davis also led a number of key oversight efforts, most notably
the investigation into the use of performance enhancing drugs in professional
sports. He also chaired the committee to investigate the Bush
administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina.
Before coming to Congress in 1995, Mr. Davis served as a supervisor
on the Fairfax County Board for 15 years, rising to chairman in
1993. Simultaneously, he served as the general counsel of Litton PRC,
specializing in federal procurement law and policy.
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