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112 Military Communications and Information Technology... The basic IT Security Architecture is based upon the RuDi Outline Concept Chapter 6.5.2 and Chapter 6.9.1 [18]. In the BI-SC AIS/NNEC SOA Implementation Guidance [19] NATO document, the layers depicted in Figure 3 are classified as IT security technology that RuDi is also based upon. Figure 3. Example of a layer-based security architecture The IT security architecture of the Reference Environment for Services is based on two components: • Elementary / basic protection (basic security of the classified Bundeswehr LAN on network level) Elementary protection: the Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology protects the transmitted information from undesired access by setting up a “tunnel” protected by powerful cryptographic mechanisms that is going through insecure networks. Basic protection: The encryption by means of HAIPE, NINE or SINA with its IPSec internet protocol is based on the network level. • Object protection (security on information level) Object protection is used to secure objects – information objects – by way of authentication, encryption, integrity securing and labeling (signature). Generally, the SOA framework is an addition to the existing elementary / basic protection, which it uses. The elementary / basic protection is not described and analyzed in any more detail in this document. RuDi implements object protection on the information level (application and web services) in the IT security architecture. Certificate / Key structure in RuDi Put in technical terms, an X.509 certificate is a data construct that includes a user’s public key, their personal data and a digital signature of the relevant certificate authority (CA). RuDi security is based upon certificates in accordance with the X.509 v3 standard. Using a root certificate, every user is able to verify whether the information signed by means of these certificates and the following certificate chain is authentic.
Chapter 2: Communications and Information Technology for Trusted... 113 An OpenDS is used as directory for certificates. It is based on the ACP 133 [20] format (ed. C or D) in order to be smoothly interoperable in the NATO context. Figure 4 shows an example of the CA structure (grayed out boxes) and an extract of the respective (Sub) CA certificate store. In the example Mission RootCA Straussberg forms the highest-level Root CA (layer 1). The SubCAs for operations (missions, layer 2) that may be located on a stationary IT system in the home country are derived from this Root CA. Figure 4. CA structure and extract of certificate store
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Military Communications and Informa
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Contents Foreword .................
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Contents 5 Methodology for Gatherin
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8 Military Communications and Infor
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Building a Layered Enterprise Archi
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Chapter 1: Concepts and Solutions f
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Applying NAF for Performance Analys
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Openness in Military Systems Jessic
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The Concept of Integration Tool for
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Chapter 3 Information Technology fo
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Run-Time Ontology on the Basis of E
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Chapter 3: Information Technology f
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A Robust and Scalable Peer-to-Peer
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Automatic Exploitation of Multiling
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Information Fusion Under Network Co
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Commanding Multi-Robot Systems with
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Application of CID Server in Decisi
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Managing Lessons Learnt from Daily
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Federated Cyber Defence System - Ap
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Chapter 4: Information Assurance &
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Development of High Assurance Guard
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Network Traffic Characteristics for
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Methodology for Gathering Data Conc
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On Multi-Level Secure Structured Co
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Generation of Nonlinear Feedback Sh
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Modern Usage of “Old” One-Time
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A Abut Fatih 161 Akcaoglu Ismail 11
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