Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...

Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ... Military Communications and Information Technology: A Trusted ...

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360 Military Communications and Information Technology... B. NATO initiatives in the area of I&AM To date, following initiatives have been of significance in NATO within the I&AM area: • NATO Identity Management (NIDM) Workshop (2008-2009) – a combined effort of NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B) Information Assurance Subcommittee (SC/4) and Information Systems Subcommittee (SC/5). As a result of this initiative, a NIDM Strawman [1] paper was published in 2009. The level of ambition for this document was to provide a framework for future work on NATO-wide Identity Management (IdM) concept, considering the federated nature on the NATO infrastructure; • NC3B SC/4 Security Management Infrastructure Ad Hoc Working Group addressed the IA view on different aspects related to identity, privilege, and access management. In 2010, this group produced a paper, aimed to provide a strategic plan for Identity Management developments in NATO [2] as well as Security Management Infrastructure Directive [3], currently being the only document where some identity and access management aspects are regulated in NATO; • The Alliance Command Operations (ACO) identified the issue of missing NATO-wide I&AM mechanism in the operational NATO Network and Information Infrastructure (NII) that would be adequate to support future Alliance Operations and Missions (AOM). As a result, a document was released in June 2011, describing a strategy to provide a capability of AOM Federated Identity and Access Management (AIDAM) [4]; • Anticipating the requirement to support NATO operations in federation scenarios, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) supported a series of research programs in the area of I&AM, aimed to analyse possible solutions. Details can be found in [5]. C. AIDAM capability strategy Published by ACO in June 2011, the so called AIDAM is an excellent source of operational requirements and a vision for utilization of identity and access control services in the NATO federations. It also provides some recommendations on the solutions that should be adopted. The AIDAM view is in line with the recommendations provided through the ACT research programs, clearly indicating the most promising direction to achieve the information sharing capability in the environment of heterogeneous NII. The AIDAM makes the following statements: • I&AM are key to cross-domain protection and sharing of sensitive Command and Control (C2) information within federated Communities of Interest (CoI);

Chapter 4: Information Assurance & Cyber Defence 361 • In the near term, the aim for web-based I&AM will pursue a claims-based I&AM; • In the mid-term IAM is to be arrived at by means of federated identity and rights translation; • In the long-term AIDAM is to be obtained through standardization of all I&AM capabilities. II. NATO-specific architectural constrains A. NATO Bi-SC AIS network topology The current (and evolving) Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) network topology is summarized and visualized in Figure 1. Figure 1. NATO NII Interconnection Visualization Detailed analysis of the Bi-SC Automated Information System (AIS) NII topology, as in [6], confirms a significant complexity in terms of possible network interconnection scenarios. The current situation can be summarized in the following way: • In the NATO Secret (NS) segment of the NATO NII, the domain integration approach allowed the achievement of a good level of consolidation. Still, fully centralized management of the entire NS segment will not be possible; in some cases only limited (unidirectional) trust relationship can be enabled between domains;

Chapter 4: <strong>Information</strong> Assurance & Cyber Defence<br />

361<br />

• In the near term, the aim for web-based I&AM will pursue a claims-based<br />

I&AM;<br />

• In the mid-term IAM is to be arrived at by means of federated identity <strong>and</strong><br />

rights translation;<br />

• In the long-term AIDAM is to be obtained through st<strong>and</strong>ardization of all<br />

I&AM capabilities.<br />

II. NATO-specific architectural constrains<br />

A. NATO Bi-SC AIS network topology<br />

The current (<strong>and</strong> evolving) Bi-Strategic Comm<strong>and</strong> (Bi-SC) network topology<br />

is summarized <strong>and</strong> visualized in Figure 1.<br />

Figure 1. NATO NII Interconnection Visualization<br />

Detailed analysis of the Bi-SC Automated <strong>Information</strong> System (AIS) NII topology,<br />

as in [6], confirms a significant complexity in terms of possible network<br />

interconnection scenarios. The current situation can be summarized in the following<br />

way:<br />

• In the NATO Secret (NS) segment of the NATO NII, the domain integration<br />

approach allowed the achievement of a good level of consolidation.<br />

Still, fully centralized management of the entire NS segment will not be<br />

possible; in some cases only limited (unidirectional) trust relationship<br />

can be enabled between domains;

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