Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...
Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ... Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...
422 Military Communications and Information Technology... • information distributed through mass media, (e.g. TV, radio, press, Internet) • information resulting from the initial analysis of factual data (at the stage of processing – before and during their storage in the repository). Main sources of information can be identified with respect to the following stages of military mission: • mission planning stage (produces mission plan), • mission execution stage (reports and notification from the battlefield), • directly after the end of the mission (report generated during debriefing). It can be reasonable to discern different sources of information about incidents between primary and secondary ones: Figure 2. Mission execution stages and relevant types of sensors • primary sources of information (observations of people directly participating in mission; technical sensors (devices)) • secondary sources of information (observations made by personnel who acquires the information about incidents, initial analysis of the information about incidents that is stored in repository). This distinction seems relevant because it presents a potential for reducing information processing overhead (number of stages). A primary information is more reliable, it is directly authorized by the source. Secondary information is pre-processed already. At every stage of processing an information is improved, validated, completed etc. However every activity of this kind (during process-
Chapter 4: Information Assurance & Cyber Defence 423 ing) is also potential source of information changes (corruption). In example the missile guidance systems rely only on primary information, which proves how important primary information can be considered. Within the process of cyber incidents data acquisition a multiple limitations (boundary conditions) have to be considered: • this process relies on a very formal set of (field) documents, e.g: OPORD (OPerational ORDer, operational order), FRAGO (FRAGmentary Order, more specific, fragmentary OPORD), • incorrect (inappropriate) training of personnel responsible for implementation of an observation process (for e.g. too high/low sensitivity threshold), • time limitation during debriefing, • presence of typical psychological barriers of a soldier/civilian during the AAR (After Action Review) stage • lack of contextual knowledge, needed to associate events to each other, • most of the factual data is rather plain text than reach multimedia content. The example of typical psychological barriers of a soldier during AAR stage can be among all: • details, which can negatively influence opinion, assessment of activities of other soldiers, • observations, which seem to be irrelevant, infantile, • emotional states, which may indicate weaknesses of soldiers and result in lack of acceptance or ridiculousness (abnormal, excessive fear, caution, tendency to recklessness, taking excessive risk), B. Formalization of the process of collecting information about cyber incidents in cyberspace The incident observation control sheet, which is an integral part of the method of collecting information about incidents consists of four main sections: start, event/ incident itself, status of the observer and the end (Figure 3). The following information should be included in particular sections of such sheet: 1. Indication of the starting point of the observation (location, time) 2. Event/incident itself, description of observation with parameters 3. The status of an observer (data, which could be combined for the purpose of identification of a person, who formalizes observation materials and information, which makes possible to assess the level of competence of this person); 4. The endpoint of the observation (location, time). Proposed methodology covers both – the AAR (After Action Review), debriefing and other materials acquired automatically through technical devices (both civilian and military).
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422 <strong>Military</strong> <strong>Communications</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Information</strong> <strong>Technology</strong>...<br />
• information distributed through mass media, (e.g. TV, radio, press, Internet)<br />
• information resulting from the initial analysis of factual data (at the stage<br />
of processing – before <strong>and</strong> during their storage in the repository).<br />
Main sources of information can be identified with respect to the following<br />
stages of military mission:<br />
• mission planning stage (produces mission plan),<br />
• mission execution stage (reports <strong>and</strong> notification from the battlefield),<br />
• directly after the end of the mission (report generated during debriefing).<br />
It can be reasonable to discern different sources of information about incidents<br />
between primary <strong>and</strong> secondary ones:<br />
Figure 2. Mission execution stages <strong>and</strong> relevant types of sensors<br />
• primary sources of information (observations of people directly participating<br />
in mission; technical sensors (devices))<br />
• secondary sources of information (observations made by personnel who<br />
acquires the information about incidents, initial analysis of the information<br />
about incidents that is stored in repository).<br />
This distinction seems relevant because it presents a potential for reducing<br />
information processing overhead (number of stages). A primary information<br />
is more reliable, it is directly authorized by the source. Secondary information<br />
is pre-processed already. At every stage of processing an information is improved,<br />
validated, completed etc. However every activity of this kind (during process-