Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...

Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ... Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...

22.01.2015 Views

364 Military Communications and Information Technology... • NS Federation Proxy, to control the policy compliant flow of the identity and access attributes. It should be noted that identity and access data processing is not explicitly addressed in the current NATO policy, which should be noted as a potential problem when defining policy rules at the Proxy. Figure 2. Federation Topology at the NS Level From the NATO as an Alliance point of view, the federation component in the Gateway Zone would operate as the Alliance Federation Broker, enabling federation services in the NATO Alliance. 2) Federation Topology for NU/NR networks: taking into account a significant defragmentation in the NU/NR environment, the “Point-to-Point” option seems to be more accurate. A consequence of this approach will be an overall mesh-topology (Figure 3). Although more flexible, this topology is more difficult to manage and control. Accountability for the establishment and maintenance of trust relationships with external parties is pushed down to the level of a single domain. The mesh topology should be adopted as an interim solution. It is anticipated that with implementation of the EBN concept at the NU/NR level, NATO will follow the same evolution path as the one delimited by the NS environment. When it happens, the “trust broker topology”, as proposed for the Bi-SC AIS NS area (Figure 2), would be more appropriate at the NU/NR level.

Chapter 4: Information Assurance & Cyber Defence 365 Figure 3. Federation Topology at the NU/NR Level C. Public key operations and infrastructure In the Web-based federation solutions, asymmetric cryptography techniques are used to underpin trustful identity and access data flows. This implies the use of public-key operations. In sensitive, classified, policy-driven environments, like the NATO organization, the requirement to utilize public-key operations has to be translated into the requirement to deploy a Public Key infrastructure (PKI). In NATO, it means a use of the NATO Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI), providing an assured foundation on top of which the NATO federation trust topology can be built. Without integrating with the existing NPKI, the federation services in NATO environment may not be considered as a valid solution. Currently, NATO is planning to deploy NPKI on two separate PKI branches, one on NS domain and the other one in support of NU/NR services. This structure reflects directly the NATO Security Policy identified sensitiveness levels of information assets as well as, in a sense, the current NATO network topology logic. From the federation services point of view, there are a number of challenges the NPKI needs to meet: • the management and distribution of certificates and private keys, which will be solved by the NPKI itself; • the validation of certificates. There are a number of approaches to this problem, e.g.:

Chapter 4: <strong>Information</strong> Assurance & Cyber Defence<br />

365<br />

Figure 3. Federation Topology at the NU/NR Level<br />

C. Public key operations <strong>and</strong> infrastructure<br />

In the Web-based federation solutions, asymmetric cryptography techniques<br />

are used to underpin trustful identity <strong>and</strong> access data flows. This implies the use<br />

of public-key operations. In sensitive, classified, policy-driven environments, like<br />

the NATO organization, the requirement to utilize public-key operations has to<br />

be translated into the requirement to deploy a Public Key infrastructure (PKI).<br />

In NATO, it means a use of the NATO Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI), providing<br />

an assured foundation on top of which the NATO federation trust topology<br />

can be built. Without integrating with the existing NPKI, the federation services<br />

in NATO environment may not be considered as a valid solution.<br />

Currently, NATO is planning to deploy NPKI on two separate PKI branches,<br />

one on NS domain <strong>and</strong> the other one in support of NU/NR services. This structure<br />

reflects directly the NATO Security Policy identified sensitiveness levels of information<br />

assets as well as, in a sense, the current NATO network topology logic.<br />

From the federation services point of view, there are a number of challenges<br />

the NPKI needs to meet:<br />

• the management <strong>and</strong> distribution of certificates <strong>and</strong> private keys, which<br />

will be solved by the NPKI itself;<br />

• the validation of certificates. There are a number of approaches to this<br />

problem, e.g.:

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!