23.01.2015 Views

SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com

SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com

SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>SAFETY</strong> <strong>MANUAL</strong><br />

3.3 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS<br />

It is re<strong>com</strong>mended that safety critical process inputs be measured using redundant<br />

input sensors.<br />

Some applications may require multiple sensors and I/O points per safety<br />

function<br />

In safety critical input applications using a single sensor, it is important that<br />

the sensor failure modes be predictable and well understood, so that there is<br />

little probability of a failed sensor not responding to a critical process<br />

condition. In such a configuration, it is important that the sensor be tested<br />

regularly, either by dynamic process conditions that are verified in the TMR<br />

system, or by manual intervention testing.<br />

The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and<br />

channel within the system. In many cases, redundant sensor and actuator<br />

configurations may be used, or differing sensor and actuator types provide alternate<br />

detection and control possibilities. Plant facilities frequently have related signals,<br />

e.g. start, and stop signals, in these cases it is important to ensure that failures<br />

beyond the system’s fault-tolerant capability do not result in either inability to<br />

respond safely or in inadvertent operation. In some cases, this will require that<br />

channels be allocated on the same module, to ensure that a module failure results<br />

in the associated signals failing-safe.<br />

However, in most cases, it will be necessary to separate the signals across<br />

modules. Where non-redundant configurations are employed, it is especially<br />

important to ensure that the fail-safe action is generated in case of failures within<br />

the system.<br />

Field loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to input channels<br />

and modules. For normally energised input configurations, field loop power failure<br />

will lead to the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there<br />

may be related functions, e.g. start and stop signals, where loss of field power<br />

should be considered in the same manner as the signal allocation. Where signals<br />

are powered from separate power groups, it is important that this separation be<br />

maintained when allocating the signals to modules, i.e. that they are not connected<br />

to input channels within the same power group.<br />

Doc Number P8094<br />

Issue 14 September 2003 Page 49 of 67

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!