SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com
SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com
SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com
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<strong>SAFETY</strong> <strong>MANUAL</strong><br />
When isolation barriers are used in safety critical applications,<br />
line-monitoring thresholds shall be configured to detect barrier faults. This<br />
ensures that barrier faults do not inhibit the safety critical function.<br />
3.2.5 EN 60204 Category 0 & 1 Configurations<br />
The system is fully <strong>com</strong>pliant for use with category 0 application (de-energise to<br />
trip).<br />
Category 1 configurations require a controlled stop with power available to the<br />
machine actuators to achieve the stop and then removal of power.<br />
The 8000 system has a defined internal fail-safe state as de-energised. This could<br />
result in the defined shutdown delay being shortened in some cases of I/O failure,<br />
CPU failure or loss of power to the system.<br />
3.2.6 NFPA 85 Requirements<br />
The 8000 system is certified to be used in NFPA 85 <strong>com</strong>pliant systems.<br />
The systems should be integrated in accordance with NFPA 85. In particular the<br />
following shall be applied.<br />
• The operator shall be provided with a dedicated manual switch that shall<br />
independently and directly actuate the safety shutdown trip relay. At least one<br />
identified manual switch shall be located remotely from the boiler where it can<br />
be reached in case of emergency.<br />
• The burner management system shall be provided with independent logic,<br />
independent input/output systems, and independent power supplies and shall<br />
be a functionally and physically separate device from other logic systems, such<br />
as the boiler or HRSG control system.<br />
• Momentary Closing of Fuel Values. Logic sequences or devices intended to<br />
cause a safety shutdown, once initiated, shall cause a burner or master fuel<br />
trip, as applicable, and shall require operator action prior to resuming operation<br />
of the affected burner(s). No logic sequence or device shall be permitted that<br />
allows momentary closing and subsequent inadvertent reopening of the main or<br />
ignition fuel valves.<br />
• Documentation shall be provided to the owner and operator, indicating that all<br />
safety devices and logic meet the requirements of the application.<br />
• System response time (i.e. throughput) shall be sufficiently short to prevent<br />
negative effects on the application.<br />
Doc Number P8094<br />
Issue 14 September 2003 Page 45 of 67