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SAFETY MANUAL - Tuv-fs.com

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<strong>SAFETY</strong> <strong>MANUAL</strong><br />

When isolation barriers are used in safety critical applications,<br />

line-monitoring thresholds shall be configured to detect barrier faults. This<br />

ensures that barrier faults do not inhibit the safety critical function.<br />

3.2.5 EN 60204 Category 0 & 1 Configurations<br />

The system is fully <strong>com</strong>pliant for use with category 0 application (de-energise to<br />

trip).<br />

Category 1 configurations require a controlled stop with power available to the<br />

machine actuators to achieve the stop and then removal of power.<br />

The 8000 system has a defined internal fail-safe state as de-energised. This could<br />

result in the defined shutdown delay being shortened in some cases of I/O failure,<br />

CPU failure or loss of power to the system.<br />

3.2.6 NFPA 85 Requirements<br />

The 8000 system is certified to be used in NFPA 85 <strong>com</strong>pliant systems.<br />

The systems should be integrated in accordance with NFPA 85. In particular the<br />

following shall be applied.<br />

• The operator shall be provided with a dedicated manual switch that shall<br />

independently and directly actuate the safety shutdown trip relay. At least one<br />

identified manual switch shall be located remotely from the boiler where it can<br />

be reached in case of emergency.<br />

• The burner management system shall be provided with independent logic,<br />

independent input/output systems, and independent power supplies and shall<br />

be a functionally and physically separate device from other logic systems, such<br />

as the boiler or HRSG control system.<br />

• Momentary Closing of Fuel Values. Logic sequences or devices intended to<br />

cause a safety shutdown, once initiated, shall cause a burner or master fuel<br />

trip, as applicable, and shall require operator action prior to resuming operation<br />

of the affected burner(s). No logic sequence or device shall be permitted that<br />

allows momentary closing and subsequent inadvertent reopening of the main or<br />

ignition fuel valves.<br />

• Documentation shall be provided to the owner and operator, indicating that all<br />

safety devices and logic meet the requirements of the application.<br />

• System response time (i.e. throughput) shall be sufficiently short to prevent<br />

negative effects on the application.<br />

Doc Number P8094<br />

Issue 14 September 2003 Page 45 of 67

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