Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...
Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ... Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...
494 Military Communications and Information Technology... reels and paper pads (Fig. 1). However, today’s electronics, as the SGCL-100M generator shown in Fig. 4 and described in chapter 4 of the article will be able to act as a practically “infinite” source of one-time keys. Capability to one-time keys generation will be no limitation any longer. Today’s realization of OTP cipher machines (Fig. 3) with embedded current one-time encryption software can process large quantities of data at high speed. Current data storage technology such as USB sticks, DVD’s, external hard disks, solid-state drives or dedicated OTK modules to enable the physical transport of enormous quantities of truly random keys. Actual sensitive communications are often limited to a small number of important users. In such cases, one-on-one communications with the associated key distribution, possibly in configuration with a star topology, is no longer a practical problem, especially considering the security benefits. By using a so-called sneakernet (transferring data on removable media by physical couriering), you can reach a throughput of one-time keys that is greater than what a network can process on encrypted data. In other words, it could take a few hours to drive a terabyte of key material, stored on an external drive, by car to someone, but it will take days or even weeks to consume that amount of keys on a broadband network. A terabyte sized key can easily encrypt e-mail traffic of special (military or diplomacy users) for a year, including attachments. Therefore, one-time key encryption is still well-suited in specific circumstances where absolute security is preferable to practical considerations, regardless of the cost of secure physical transport of keys by couriering. In the future quantum key distribution (QKD) may be helpful as an alternative for secure physical transport of keys by couriering. The security of quantum key distribution relies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, in contrast to a traditional key distribution protocol which relies on the computational difficulty of certain mathematical functions. An interesting and promising method of QKD was presented in [2] with usage of Professor Artur Ekert type of QKD [11]. But at present the ability of efficient QKD usage is still an open question. References [1] M. Leśniewicz, “Sprzętowa generacja ciągów losowych z przepływnością 100 Mbit/s. Hardware generation of binary sequences with throughput 100 Mbit/s,” Przegląd Telekomunikacyjny nr 11/2011. [2] W. Nowakowski, “O kryptografii kwantowej. About quantum cryptography,” Elektronika, nr 2, Warszawa 2010. [3] M. Leśniewicz, Sprzętowa generacja losowych ciągów binarnych. Hardware generation of binary random sequences, WAT, Warszawa 2009, ISBN 978-83-61486-31-2. [4] M. Borowski, R. Wicik, “A one-time cipher machine for Polish Army,” Military Communication Conference,” Prague, 2008.
Chapter 4: Information Assurance & Cyber Defence 495 [5] R. Wicik, M. Borowski, “Randomness testing of some random and pseudorandom sequences,” Military Communication Conference, Prague, 2008. [6] P. Komorowski, M. Leśniewicz, “Sprzętowy generator binarnych ciągów losowych o wyjściowej przepływności 1 MB/s. A hardware binary genertaor with output throughput 1 MB/s,” X Krajowa Konferencja Zastosowań Kryptografii ENIGMA 2006. [7] W. Oszywa, M. Gawroński, T. Czajka, “Hierarchic cryptographic data management system,” Bulletin of Military Communication Institute, 2005. [8] R. Gliwa, M. Leśniewicz, R. Wicik, “Testing of hardware-based random bit generators utilized in cryptography”, National Telecommunication Symposium, Bydgoszcz, 2002. [9] W. Schindler, W. Killmann, “Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) Random Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications,” Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES,2002, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003. [10] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone, Handbook of applied cryptography, CRC Press, 1997. [11] A.K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Physical. Review Letters, 1991. [12] D. Rijmenants’, Cipher Machines and Cryptology, Historical and Technical Information about Crypto Machines, Cryptology and Free Software Simulations, http://users.telenet. be/d.rijmenants/index.htm
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Chapter 4: <strong>Information</strong> Assurance & Cyber Defence<br />
495<br />
[5] R. Wicik, M. Borowski, “R<strong>and</strong>omness testing of some r<strong>and</strong>om <strong>and</strong> pseudor<strong>and</strong>om<br />
sequences,” <strong>Military</strong> Communication Conference, Prague, 2008.<br />
[6] P. Komorowski, M. Leśniewicz, “Sprzętowy generator binarnych ciągów losowych<br />
o wyjściowej przepływności 1 MB/s. A hardware binary genertaor with output<br />
throughput 1 MB/s,” X Krajowa Konferencja Zastosowań Kryptografii ENIGMA 2006.<br />
[7] W. Oszywa, M. Gawroński, T. Czajka, “Hierarchic cryptographic data management<br />
system,” Bulletin of <strong>Military</strong> Communication Institute, 2005.<br />
[8] R. Gliwa, M. Leśniewicz, R. Wicik, “Testing of hardware-based r<strong>and</strong>om bit generators<br />
utilized in cryptography”, National Telecommunication Symposium, Bydgoszcz, 2002.<br />
[9] W. Schindler, W. Killmann, “Evaluation Criteria for True (Physical) R<strong>and</strong>om<br />
Number Generators Used in Cryptographic Applications,” Workshop on Cryptographic<br />
Hardware <strong>and</strong> Embedded Systems CHES,2002, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003.<br />
[10] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, S.A. Vanstone, H<strong>and</strong>book of applied cryptography,<br />
CRC Press, 1997.<br />
[11] A.K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem,” Physical. Review<br />
Letters, 1991.<br />
[12] D. Rijmenants’, Cipher Machines <strong>and</strong> Cryptology, Historical <strong>and</strong> Technical <strong>Information</strong><br />
about Crypto Machines, Cryptology <strong>and</strong> Free Software Simulations, http://users.telenet.<br />
be/d.rijmenants/index.htm
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