TAKE RISK SERIOUSLY. RISK TARGET MULTI ASSET FUNdS - Aviva

TAKE RISK SERIOUSLY. RISK TARGET MULTI ASSET FUNdS - Aviva TAKE RISK SERIOUSLY. RISK TARGET MULTI ASSET FUNdS - Aviva

22.01.2015 Views

Take risk seriously. Risk target Multi Asset Funds This is for professional clients and/or qualified investors only. It is not to be viewed by or used with retail investors. Introduction Brian O’Nuallain and Fergus Ryan The lessons learned from 2008 Brian O’Nuallain Risk is part of the solution, not just the problem Fergus Ryan Risk targeted or absolute return funds Nick Samouilhan and Justin Onuekwusi What is volatility and why is it important Gavin Counsell Enhanced client solutions Nick Samouilhan Is your portfolio diversified or just varied Nick Samouilhan and Justin Onuekwusi Active or passive management NIck Samouilhan avivainvestors.com

Take risk seriously.<br />

Risk target Multi<br />

Asset Funds<br />

This is for professional clients and/or<br />

qualified investors only. It is not to be<br />

viewed by or used with retail investors.<br />

Introduction<br />

Brian O’Nuallain and Fergus Ryan<br />

The lessons learned<br />

from 2008<br />

Brian O’Nuallain<br />

Risk is part of the<br />

solution, not just<br />

the problem<br />

Fergus Ryan<br />

Risk targeted or<br />

absolute return funds<br />

Nick Samouilhan and Justin Onuekwusi<br />

What is volatility and<br />

why is it important<br />

Gavin Counsell<br />

Enhanced client<br />

solutions<br />

Nick Samouilhan<br />

Is your portfolio<br />

diversified or just varied<br />

Nick Samouilhan and Justin Onuekwusi<br />

Active or passive<br />

management<br />

NIck Samouilhan<br />

avivainvestors.com


Introduction<br />

Of all the differences between multi-asset funds and other<br />

fund types, there is one in particular that helps to explain<br />

their growing popularity and adoption: most funds aim to<br />

outperform a benchmark, while multi-asset funds aim to<br />

provide a solution. Put differently, instead of starting with<br />

a particular benchmark and asking how we can beat it, we<br />

ask what you would like to achieve, and then ensure that we<br />

aim to do that in a clear, well resourced and robust manner<br />

using various asset classes put together in a structured and<br />

dynamic manner.<br />

In Ireland, “multi-asset funds” have<br />

generally meant either the Balanced<br />

Managed funds or their “less risky”<br />

cousin the Consensus fund. These funds,<br />

by diversifying among equities, bonds,<br />

cash and property, hoped to provide<br />

a stable return stream to investors.<br />

However, the lessons of 2007 showed<br />

that this structure, driven by peer group<br />

positions and with significant home bias,<br />

failed to adequately meet their investors’<br />

expectations. While improvements in this<br />

sector have been made and are to be<br />

welcomed, these modifications tend to<br />

remind us of the great Yogi Berra quote<br />

“we’re lost, but making good time”. Put<br />

frankly, there is only so much tinkering<br />

that can be done to something that is<br />

fundamentally built wrong. There is only<br />

so much that can be fixed, a full solution<br />

requires a full rethink about what investors<br />

need, and which fund design is best<br />

placed to meet this.<br />

With this task of building a next<br />

generation fund, our feedback from<br />

our clients led us to build funds that<br />

in our view were global in nature, well<br />

resourced, understandable, affordable<br />

and appropriate for a wide range of<br />

investors. Most importantly, to dove tail<br />

with client expectations, these funds were<br />

built from a risk perspective upwards,<br />

with their explicit aim being to deliver<br />

long term returns within the specific risk<br />

levels that our clients want to take. The<br />

result was our <strong>Aviva</strong> Irl Multi-Asset Funds,<br />

a fund family of thee risk targeting funds<br />

that represent a complete step change<br />

in product offering for Irish clients.<br />

These funds, built from the ground up<br />

aim to address the diverse needs of Irish<br />

investors, provide a one stop investment<br />

solution for our clients, bringing the global<br />

capabilities and resources of <strong>Aviva</strong> to the<br />

Irish market within an affordable, market<br />

leading offering.<br />

These MAF funds are a significant<br />

evolution from the relatively simple<br />

“balanced funds”. Indeed, this is a global<br />

trend, with multi-asset investing outside<br />

of Ireland having already moved a long<br />

way from the traditional, old fashioned<br />

equity bond mix. Portfolios are now<br />

diversified across a much wider range<br />

of global asset classes, allowing greater<br />

return opportunities and diversification.<br />

Perhaps more importantly, asset allocation<br />

is more dynamically managed to position<br />

the portfolio in light of prevailing market<br />

conditions, while investment selection<br />

covers the broader spectrum of investment<br />

choices. We have also seen a trend in<br />

multi-asset investing away from peer<br />

group benchmarking towards funds that<br />

target return and more recently funds<br />

that target risk as part of the evolution of<br />

funds towards client needs.<br />

The objective of this compendium of<br />

articles is to provide some insights into the<br />

day-to-day management of multi-asset<br />

portfolios. We review some topics that we<br />

find interesting, relevant and hopefully<br />

helpful. We hope that you find value in<br />

the articles and enjoy reading them.<br />

3


The lessons learned<br />

from 2008 (or the<br />

problem with Managed<br />

and Consensus funds!)<br />

As the saying goes “a rattlesnake that doesn’t bite<br />

teaches you nothing.”<br />

Brian O’Nuallain<br />

Business Development Manager<br />

Main Responsibilities<br />

Brian is a Business Development Manager with<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors and has gained vast experience<br />

from a career built in the financial services<br />

sector, particularly in the areas of investment<br />

and asset management, together with client<br />

portfolio and wealth management.<br />

Experience & Qualifications<br />

He is a graduate of University College Dublin<br />

with a B.A. in Economics and English and<br />

the Higher Diploma in Education. He is also a<br />

Qualified Financial Advisor and a Fellow of the<br />

LIA and a former LIA gold medal winner.<br />

4


“We can’t solve problems by<br />

using the same kind of<br />

thinking we used when we<br />

created them.”<br />

Albert Einstein<br />

For the average Irish balanced managed<br />

and consensus fund investor the year 2008<br />

was a big rattlesnake with a venomous<br />

bite. According to the Mercer Managed<br />

Fund survey, the average Balanced<br />

Managed Fund delivered performance<br />

for that year of -34.6% and the average<br />

Consensus Managed Fund delivered a very<br />

similar and also painful -35%.<br />

Managed funds – an abridged history<br />

Managed funds became popular<br />

investments during the 1980s as they<br />

offered investors diversification over 4<br />

main asset classes, i.e. equities, property,<br />

bonds and cash. Equities were invested<br />

globally but there was a high exposure<br />

to Irish equities as a natural consequence<br />

of currency considerations for the<br />

Punt at the time and the level of local<br />

investment management expertise (or<br />

perhaps the lack of global expertise). The<br />

property element was mainly invested<br />

in Irish commercial property and bonds<br />

initially consisted of investments in Irish<br />

Government bonds but in later years<br />

gained exposure to Euro sovereign bonds<br />

following the introduction of the Euro.<br />

These funds would generally have a<br />

greater proportion of their funds under<br />

management invested in equities as<br />

this asset class is generally the leading<br />

performer at the head of the risk return<br />

spectrum over the long term and offers<br />

high liquidity. Property and bonds provided<br />

alternative asset classes that could be<br />

considered to act somewhat differently<br />

to equities during rises and falls in stock<br />

markets providing a level of protection<br />

to investors.<br />

Reward can’t have a downside… can it<br />

The balanced managed fund sector was<br />

defined as medium risk by consensus of<br />

the industry as a whole. However, what<br />

does “medium risk” really mean to an<br />

investor What level of return can be<br />

considered “medium” – a return of<br />

plus 10% or minus 10% for example<br />

– or plus 15% or minus 5% The mere<br />

mention of “minus” in my experience can<br />

magically transform a happily enthusiastic<br />

and adventurous investor to a “keep my<br />

capital intact” investor in an instant. As<br />

you’d expect the 1980s were a more<br />

innocent time. I’m sure I recall that when<br />

one of the now iconic first customer<br />

warnings was introduced, it began its life<br />

as “Warning: the value of your investment<br />

can rise or fall”, which soon was amended<br />

to a more cautious, “Warning: the value<br />

of your investment can fall or rise” Did<br />

you spot the difference This was on the<br />

basis that the original statement might<br />

mislead investors to expect an increase in<br />

their investment before any subsequent<br />

fall (ouch!).<br />

The average investor in a balanced<br />

managed fund since 1987 (according<br />

to the Mercer surveys of returns) has<br />

experienced a variety returns from +34%<br />

in 1997, to -34% in 2008. “Now Mr. and<br />

Mrs Client, tell me, was that the kind of<br />

investment journey you expected from<br />

your “medium risk” fund” A swing in<br />

returns of some 68%, somehow, I don’t<br />

think so!<br />

So where did it all go wrong<br />

Over time a number of factors<br />

contributed to the dramatic negative fund<br />

performance in 2008 and in our view here<br />

5


are four of the central characters in that<br />

tragedy:<br />

––<br />

Fund managers monitored each other’s<br />

asset allocations and performance very<br />

closely through the available industry<br />

surveys and began taking additional risk<br />

by investing more in equities over time in<br />

a bid to outperform their peers. This led<br />

to “herding” around the benchmark and<br />

to a vicious cycle of ever increasing equity<br />

exposures to aggressive levels (of circa<br />

80% in 2007 (source: Mercer) which<br />

were amongst the very highest, if not the<br />

highest in international pension terms at<br />

the time. Ireland may have been extreme<br />

in this respect but it was not alone as<br />

there were similarly high average equity<br />

allocations in the UK balanced managed<br />

fund sector during 2007.<br />

––<br />

There were very high allocations to Irish<br />

equities and Irish assets in these funds<br />

which while justified by the performance<br />

of the Irish economy pre-crash, reduced<br />

the overall protective benefits that wider<br />

global diversification would have<br />

provided. They were also effectively big<br />

bets on a very small economy and stock<br />

market in global terms.<br />

––<br />

Fund managers were also constrained by<br />

investment mandates set for them by<br />

their life companies which required them<br />

always to have a certain percentage<br />

allocation to equities, say 55%-75%. This<br />

was irrespective of the actual market<br />

conditions. For example, in this instance,<br />

if equity markets were in freefall the fund<br />

managers were still mandated to hold at<br />

least 55% of the fund in equities.<br />

––<br />

Also a “one size fits all” approach to<br />

finding a suitable investment solution for<br />

an “average” investor led to these being<br />

most popular fund recommendations<br />

for clients.<br />

The story for Consensus Funds is<br />

different though, right<br />

Wrong! Consensus funds are designed<br />

to deliver the average balanced managed<br />

fund return from the Irish fund manager<br />

market. They effectively remove the risk<br />

of the fund underperforming the average<br />

fund manager’s performance…by… yes<br />

you’ve guessed it, delivering approximately<br />

the average performance of the balanced<br />

managed fund sector. All of the above<br />

mentioned flaws were immediately also<br />

inherent in Consensus funds as they<br />

evolved, and this led to a very similar<br />

looking performance of -35% for the<br />

investors in these funds for 2008.<br />

Thus performance in 2008 demonstrates<br />

that existing Managed and Consensus<br />

funds have fundamental issues which<br />

directly impact on investors. It is strikingly<br />

apparent that there was a dis-connect<br />

between the level of risk being taken in<br />

these funds and the client’s comfort level /<br />

return expectations.<br />

So, what’s the solution then<br />

As Albert Einstein said, “We can’t<br />

solve problems by using the same<br />

kind of thinking we used when we<br />

created them.”<br />

Managed funds in Ireland have been<br />

around for the best part of two to three<br />

decades. The investment industry has<br />

evolved and developed significantly<br />

during this period with access to an ever<br />

increasing number of asset classes. A<br />

number of developing economies around<br />

the globe are also offering increasing<br />

investment opportunities. Innovations in<br />

modern portfolio modelling and the use of<br />

better, together with more technologically<br />

advanced methods of risk management<br />

are enhancing the risk adjusted outcomes<br />

for investors.<br />

A next generation solution…<br />

We believe there is a fresh solution<br />

available to the problems exhibited by<br />

both managed and consensus funds and<br />

to the performance experienced by their<br />

investors – Multi Asset Funds. These types<br />

of funds are growing in popularity in<br />

both Ireland and the UK and are seeing<br />

increasing investment flows into them<br />

since 2008. They are being welcomed<br />

in both markets as a next generation<br />

or a “state of the art” solution to the<br />

weaknesses of the “old” balanced<br />

managed fund model.<br />

6


“One of the critically important lessons arising from the<br />

last few years is that clients’ perspectives have<br />

changed from a return to a risk focus.”<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

These funds are genuinely different from<br />

the past, or at least they should be if they<br />

truly have access to global capabilities<br />

with experts in the field of asset allocation<br />

together with a very wide and increasing<br />

number of asset classes to invest in. The<br />

best of these Multi Asset Funds will usually<br />

include:<br />

––<br />

Robust portfolios built from a much<br />

wider choice of asset classes from an<br />

increasing number of regions of<br />

the world.<br />

––<br />

The expertise and insight of specialist<br />

asset allocation experts who analyse the<br />

long-term forecasts for the valuations,<br />

correlation and volatility of various assets.<br />

––<br />

A specialist short-term tactical team who<br />

assess the threats and opportunities<br />

offered by the economic environment<br />

over the next 6-12 months and how the<br />

portfolio can be adjusted to take<br />

advantage of these.<br />

––<br />

Utilise different styles of investment e.g.<br />

passive/active, value/growth etc., at times<br />

in the economic cycle that are most<br />

advantageous for the portfolio<br />

––<br />

The ability to include an external<br />

manager’s fund, as rarely does one asset<br />

management house have access to all of<br />

the available solutions<br />

––<br />

Access to a diverse range of the latest<br />

developments in asset classes such as<br />

commodities, absolute returns, emerging<br />

market debt and convertibles.<br />

––<br />

Targeting investment risk. One of the<br />

critically important lessons arising from<br />

the last few years is that clients’<br />

perspectives have changed from a return<br />

to a risk focus.<br />

A lot of investors targeting a return of<br />

say 7%-8%, have discovered that they<br />

certainly don’t like the experience of<br />

a potential fall in their investment by<br />

30%-40% (unsurprisingly) at some stage<br />

during their investment term. To address<br />

this, what if fund managers could use<br />

modern techniques and a greater variety<br />

of investment assets to control and target<br />

risk within certain levels to deliver a more<br />

consistent level of return for investors<br />

– a return that would be consistent with<br />

a client’s risk profile<br />

Too futuristic...too optimistic Certainly<br />

not – a select few Multi Asset funds in<br />

the market have now very successfully<br />

addressed this by designing funds which<br />

manage and control the risk of their<br />

funds over the client’s investment horizon<br />

thus providing more clarity around return<br />

expectations.<br />

It is important to point out that all of<br />

this extra fire power for generating a<br />

better risk reward outcome for your<br />

clients needn’t come at an extra premium<br />

– global asset managers can generate<br />

economies of scale which can nicely<br />

translate into an affordable annual<br />

management charge.<br />

This modern approach is a welcome and<br />

significant development, because now,<br />

probably for the first time, the objectives<br />

of investors, brokers, fund managers and<br />

pension trustees are aligned together in<br />

managing or targeting specific risk levels<br />

to provide a better return outcome for<br />

investors.<br />

Finally, a few words of caution – beware<br />

of poor quality and expensive imitations<br />

which have more of a resemblance to the<br />

old managed funds of yesteryear!<br />

7


isk is part of the solution,<br />

not just the problem<br />

Fergus Ryan<br />

Business Development Manager<br />

Main Responsibilities<br />

Fergus is responsible for supporting all<br />

investment related activity with <strong>Aviva</strong> Life &<br />

Pensions sales teams and their independent<br />

advisors.<br />

Experience & Qualifications<br />

Fergus joined <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors in September<br />

1998 having worked for the <strong>Aviva</strong> Life<br />

& Pensions from 1996. He holds a BA in<br />

Economics and Philosophy from University<br />

College Dublin and is a Qualified Financial<br />

Advisor.<br />

8


The reasons for the collapse<br />

in Managed Fund<br />

performance have been well<br />

documented; namely the<br />

over-exposure to equities.<br />

Jana Novotna entered the 1993<br />

Wimbledon tournament playing some<br />

of the finest tennis of her career. Going<br />

into her quarterfinal match with Gabriella<br />

Sabatini, Novotna had lost her previous 6<br />

matches against the Argentine. Novotna<br />

destroyed Sabatini, winning 6-4, 6-3. Her<br />

semi-final match was against the great<br />

Martina Navartilova, who had won each<br />

of their previous 5 meetings. Novotna<br />

prevailed beating Navartilova 6-4, 6-4,<br />

setting up a final against Steffi Graf. At<br />

one set each and serving to go 5-1 in<br />

the final set, Novotna’s game collapsed<br />

as double faults followed fluffed shots.<br />

The process, the years of training that<br />

had led her to the cusp of victory broke<br />

down spectacularly. She had overcome<br />

adversity before but this was different.<br />

She ‘choked’. Graf broke Novotna’s serve<br />

and went on to win the next 5 games to<br />

clinch the ladies title. During the trophy<br />

presentation a devastated Novotna<br />

broke-down sobbing on Duchess of Kent’s<br />

shoulder.<br />

In ‘What the Dog saw’ Malcolm Gladwell<br />

describes how Novotna ‘choked’ at a<br />

crucial point in her game. She retreated<br />

into her process for making shots instead<br />

of playing naturally on instinct and muscle<br />

memory. The more stressful the situation<br />

became the further she retreated into<br />

her process, becoming deliberate and<br />

laboured. How can something that has<br />

worked for so long and taken qualified<br />

people thousands of hours to perfect just<br />

stop working Managed Funds appeared<br />

to stop working in 2007. Did the<br />

Managed Fund process choke According<br />

to Gladwell “how failure happens is<br />

important to understanding why failure<br />

happens.” When we understand why<br />

failure happened we can work on how to<br />

prevent a reoccurrence.<br />

“All change is not growth, as all<br />

movement is not forward”<br />

Managed Funds were the traditional<br />

default fund for savers. They started life<br />

with the noble intent of trying to create<br />

a balanced, diversified fund for the<br />

average investor. The typical Managed<br />

Fund’s mandate (the rules that set out<br />

how the fund is to be invested) state that<br />

your Managed Fund asset mix must be<br />

within certain parameters of the average<br />

Managed Fund, giving flexibility to<br />

differentiate and add value. For the most<br />

part, this worked. Prior to 2007, 7 of the<br />

previous 10 years had seen Managed<br />

Funds return double digit growth (source:<br />

Mercer Group Pension Managed Fund<br />

Surveys as at 31/12/1997)<br />

Like Novotna, Managed funds had come<br />

up against difficult periods prior to<br />

2007 and survived. In 1990 the average<br />

Managed Fund lost almost -12%. In 1994<br />

they fell another -4%. In 2001 Managed<br />

funds fell almost -6% and followed on<br />

in 2002 with a -19% loss. However,<br />

we knew that despite all these knocks<br />

Managed Funds were for the long term<br />

and had always recovered in the past. In<br />

December 2007 as markets had begun<br />

to slide yet again, we were pointing<br />

to the average Managed Fund 10 year<br />

annualised return of 6% saying ‘we’ve<br />

been here before; it’ll work out fine in<br />

the end’. 2 years later, after a significant<br />

stock market correction, Managed Funds<br />

10 year annualised return had collapsed to<br />

0% at the end of 2009. (Source: Mercer)<br />

The reasons for the collapse in Managed<br />

Fund performance have been well<br />

documented; namely the over-exposure to<br />

equities. But why did Managed funds get<br />

so deep into equities When you have a<br />

peer group benchmark based on relative<br />

9


The advantage of categorising funds on their volatility<br />

is clarity for the advisor and investor as to what they<br />

are investing in; it is low risk because the price is not<br />

prone to sharp rises or falls.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

performance everyone is going to lean<br />

towards the asset that goes up the most.<br />

Through the 1980’s and 1990’s equities<br />

went up consistently, recovering stronger<br />

after any fall. This brought a circularity<br />

to investment decisions in the Managed<br />

Fund process – as the benchmark is<br />

the average mix, and as everyone is<br />

incentivised to increase equities over time<br />

to try and outperform, this will pull up<br />

the average equity position, which makes<br />

people have to hold more equities to<br />

generate an overweight position relative<br />

to benchmark, which pulls up the average<br />

equity position and on and on. As a result<br />

Managed Funds went from having an<br />

average holding of approximately 45% in<br />

equities in 1988 to having 78% in 2007.<br />

(Source: Mercer)<br />

Relative performance peer-group<br />

benchmarking has been shown to have<br />

little safeguard against drastic moves<br />

in equity markets. For example, at the<br />

peak in markets in Q3 2007 Managed<br />

Funds had on average 78% in equities.<br />

Therefore, if a fund manager woke up the<br />

day before the stock market was to crash<br />

and knew the fall was coming and wanted<br />

to get as far out of equities as he could in<br />

his Managed Fund, the lowest exposure to<br />

equities he could achieve is approximately<br />

70% due to the mandate. Your Managed<br />

Fund would be massively underweight,<br />

your relative performance would look<br />

good against your peers but despite your<br />

drastic action for every 10% equities fall<br />

your fund still falls 7% while your peers<br />

fall 8%. Hardly a victory, moreover a small<br />

consolation. The process of benchmarking<br />

against a peer group is flawed.<br />

“The dangers of life are infinite, and<br />

among them is safety”<br />

The fallout from Managed Funds has<br />

spilled over into the broader Fund<br />

Management arena. Irish clients are now<br />

wholly dissatisfied with the idea of funds<br />

in general and prefer to invest in deposit<br />

based or cash funds. Why This is a<br />

representation of how the Irish investors<br />

mind set has changed. 5 years ago if you<br />

asked a client where their emphasis lay<br />

between risk and reward, they probably<br />

would have said reward. Today, the<br />

emphasis is minimizing risk by not taking<br />

any. Unit-linked funds offer an aspiration<br />

towards reward with no apparent measure<br />

of risk. Cash or deposit funds offer little<br />

reward but this is seen as an acceptable<br />

price for not taking any risk. Both of these<br />

solutions are also flawed.<br />

Enter the risk targeted Multi Asset Funds<br />

(MAF), which aim to provide a genuinely<br />

low, medium and high solution for Irish<br />

investors. This is done by selecting assets<br />

based on a volatility range for each fund.<br />

There are no peer group benchmarks for<br />

asset mix or performance and therefore<br />

there are no constraints on where<br />

each of the MAF are invested. The only<br />

commitment <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors make in<br />

running their MAF is to monitor risk<br />

exclusively thereby aiming to deliver the<br />

investment experience that clients expect<br />

from a genuinely low, medium or high<br />

risk fund.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors created the MAF series<br />

in response to a piece of proposed<br />

legislation on the risk categorisation<br />

of funds. The European Securities and<br />

Markets Authority published a white<br />

paper that recommended Life Companies<br />

in future should categorise funds<br />

based on the volatility of each funds’<br />

performance. Currently, risk categorisation<br />

is at the discretion of the individual Life<br />

Company and most Life Companies have<br />

different scales of risk. The advantage of<br />

categorising funds on their volatility is<br />

clarity for the advisor and investor as to<br />

what they are investing in; it is low risk<br />

because the price is not prone to sharp<br />

rises or falls. Many funds today classed<br />

as low risk are done so on the basis that<br />

it holds less equities or more cash than<br />

other funds. If a Life Company declares<br />

the fund to be low risk, the only way this<br />

can be monitored is by targeting volatility<br />

that is considered truly low risk. At present<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Life and Pensions Ireland are the<br />

only company in Ireland offering such a<br />

fund solution.<br />

In addition to proposed regulation on<br />

fund categorisation, the Retail Distribution<br />

Review is a piece of regulation that<br />

will commence in the UK from 2013. It<br />

requires brokers to prove that the fund<br />

they invest a client in is appropriate to<br />

their clients risk profile and will remain<br />

appropriate for their client in the future.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> launched a sister range of MAF<br />

funds in the UK in Q4 2010 specifically to<br />

address these impending regulatory issues.<br />

Risk rating is nothing unless you’re risk<br />

targeting<br />

At <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors we believe in order to<br />

deliver a risk targeted solution you need<br />

1. the proliferation of choice that allows you<br />

invest in a truly unconstrained manner<br />

2. expertise to construct robust portfolios to<br />

deliver on the risk target<br />

3. technology that allows you monitor risk<br />

constantly in real-time<br />

10


The Multi Asset Fund team have<br />

approximately 100 different portfolios to<br />

choose from across the 4 assets – equity,<br />

bond, property and cash. The MAF team<br />

blend 16-18 portfolios together to deliver<br />

the targeted amount of risk. They have<br />

absolute freedom to chop and change<br />

those portfolios as they see fit. At no<br />

stage in the process do they consider what<br />

competitors are doing.<br />

In addition to the fund managers and<br />

analysts involved in running the 100<br />

portfolios, the MAF team also use the<br />

Strategic Asset Allocation Team to build<br />

a robust, long term asset mix and the<br />

Tactical Asset Allocation to tweak the<br />

asset mix for short term market events.<br />

On any given day approximately 50 people<br />

from <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors are working on the<br />

Multi Asset Funds.<br />

To ensure that everyone is doing their job,<br />

the MAF team use the BarraOne online<br />

system for risk measurement specifically<br />

designed for the MAF teams needs. At<br />

any hour of the day BarraOne can provide<br />

detailed analysis of the volatility and the<br />

contributors to the volatility of each of<br />

the MAF.<br />

We accept that at various points in the<br />

past funds have been launched claiming<br />

to be a panacea for all previous errors<br />

in fund management processes only to<br />

fall foul of the next ‘black swan’ event<br />

markets have to offer. <strong>Aviva</strong> are making<br />

no such claim with their risk targeted<br />

Multi Asset Funds. However, we believe<br />

that investing in MAF firstly, provides an<br />

appropriate solution for clients who are<br />

either low, medium and high risk investors<br />

with the particular level of risk for each<br />

fund being maintained irrespective of<br />

market conditions. Secondly, MAF was<br />

developed with future regulations in mind<br />

and therefore provides the advisor the<br />

comfort that an appropriate fund is on<br />

offer to their client based on risk profile.<br />

And lastly and most importantly, we<br />

understand why failure occurred in the<br />

Managed Fund arena and we feel focusing<br />

on risk through the Multi Asset Funds<br />

can prevent a reoccurrence for clients.<br />

Jana Novotna also understood why failure<br />

occurred; she won the Wimbledon Ladies<br />

Singles title in 1998.<br />

11


Risk targeted or<br />

absolute return funds<br />

Justin Onuekwusi<br />

CFA<br />

Main Responsibilities<br />

Justin is responsible for managing a range of<br />

multi asset funds<br />

Experience & Qualifications<br />

Prior to joining <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors, Justin was a<br />

fund research analyst at Merrill Lynch where<br />

he was responsible for the research of funds<br />

that invest in traditional and non-benchmark<br />

assets. “Non-benchmark” encompasses a wide<br />

range of asset classes including real estate,<br />

currency, commodities, sector and ethical/<br />

environmental funds. Justin joined Merrill Lynch<br />

in April 2007. Before joining Merrill Lynch, he<br />

worked as an Investment Consultant for Aon<br />

Consulting, focusing on manager research<br />

and selection, asset allocation, performance<br />

analytics and the transitioning of assets for<br />

Aon’s U.K. corporate pension fund clients.<br />

Justin is a CFA charterholder and a member<br />

of the CFA Institute. He also holds a degree in<br />

Economics from the University of Warwick and<br />

the Investment Management Certificate.<br />

Nick Samouilhan<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager<br />

Main Responsibilities<br />

Nick is responsible for responsible for managing<br />

a range of multi-asset funds<br />

Experience & Qualifications<br />

Prior to joining <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors, Nick worked<br />

at Investec Asset Management on their<br />

Multi-Asset desk. His specific focus was on<br />

cross-asset research, quantitative modelling<br />

and strategic asset allocation. Before joining<br />

Investec, Nick worked in academia, where<br />

he lectured economics and finance, and has<br />

published multiple academic papers on volatility<br />

modelling, macro-economic forecasting and<br />

portfolio diversification. Nick holds a PhD<br />

degree in Economics from the University of<br />

Cape Town and the Investment Management<br />

Certificate. Nick is also a FRM charterholder<br />

and a member of the Global Associate of Risk<br />

Professionals.<br />

12


As riskier assets, such as equities, generate higher<br />

returns over time than less risky assets such as cash,<br />

fund mandates run against a peer group will generally<br />

tend to take greater and greater equity risks over time.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

Introduction<br />

With rare exception, most retail funds<br />

are managed with a degree of separation<br />

between the fund manager and the<br />

ultimate end client. Investors, saving<br />

for retirement or a rainy day, put their<br />

money away to be invested in a fund<br />

under the understanding or hope that the<br />

fund’s risks and returns align with their<br />

requirements or investment objectives.<br />

Fund managers, on the other end,<br />

are mostly rewarded on whether their<br />

particular funds perform well or not versus<br />

the relevant benchmark. It is up to the<br />

broker, acting as the intermediary between<br />

the two, to ensure that the objectives<br />

followed by the particular fund manager<br />

are aligned with the requirements of<br />

the investor. Performance fees, for<br />

example, are often defended from<br />

this perspective, in that the additional<br />

reward for outperformance aligns the<br />

incentives of the fund manager with<br />

that of the end investor’s desire for good<br />

performance. Broadly speaking, client<br />

disappointment is often the result of these<br />

fund management incentives and investor<br />

expectations not being appropriately<br />

aligned. Going back to the performance<br />

fee example, by overly skewing the fee<br />

to outperformance, performance fees<br />

are also criticised for incentivising fund<br />

managers to take greater risks than that<br />

desired by the end investor.<br />

This incentive mismatch is a considerable<br />

problem for traditional Balanced Managed<br />

type funds, a popular investment vehicle<br />

in Ireland. Being diversified across equities,<br />

bonds, property and cash, these funds<br />

were designed to be broadly applicable<br />

investment options, suitable for the<br />

investment objectives of many different<br />

clients. However, the key to understanding<br />

the incentives of the fund managers<br />

behind these funds is to note that these<br />

are so called “peer grouped managed<br />

funds”, meaning that the fund managers<br />

objective is to beat the other Balanced<br />

Managed funds that are on offer to<br />

clients (the “peer group”). In theory, such<br />

comparisons will allow investors to identify<br />

the better funds from the rest, allowing<br />

investors to put their money with the best<br />

managers available.<br />

The problems with peer groups<br />

In practice, however, it is important to<br />

think through what this incentive does<br />

to a fund manager’s objective over time,<br />

and whether this relative objective (return<br />

and risk relative to the benchmark such as<br />

excess return and tracking error) is aligned<br />

to the absolute expectations (return and<br />

risk agnostic to benchmark such as total<br />

return and volatility) of the final investor.<br />

Specifically, by managing a multi-asset<br />

fund against a peer group with an aim<br />

of generating the highest return relative<br />

to the others, fund managers are clearly<br />

incentivised to take a greater level of<br />

risk than the average fund in order to<br />

generate the highest return. As riskier<br />

assets, such as equities, generate higher<br />

returns over time than less risky assets<br />

such as cash, fund mandates run against<br />

a peer group will generally tend to take<br />

greater and greater equity risks over time.<br />

This is, indeed, exactly what happened to<br />

the Balanced Managed sector in Ireland.<br />

Worse, as the average return of the peer<br />

group is the benchmark this is an ongoing,<br />

circular process: fund managers take<br />

greater and greater risks in order to beat a<br />

peer group that itself is made up of other<br />

funds which are themselves taking greater<br />

and greater risks. The result is a vicious<br />

cycle of steady increase in risk over time,<br />

13


which may not necessarily be aligned with<br />

the objectives of the underlying investors,<br />

who would generally take less and less risk<br />

as they approach retirement.<br />

Another aspect of concern with these<br />

peer grouped funds has to do with the<br />

flexibility of the fund managers to invest<br />

in ways that they would like. Many of<br />

these peer grouped funds have mandates<br />

that prevent the fund managers from<br />

deviating too much from the peer group<br />

asset allocations, with these rules mostly<br />

written for risk reasons. These are either<br />

expressed as a percentage difference in<br />

allocation from the average fund (say, +/-<br />

5% in Japanese equities versus the peer<br />

group), or in relative risk terms (e.g., no<br />

more than 4% tracking error). This means<br />

that if a fund manager had a view that,<br />

say, Japanese equities were likely to lose<br />

money in the foreseeable future, he/she<br />

could only underweight it versus the peer<br />

group, not avoid it completely despite<br />

feeling it will lose money. Again,<br />

it is unclear that such mandate restrictions<br />

within peer group funds, designed to<br />

manage risks and returns in a relative<br />

perspective, align the management of<br />

the fund with the objectives of the end<br />

investor, who is ultimately interested in<br />

absolute risks and returns, not relative.<br />

Greater client sensitivity following the<br />

recent difficult investment period in<br />

Ireland (the 2008 global credit crunch<br />

and the 2011 European sovereign debt<br />

crisis), especially the disappointment of<br />

many investors in Balanced Managed<br />

mandates, means that brokers are<br />

focusing more directly on this mismatch<br />

problem, ensuring that the funds in which<br />

their clients invest are appropriate to their<br />

expectations. Unfortunately, peer group<br />

managed funds, such as the Balanced<br />

Managed fund sector, will always raise<br />

considerable problems for brokers in<br />

this regard due to the incentivisation<br />

mismatch between the relative focused<br />

fund managers and the absolute focused<br />

end investor.<br />

Alternatives to peer group managed<br />

funds<br />

As part of a broader process of structural<br />

change, the fund management industry<br />

has proposed two different responses<br />

to this mismatch, both in Ireland and<br />

elsewhere. As the starting point of the<br />

investment process is the end investors’<br />

risk and return expectations, both stated<br />

in absolute terms, these two industry<br />

responses are either (I) funds that aim to<br />

generate a specific absolute return each<br />

year regardless of the peers and broader<br />

market behaviour (called absolute return<br />

funds); or (II) funds that commit to taking<br />

a specified absolute level of risk regardless<br />

of the behaviour of other funds and the<br />

market (called risk controlled funds).<br />

The two solutions follow different<br />

approaches because it is impossible to<br />

target both a specific level of risk and a<br />

specific level of return at the same time.<br />

This is easy to understand, as there will<br />

be times when the committed return<br />

target is easier to achieve, and hence little<br />

risk is required, while at other times the<br />

return target requires the fund manager<br />

to take much larger risks to reach it. For<br />

example, it easier for an absolute return<br />

fund to achieve positive returns when cash<br />

generates 4% per annum, as it provides<br />

a cushion for positive returns, compared<br />

to an environment when cash generates<br />

only 1%, all else being equal. Generating<br />

positive returns when cash is at a 1%<br />

14


The specific solution offered to the client will come<br />

down, as always, to ensuring that the objectives<br />

followed by the fund manager, whether to reach a<br />

return target or to maintain a specific level of risk, best<br />

align with the investor’s objectives.<br />

level and yields on bonds are low, and<br />

hence bonds are expected to generate<br />

low total returns, requires taking more risk<br />

elsewhere and more active management<br />

to generate alpha. Conversely, for risk<br />

controlled funds with a risk commitment<br />

there will be times when that specific<br />

risk level will generate large returns due<br />

to the abundant opportunities available<br />

in the market, while at other times<br />

the opportunities available, and hence<br />

returns for that risk level, will be far less.<br />

The opportunities depend, for example,<br />

on the level of interest rates on cash,<br />

yields on bonds, the expected equity risk<br />

premium (i.e., the expected compensation<br />

for taking equity risk) and the relative<br />

valuations across asset classes and<br />

investments.<br />

In conclusion<br />

Deciding on which of these two<br />

approaches works for a specific client is<br />

the responsibility of the particular broker,<br />

with the two options being quite different<br />

in both approach and appropriateness.<br />

Absolute return funds, for example, will<br />

not always make the return target year<br />

after year, and the need for complex<br />

derivatives and dynamic strategies in order<br />

to deliver the return regardless of the<br />

broader market means that understanding<br />

the risks being taken will be hard to<br />

understand and communicate to the<br />

client. An absolute return fund with a<br />

return objective of cash +4% may need to<br />

take equity-like risk and might experience<br />

large negative returns during some time<br />

periods. For risk controlled funds, the risk<br />

targets are likely to be easier to achieve<br />

than those of absolute return funds,<br />

though it would be difficult to understand<br />

what returns would be generally expected<br />

from them over time. Risk controlled<br />

funds do not aim or promise to generate<br />

positive returns year after year, but rather<br />

the maximum return for a given level of<br />

risk. The risk of disappointment may be<br />

therefore lower for these funds than for<br />

absolute return funds.<br />

The specific solution offered to the client<br />

will come down, as always, to ensuring<br />

that the objectives followed by the fund<br />

manager, whether to reach a return target<br />

or to maintain a specific level of risk, best<br />

align with the investor’s objectives.<br />

15


What is volatility and<br />

why is it important<br />

There are many measures of investment risk; the<br />

most commonly used measure is volatility. Whilst it<br />

is commonly used, it is measure that can be open<br />

to different interpretations. We set out below how<br />

we think of volatility, why it is important and how<br />

it can be used to form investment decisions.<br />

Gavin Counsell<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager, FIA<br />

Main Responsibilities<br />

Gavin is responsible for managing a range of<br />

multi-asset funds.<br />

Experience & Qualifications<br />

Prior to joining <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors, Gavin was<br />

a Senior Investment Consultant at Towers<br />

Watson within the Strategy team. Within this<br />

role Gavin provided strategic investment advice<br />

to clients. This included portfolio construction<br />

analysis and asset allocation advice, to achieve<br />

both target return objectives and diverse risk<br />

exposures. Before joining Towers Watson,<br />

he worked as a Pensions and Investment<br />

Consultant for Aon Consulting, between 2000<br />

and 2007, focusing on asset liability modelling<br />

studies, asset allocation, portfolio structuring<br />

and performance analytics. Gavin is a qualified<br />

Fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries.<br />

He also holds a Master of Mathematics degree<br />

from the University of Warwick.<br />

16


Chart 1: Volatility measurement<br />

% 3.0<br />

2.0<br />

Low volatility<br />

High volatility<br />

1.0<br />

0.0<br />

-1.0<br />

-2.0<br />

Returns over time<br />

What is volatility<br />

Volatility is essentially a measure of the<br />

expected level of dispersion in the range<br />

of investment outcomes. More formally<br />

volatility is the standard deviation, which is<br />

a measure of how far investment returns<br />

may differ from the expected return<br />

(ie arithmetic average or mean return).<br />

Broadly speaking, an asset (or a fund) with<br />

large variations in return would have a<br />

high volatility and therefore said to have a<br />

high degree of investment risk. Conversely,<br />

if the returns of an asset/fund are more<br />

stable and predictable, the volatility would<br />

be lower. A fund with a lower volatility<br />

would be described as having a low level<br />

of investment risk.<br />

Typically, volatility is measured in<br />

percentage terms, and referenced over a<br />

particular time frame, with a higher figure<br />

representing a higher level of volatility. For<br />

example, equities have typically shown a<br />

volatility of around 15-20% per annum,<br />

compared to bonds, which have shown a<br />

volatility of around 5-7% per annum.<br />

One point to note (as shown in the<br />

illustration above) is that volatility captures<br />

both potential variations on the upside (ie<br />

outcomes that are better than expected)<br />

as well as variations on the downside.<br />

Volatility captures both good and bad<br />

investment outcomes. This aspect is an<br />

example of one of the potential flaws<br />

in using volatility as a risk measure, as<br />

more often it is the downside risk that<br />

is of more importance and concern for<br />

investors.<br />

Why is it important<br />

Understanding the volatility of a fund<br />

(or an asset) is crucial as it provides an<br />

indicator to the size of the potential<br />

investment gains or, more importantly,<br />

potential losses. It is therefore important<br />

that an investor is aware of the potential<br />

risk exposure before investing. Different<br />

investors may be more willing and/or able<br />

to accept investment risk than others.<br />

For example, would you be prepared to<br />

tolerate an investment loss of 2% How<br />

would you feel if the potential loss was<br />

bigger, say, 10% or may be even 20%<br />

The expected asset volatility can be used<br />

to give an indication of the potential<br />

deviations in return. For example, if we<br />

had two investments with volatilities<br />

of 5% and 15% then if we make<br />

an assumption about the potential<br />

distribution of returns we can estimate<br />

how widely the two investments<br />

may differ.<br />

17


15% volatility “2-in-3 years” range: -10% to 20%<br />

8<br />

Frequency %<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-48 -38 -28 -19 -9 0 10 19 29<br />

38<br />

48<br />

57<br />

Using volatility to estimate ranges of<br />

return<br />

These graphs show the spread of monthly<br />

returns for two hypothetical investment<br />

funds with annual volatilities of 5% and<br />

15%. For the purpose of illustration we<br />

assume that on average both investments<br />

are expected to return 5% each year.<br />

The graphs show how often returns were<br />

experienced at different points across the<br />

return spectrum.<br />

Range of returns<br />

5% volatility “2-in-3 years” range: 0% to 10%<br />

8<br />

Frequency %<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-48 -38 -28 -19 -9 0 10 19 29<br />

Range of returns<br />

38<br />

48<br />

57<br />

Visually the high volatility fund has a<br />

wider spread of potential returns both on<br />

the upside and on the downside.<br />

Based on a ‘normal’* return distribution,<br />

we can estimate the likelihood that the<br />

returns fall within a range. Roughly, in 2<br />

out of 3 years investment return are likely<br />

to be within volatility measure of the<br />

long-term expected return. For the 15%<br />

volatility fund, this means that two thirds<br />

of the time returns are expected to be in<br />

the range, -10% (= 5% – 15%) to 20%<br />

(= 5% +15%). For the 5% volatility fund,<br />

this range is 0% to 10%.<br />

* A Normal distribution is an assumption about the potential shape of the return profile. In reality it is unlikely to be an exact match to actual return distribution (in particular<br />

it is often shown that the Normal distribution underestimates the likelihood of extreme bad and good events). We show in the graphs overleaf how actual US equity and<br />

bond returns compare to Normal distributions.<br />

Why be exposed to volatility at all<br />

Given that no one likes or wants to lose<br />

money, why would anyone want to be<br />

exposed to a high level of investment risk<br />

The answer comes down to expected<br />

investment returns. It is widely accepted<br />

that over the long-term, being exposed to<br />

higher risk investments, such as equities,<br />

should result in higher expected returns.<br />

This is why some people prefer to be<br />

exposed to higher risk, higher expected<br />

return investments. The crucial aspect it to<br />

ensure that the investor can cope with the<br />

potential roller-coaster of a ride along the<br />

way, that is, to be prepared to accept large<br />

falls in performance as well as large gains.<br />

To put this into context, although equities<br />

are accepted as having a higher level of<br />

investment risk than bonds, equities are<br />

also expected to outperform bonds over<br />

the longer term (essentially an investor<br />

may be expected to be rewarded over the<br />

longer term through higher investment<br />

returns for being exposed to the higher<br />

level of risk).<br />

Using volatility to assess funds<br />

It is imperative for investors to choose<br />

funds to suit their own risk and return<br />

objectives. Comparing different funds’<br />

volatilities, and understanding what<br />

this means to the risk exposure, is<br />

an important step in investing in<br />

the appropriate fund. Not only is it<br />

important that the chosen fund suits<br />

the investor’s risk tolerance at the point<br />

of initial investment, it is also important<br />

to ensure it remains appropriate over<br />

time. This can be done by monitoring<br />

the levels of investment risk within the<br />

fund or alternatively choosing a fund<br />

that is expected to maintain a constant<br />

risk objective over time (rather than an<br />

objective based on the fund’s peers, for<br />

example).<br />

How we measure volatility<br />

There is a wide range of accepted<br />

methods of measuring volatility. Typically<br />

most measures are expressed as an annual<br />

rate. Whilst expressed as an annual rate,<br />

volatility may be averaged over different<br />

time horizons. For example, you could<br />

look at the volatility averaged over a one<br />

year period, five year period or a ten<br />

year period (or any period in between, or<br />

longer or shorter). Different time horizons<br />

can be used to suit different purposes.<br />

Using longer time horizons make sense for<br />

longer term investors.<br />

We also recognise that when managing<br />

risk, the “long term” journey is made up a<br />

series of shorter terms. To ensure we reach<br />

the “longer term” as expected, we believe<br />

it is important to be aware of the level<br />

of risk along the journey. We therefore<br />

typically measure volatility over a five year<br />

period. This is in keeping with the time<br />

horizons used by European Securities and<br />

Markets Authority for measuring risk.<br />

However, whilst volatility is a useful<br />

measure it is important to be aware that<br />

it is only one measure. It is therefore<br />

often sensible to combine different risk<br />

measurement techniques when making<br />

an investment decision. For example, we<br />

find using “what if” scenario testing a<br />

powerful tool in understanding how an<br />

investment may be expected to react in<br />

different outcomes.<br />

18


Over the long-term equities are expected to outperform lower risk assets (such as bonds) but there are periods (even<br />

lengthy periods) when equities under perform<br />

Since the early 1970s US equities have outperformed bonds<br />

Cumulative Return<br />

Dec 1969=1, log scale<br />

64<br />

32<br />

16<br />

8<br />

4<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0.5<br />

1969<br />

1974<br />

1979<br />

1984<br />

1989<br />

1994<br />

1999<br />

2004<br />

2009<br />

But over the last ten years, equities have underperformed<br />

Cumulative Return<br />

Dec 2001=1, log scale<br />

2.00<br />

1.25<br />

0.50<br />

2001<br />

2003<br />

2005<br />

2007<br />

2009<br />

2011<br />

US 10Yr Treasury<br />

S&P 500<br />

US 10Yr Treasury<br />

S&P 500<br />

Source: Bloomberg, based on monthly data between January 1970 and December 2011.<br />

However equities are also expected to be more volatile than bonds<br />

Monthly returns for US equities<br />

Frequency %<br />

10<br />

9<br />

8<br />

7<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0<br />

-15<br />

-12<br />

S&P 500<br />

-9.0<br />

-6.0 -3.0 0.0 3.0 6.0<br />

Range of monthly returns<br />

Normal Distribution<br />

9.0<br />

12.0<br />

These graphs show the spread of monthly returns for US equities<br />

and bonds. They show how often returns were experienced at<br />

different points across the return spectrum.<br />

For example, 7% of the equity experience produced a monthly<br />

return of around -1.5% (compared to 6% for bonds). At the<br />

more extreme, equities have experienced monthly returns of<br />

less than -5% where as bonds have virtually no experience of<br />

15monthly returns this extreme*.<br />

The wider spread of equity returns compared to bond returns<br />

demonstrates the higher level volatility that equities pose.<br />

Monthly returns for bonds<br />

Frequency %<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

-15<br />

-12<br />

-9.0<br />

-6.0 -3.0 0.0 3.0 6.0<br />

Range of monthly returns<br />

9.0<br />

12.0<br />

15<br />

Based on the data shown, averaged over 40 years, US equities<br />

have shown an annualised volatility of 16%pa compared to US<br />

10 year Treasury bonds of 8%pa.<br />

* This is not to say in the future that returns may not be this extreme or worse.<br />

US 10Yr Treasury<br />

Normal Distribution<br />

Source: Bloomberg, based on monthly data between January 1970 and December 2011.<br />

Conclusion<br />

Volatility measures how varied the actual investment outcomes may<br />

differ to the expected investment return. High levels of investment<br />

volatility are associated with high levels of investment risk, ie the wider<br />

the dispersion of investment outcomes (both on the upside and the<br />

downside). It is crucial that investors choose funds that match a level<br />

of risk that is appropriate for them; understanding a fund’s volatility<br />

provides one important tool to do this.<br />

19


Enhanced Client<br />

solutions<br />

October, as the American author Mark Twain<br />

observed over a hundred years ago in his 1894<br />

novel “Pudd’nhead Wilson”, is one of the<br />

“peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in<br />

stocks in. The others are July, January, September,<br />

April, November, May, March, June, December,<br />

August, and February.”<br />

Nick Samouilhan<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager, PhD, FRM<br />

20


The first step is by far the<br />

most important: we need to<br />

decide what to invest in over<br />

the long-term.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

Humour aside, October is also pensions<br />

season in Ireland, a time when many Irish<br />

brokers sit down and begin the daunting<br />

task of constructing portfolios that aim<br />

to meet their client expectations while<br />

investing in an uncertain environment.<br />

This year, perhaps, the uncertainty is even<br />

higher than usual given the economic<br />

and political changes and concerns<br />

going on both globally and locally, while<br />

client expectations and trust are still in<br />

need of careful management given the<br />

violent reversal from good times to hard<br />

times seen in Ireland over the last few<br />

years. How should brokers approach<br />

this important task We provide here an<br />

overview of how we at <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

structure the portfolio construction<br />

process in our funds, a process that we<br />

strongly believe in and a process that has<br />

stood us well in good times and bad.<br />

Dealing with information overload<br />

A major difficulty with constructing<br />

portfolios is that, like much else these<br />

days, it suffers from the problem of having<br />

too much information rather than too<br />

little. Indeed, it is often hard to work out<br />

from the constant newspaper headlines,<br />

economic announcements and market<br />

moves what information actually matters,<br />

how one should interpret it and how it<br />

impacts (if at all) on the task at hand.<br />

For example, how important is the latest<br />

Chinese GDP number for equities Or the<br />

disappointing US labour market report<br />

for that matter How do these two affect<br />

the Euro What do the European council<br />

negotiations mean for government<br />

bonds Most importantly, how do these<br />

things affect the market over the next few<br />

months versus the next few years Or my<br />

specific equity manager How is he/she<br />

likely to do in these markets<br />

It’s as easy as 1,2,3<br />

We address this information overload<br />

problem at <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors by breaking<br />

the problem down into three distinct<br />

steps, allowing us to filter and<br />

contextualise what information matters<br />

to what decisions. We are fortunate to<br />

have large dedicated teams working with<br />

us on each step, though the broader<br />

concept of a step wise decision making<br />

process is still one that we believe all<br />

portfolio constructors should follow. The<br />

specific three steps that we focus on are,<br />

firstly, how should we invest over the long<br />

term, say five to ten years Secondly, are<br />

there any strong reasons not to invest<br />

that way for the next few months Lastly,<br />

how do we best put on this view These<br />

three steps, which require very different<br />

perspectives, make up the backbone of<br />

the successful investment process pursued<br />

by <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors across all of its multiasset<br />

funds.<br />

1. Take a long –term view<br />

The first step is by far the most important:<br />

we need to decide what to invest in over<br />

the long-term. While a thirty year view<br />

(i.e. until retirement) is far too long a<br />

perspective, a five to ten year horizon<br />

helps to frame the discussions away from<br />

the daily, weekly or even monthly noise,<br />

allowing us to sit back and ask what we<br />

should hold in our clients’ portfolios.<br />

There is also some good news here: this<br />

step is the least dependent on daily,<br />

weekly or even monthly news-flow: what<br />

matters here are a few big picture items.<br />

For example, for long term equity returns<br />

it is the dividend yield, economic growth<br />

and profit cycle that matters most; not the<br />

weekly market movements or quarterly<br />

earnings updates. For commodities, it<br />

is the long term relationship between<br />

21


structural demand and structural supply,<br />

not strikes at specific mines in South<br />

America or bad weather in the Gulf of<br />

Mexico. For Government Bonds it is the<br />

yield and (possibly) the credit risk of not<br />

being paid back, not the morning papers’<br />

rumours about the possible outcome<br />

from latest government summit. Simply<br />

put, if you are investing for someone’s<br />

retirement, ignore the days’ details and<br />

invest for the long-term.<br />

2. But don’t forget the short-term!<br />

In our next step we ask ourselves a very<br />

specific, yet simple, question: are there<br />

any strong investment reasons why these<br />

long-term positions should not be held<br />

for the next few months This allows us<br />

to avoid holding positions where we have<br />

a strong view that the short term picture<br />

is negative, or avoid missing investments<br />

that we have strong positive views on<br />

in the short term but are negative in the<br />

longer term. Note the critical phrasing of<br />

the question here: we don’t ask what our<br />

allocation should be in the short-term;<br />

instead we start by looking at investing<br />

over the long term and then adjust it in<br />

the short term if, and only if, we have<br />

strong reasons not to hold the position<br />

in the short term. This approach has<br />

numerous benefits, not least of which<br />

is the avoidance of excessive trading by<br />

chasing the latest market fad or animal<br />

spirit, as is the want of many individual<br />

investors. Even more importantly, we<br />

employ this approach because we have<br />

far more conviction in our ability to get<br />

the bigger, longer term picture correct<br />

than we do in getting the shorter term<br />

picture right given the inherent volatility<br />

and animal spirits at play in the short<br />

run, a view backed up by considerable<br />

industry and academic research. As a good<br />

example of this approach we could believe<br />

that commodities are a good investment<br />

over five years but have strong concerns<br />

about them being overvalued in the short<br />

term. In this case we would look to hold<br />

less commodity exposure or none at all<br />

until our strong short-term negative view<br />

fades. In making this adjustment we at<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors are fortunate to have<br />

access to dedicated teams of strategists,<br />

economists and analysts, who build<br />

detailed short term scenarios for us to use,<br />

though again the broader process<br />

of investing long term but watching short<br />

term should, in our view, be a foundation<br />

of good portfolio construction.<br />

22


Managers often have significant style biases and<br />

performance cycles, and we believe that understanding<br />

this is key to choosing a manager that will add value to<br />

the portfolio in the future.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

3. Get the right exposure<br />

Lastly, we need to invest the money.<br />

We may think that US equities are a<br />

good long term investment, and find<br />

no strong reason to avoid this position<br />

in the short term. How do we invest the<br />

money In this approach the multi-asset<br />

desk at <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors is very similar to<br />

many Irish brokers, in that we are not<br />

stock pickers but rather “fund pickers”.<br />

If we want to invest in US equities for<br />

our clients’ portfolios, the choice is<br />

whether to buy an index fund, an ETF<br />

or a mutual fund managed by various<br />

fund managers, including <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors.<br />

In this regard there are two things to<br />

bear in mind. The first is that this step is<br />

often the least important determinant of<br />

whether a portfolio meets its long term<br />

client expectations, it’s the allocation<br />

steps above that determine that mostly.<br />

Secondly, it is not simply the case of<br />

looking in the rear view mirror and<br />

investing in the manager with the best<br />

record over twelve months, six months<br />

or three years (or whatever horizon).<br />

Managers often have significant style<br />

biases and performance cycles, and<br />

understanding this is key to choosing<br />

a manager that will add value to the<br />

portfolio in the future.<br />

We hope this article helps you to build<br />

better portfolios for your clients during<br />

this “peculiarly dangerous” month for<br />

investing. We want to emphasise the<br />

importance of a disciplined, step-wise<br />

approach in avoiding the latest investment<br />

trend or market spirits, helping to<br />

construct enduring portfolios that will<br />

meet your client expectations over the<br />

long-term. Unfortunately this advice was<br />

not taken by the aforementioned Mr<br />

Twain, who lost all of his wealth (and most<br />

of his wife’s inheritance) through investing<br />

in the development of a particular<br />

typesetting machine, only for this to be<br />

made obsolete by a better model only a<br />

short while later. It is not known what<br />

month he made the fateful investment<br />

decision in.<br />

23


Is your portfolio diversified,<br />

or just varied<br />

Justin Onuekwusi<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager, CFA<br />

Nick Samouilhan<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager, PhD, FRM<br />

24


It is the diversification of investment returns, and not<br />

assets, that is of benefit to portfolios. In this sense, a<br />

varied portfolio is very different from one that is truly<br />

diversified.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

One of the key tenets of sound portfolio<br />

construction is that portfolios should be<br />

diversified. By spreading the risk across<br />

different investments this approach<br />

hopes to provide higher, more stable<br />

and less risky long-term returns. Indeed,<br />

the advantages of this approach were<br />

formalised mathematically in 1952 by<br />

Harry Markowitz, who won a Nobel Prize<br />

for proving that portfolios which hold<br />

assets that are not perfectly correlated<br />

with each other could achieve either<br />

the same return with lower risk, or<br />

alternatively a higher return for the<br />

same risk, than less diversified portfolios.<br />

However, while this tenet is often followed<br />

(at least in theory), many investors ignore<br />

two important points about it. First, that<br />

diversification does not negate valuation<br />

concerns i.e. identifying value remains<br />

important and, secondly, that it is the<br />

diversification of investment returns, and<br />

not assets, that is of benefit to portfolios.<br />

In this sense, a varied portfolio is very<br />

different from one that is truly diversified.<br />

Take a simple portfolio with a single<br />

holding in, say, Irish company CRH<br />

as a starting point. This company, a<br />

manufacturer and supplier of construction<br />

materials, has its returns determined by a<br />

number of factors, especially the outlook<br />

for construction industry, the outlook of<br />

the company and the current price of its<br />

shares (i.e. the value of the company). If<br />

the construction market does well, the<br />

investment will do well, all else being<br />

equal. However, the valuation of the<br />

company matters just as well, as if the<br />

stock is overvalued then it is possible,<br />

for example, for the construction industry<br />

to do well while you lose money in the<br />

investment as it becomes more fairly<br />

priced, i.e. is rerated downwards.<br />

To diversify this portfolio you could hold<br />

another stock, say C&C group, the Irish<br />

manufacturer and distributor of beers and<br />

ciders. Again, the factors that will impact<br />

the return are three-fold: C&C’s valuation,<br />

the outlook of C&C and the outlook for<br />

the drinks industry. Holding this stock in<br />

addition to CRH creates a more diversified<br />

portfolio, as there are now two different<br />

drivers of the portfolio (the construction<br />

industry and the drinks industry), and it<br />

is possible to imagine a situation where<br />

one industry does poorly but the other<br />

one does well. In this case diversification<br />

has helped, as one stock will be up and<br />

offsetting the other one’s negative return.<br />

There are two key things to note about<br />

this simple example.<br />

The first is that the portfolio is more<br />

diversified because the underlying drivers<br />

of the two stocks are not the same, not<br />

because there are more “holdings”. A<br />

portfolio of five drinks related companies,<br />

or five construction related companies,<br />

would probably be less diversified than<br />

this simple example consisting of one from<br />

each industry.<br />

Secondly, diversification without due<br />

regard to the valuation or the outlook of<br />

the individual holdings, i.e. a “ticking the<br />

box” or “optical diversification” approach,<br />

is likely to lead to poorly diversified<br />

portfolios. For example, if both stocks are<br />

overvalued, the likelihood is that they will<br />

both revert to “fair value”, irrespective of<br />

whether they have different drivers. Simply<br />

put, to be truly diversified, more is needed<br />

than simply a large number of holdings,<br />

there has to be an understanding of the<br />

valuation and outlook of the companies in<br />

the portfolio.<br />

25


Moving on to multi-asset portfolios,<br />

where diversification of risk is a key<br />

attraction, these two lessons continue<br />

to be important, if not more so. Indeed,<br />

understanding them correctly is the key<br />

to assessing whether a multi-asset fund<br />

holds diversified asset classes, or just<br />

“various” asset classes.<br />

The first point, on drivers, comes across<br />

starkly in multi-asset funds, and the key<br />

to successfully diversifying in them is to<br />

understand both the unique drivers and<br />

the common drivers of the different asset<br />

classes. Japanese economic growth, for<br />

example, will be a larger driver to the<br />

returns of Japanese equities than it is<br />

to US equities. However, both Japanese<br />

and US equities are likely to be more<br />

impacted by changes in international<br />

growth through their exporting companies<br />

and international trade. The returns to<br />

governments bonds are, predominantly,<br />

driven by inflation concerns, policy rates<br />

and, increasingly, solvency concerns.<br />

Commodities tend to be driven by factors<br />

such as inflation, global supply and<br />

demand conditions, seasonal weather<br />

patterns and government actions.<br />

Corporate credit shares similar drivers<br />

to both equities and government bonds,<br />

while <strong>Aviva</strong>’s Index Opportunity fund<br />

is driven by a completely idiosyncratic<br />

driver: changes in the composition of<br />

indices around the world (e.g. which<br />

companies are going into, or out of, the<br />

S&P 500 the next time it is rebalanced).<br />

Common drivers are also often quite<br />

subtle; investments in Russian equities<br />

and debt issued by Chilean government,<br />

for example, have the common factor of<br />

commodity returns (oil in Russia’s case,<br />

copper in Chile’s). Both oil and copper can<br />

move broadly together at times given their<br />

economic importance, and Chilean bonds<br />

and Russian stocks, therefore, would be<br />

considered poor diversifiers of each other’s<br />

returns at these times.<br />

The second point, on valuations is that<br />

when investing across different asset<br />

classes, valuation and the outlook of<br />

that asset class matter just as much as it<br />

does with individual stocks, perhaps even<br />

more so. Diversifying amongst different<br />

asset classes with different drivers is not a<br />

replacement for analysing whether those<br />

asset classes are a good investment or not.<br />

A good example (of many), is the Japanese<br />

stock market (Topix) which, in the late<br />

1980s, was trading above 2800. Today<br />

it is trading around 850, a fall of around<br />

70%, despite growth in the Japanese<br />

and international economy over those<br />

20 plus years. Why In 1980 Japanese<br />

equities traded at 60 times earnings,<br />

making them incredibly expensive and<br />

therefore a poor investment; in 2010 they<br />

traded at 16 times earnings, and it was<br />

this revaluation that swamped the positive<br />

26


The returns during that troubled period, when<br />

“diversification” in many portfolios famously failed,<br />

should be viewed not as a breakdown of diversification<br />

but rather as a lesson on why doing it properly matters<br />

so much.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

drivers and led to the large investment<br />

loss. Holding Japanese equities as a<br />

diversifying exposure does not change the<br />

fact that you would have lost 70% of your<br />

investment. Valuation remains central to<br />

successful long term investing whether<br />

its regional equities, government bonds,<br />

commodities, corporate bonds or any<br />

other asset class, and is not replaced by<br />

diversification justifications.<br />

What does this mean for investors<br />

The first is that, despite the problems of<br />

2007/8, diversification should still be one<br />

of the central tenets of sound portfolio<br />

construction, especially in long-term<br />

Managed or Multi-Asset portfolios.<br />

The returns during that troubled period,<br />

when “diversification” in many portfolios<br />

famously failed, should be viewed<br />

not as a breakdown of diversification<br />

but rather as a lesson on why doing it<br />

properly matters so much. Indeed, the<br />

performance of typical Managed funds<br />

during that period is a perfect example of<br />

this, as the returns of the average fund<br />

during this period was dominated by a<br />

single common factor (the Irish property<br />

market, which impacted Irish commercial<br />

property, Irish financial companies and<br />

Irish government bonds) and by investing<br />

in overvalued asset classes. Secondly,<br />

portfolio construction should not be done<br />

through a predetermined “tick the box”<br />

approach whereby you need to have four,<br />

14 or 44 holdings. Rather, start with the<br />

objective in mind (the return requirement,<br />

this maximum loss, that level of volatility<br />

etc.) and then build your portfolio up,<br />

diversifying only when it makes sense to<br />

do so, with a focus on the drivers (and,<br />

importantly, how these interact with each<br />

other) and valuations. Understanding this<br />

will help investors understand whether<br />

their portfolios are truly diversified, or just<br />

varied.<br />

27


Active or passive<br />

management<br />

Nick Samouilhan<br />

Multi-asset Fund Manager, PhD, FRM<br />

28


Firstly in our view, it is important to constantly reiterate<br />

that manager or investment selection, whether active or<br />

passive, is secondary to asset allocation when it<br />

comes to meeting clients’ investment objectives.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors<br />

The active versus passive debate<br />

A lively discussion currently takes place<br />

amongst the broader investment advisor<br />

community on the use of passive funds<br />

versus active funds in their clients’<br />

portfolios. The background to the debate<br />

is the confluence of ever greater passive<br />

options (both in number of asset classes<br />

offered and the number of providers)<br />

and recent underperformance of many<br />

active managers. This discussion can be<br />

easily summarised, with proponents of<br />

passive management arguing that active<br />

managers are often more expensive,<br />

require onerous due diligence and have<br />

often underperformed their respective<br />

benchmarks. In reply, supporters of<br />

active management argue that passive<br />

management exposes investors to<br />

opaque risks beyond their understanding<br />

(particularly with regards to swap based<br />

ETFs): prevents investors from avoiding<br />

obvious problems with certain securities<br />

in the particular replicated benchmark;<br />

bounds to underperform the benchmark<br />

after fees and costs; and gives up<br />

potential alpha.<br />

This debate, while both important and<br />

timely, has become in our view rather<br />

“boring”, being framed as it has in the<br />

unfortunate way of active or passive,<br />

leading to more confusion than clarity<br />

as active and passive fund providers<br />

publicly trade their views. In practice,<br />

management of a client’s full portfolio to<br />

his/her expectations is a complex task, and<br />

a blended use of both active and passive<br />

exposures is, in our view, often a better<br />

way to approach this overall portfolio<br />

management than simply a “one or the<br />

other” absolutist approach. As a large user<br />

of both active and passive investments<br />

in our clients’ funds, we, the Multi-Asset<br />

Fund team at <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors, view the<br />

management of this blend as a key<br />

component of our role and client offering,<br />

and provide here the broad thinking on<br />

this topic that we follow in<br />

all our portfolios.<br />

Setting the strategic, long term split<br />

between active and passive<br />

Firstly, it is important to constantly<br />

reiterate that manager or investment<br />

selection, whether active or passive, is<br />

secondary to asset allocation when it<br />

comes to meeting clients’ investment<br />

objectives. Asset allocation aligns the<br />

portfolio with the long-term risk and<br />

performance objectives. As such the<br />

focus should remain on getting this asset<br />

allocation step right first and foremost.<br />

Only once the asset allocation decision<br />

has been made the decision on the<br />

specific used to express the allocation<br />

views should be looked at. The choice<br />

between Japanese equities and US<br />

equities, for example, has in the past easily<br />

led to annual differences of over 10% in<br />

total portfolio performance, putting the<br />

possible 1-2% outperformance of the<br />

active Japanese manager versus passive<br />

Japanese manager into perspective.<br />

Secondly, once asset allocation has<br />

been set there are, in our view, certain<br />

asset classes that lend themselves more<br />

to active management than others do.<br />

Emerging market equities and high<br />

yield bonds, for example, have certain<br />

structural and informational inefficiencies<br />

that make active management potentially<br />

more able to add value, and this would<br />

bias us towards having more of this asset<br />

class actively managed, all else being<br />

equal. Other investments, such as hedge<br />

funds and private equity, are potentially<br />

29


attractive because of manager skill and<br />

active management. In contrast, US<br />

equities and gilts are, in our view, more<br />

efficient markets where active managers<br />

will probably struggle to consistently add<br />

value. Hence we would be more likely to<br />

have more in passive investments here<br />

than in active, generally speaking. Asset<br />

classes with a lower potential for active<br />

management should be tilted to passive<br />

investments to reduce costs and free<br />

manager monitoring resources to other<br />

areas in the portfolio. In a typical core/<br />

satellite approach, the core of a portfolio<br />

is invested in cost efficient passive<br />

investments, aligning the portfolio with<br />

its asset allocation, and the satellite is<br />

invested in active investments, where the<br />

potential for outperformance is more<br />

abundant.<br />

Thirdly, it is important to view the active/<br />

passive decision from a total portfolio and<br />

client perspective as part of the overall<br />

portfolio construction process, and not<br />

as a series of independent decisions. For<br />

example, looking at an active manager in<br />

isolation may mean that advisors miss that<br />

this particular manager’s skill and style<br />

may be already present across other active<br />

managers in the portfolio, inadvertently<br />

doubling up the style or sectors bets.<br />

The portfolio’s credit and equity managers,<br />

for example, may all be underweighting<br />

the financial sector, or the European and<br />

Japanese equity managers both investing<br />

in value stocks, leading to large portfoliowide<br />

style and sector bets. Unless these<br />

compounded biases are desired this<br />

particular portfolio would benefit from<br />

decreases in the use of active managers<br />

towards more passive exposure to dilute<br />

these style and sector bets.<br />

Fourthly, the active/passive split is used<br />

to control the overall risk level of the<br />

portfolio. The Multi-Asset Fund team<br />

at <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors has developed a<br />

proprietary process whereby the total<br />

risk budget of a portfolio (for example,<br />

tracking error versus the benchmark)<br />

is dynamically allocated to three main<br />

activities: Strategic Asset Allocation,<br />

Tactical Asset Allocation and investment<br />

selection. The active/passive split is used<br />

to dial up or down the risk allocated to<br />

underlying investments. The process is<br />

dynamic as asset class risk premiums and<br />

cross asset class relative opportunities,<br />

which drive the risk allocated to asset<br />

allocation, as well as the degree that the<br />

environment supports active management,<br />

constantly change.<br />

Just as importantly, active management<br />

is focused on outperformance over the<br />

long-term, meaning potential periods of<br />

short-term underperformance. Clients<br />

with short investment horizons are in our<br />

view probably best suited to more passive<br />

exposures to reduce the risk of these<br />

periods of underperformance, while clients<br />

with longer term perspectives should have<br />

portfolios relatively more biased to active<br />

managers, all else being equal.<br />

Tactically adjusting the active/passive<br />

split over time<br />

We believe that addressing these points<br />

above will help you to decide upon the<br />

long-term structural allocations of active<br />

and passive exposures in your clients’<br />

portfolios, creating a blended approach<br />

suitable to each specific client. However,<br />

we also believe that there is some value<br />

to be added by tactically changing these<br />

structural allocations over time, aiming<br />

to increase (or decrease) the allocations<br />

30


to active managers when they are<br />

expected to add more (or less)<br />

outperformance than usual. This is, clearly,<br />

a very difficult task and should only be<br />

done on the margin, as should all shortterm<br />

tactical changes. With that qualifier,<br />

we suggest two ways of undertaking<br />

these marginal changes.<br />

Firstly, annual reviews of your active<br />

managers will give you greater or lesser<br />

confidence in their ability to meet their<br />

performance targets, allowing small<br />

adjustments where this makes sense. In<br />

this regard, the views of the underlying<br />

active managers are often insightful as<br />

they are the ones best placed to say<br />

whether the current environment is more<br />

or less conducive to their particular way<br />

of managing money. This clearly requires<br />

a degree of trust and honesty between<br />

the underlying active managers and the<br />

portfolio constructor; though this trust<br />

should anyway form the basis of the<br />

investment relationship.<br />

Secondly, there is considerable academic<br />

and industry research, conducted by<br />

both others and ourselves, showing that<br />

active managers tend to add greater value<br />

during periods of high intra-stock volatility<br />

and unusual cross correlations, all else<br />

being equal. To use a simple if somewhat<br />

extreme example to explain this, if all<br />

stocks in a particular asset class (European<br />

equities, for example) were moving<br />

perfectly together it would be physically<br />

impossible for an active manager to<br />

beat the respective benchmark index by<br />

underweighting or overweighting different<br />

stocks. In contrast, when there are wide<br />

dispersals of stock movements there is a<br />

greater opportunity for active managers<br />

to add value by selecting among different<br />

stocks. By monitoring this level of crosssectional<br />

market volatility or opportunity<br />

within the specific asset classes investors<br />

can marginally change their allocation to<br />

active managers as the opportunity set<br />

grows and contracts, allocating more to<br />

active managers when it makes sense to,<br />

and more to passive when it does not.<br />

In conclusion<br />

Following the points above and<br />

approaching the active/passive decision<br />

from a total portfolio perspective will help<br />

you to manage what has become another<br />

important aspect to multi-asset portfolio<br />

construction. We believe that a blended<br />

approach, using active and passive<br />

investments where they respectively<br />

make sense, provides a far better offering<br />

for your clients than the absolutist one<br />

or other approaches within which the<br />

decision is often framed.<br />

31


Unless stated otherwise, any opinions<br />

expressed are those of <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors Global<br />

Services Limited (<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors).<br />

They should not be viewed as indicating any<br />

guarantee of return from an investment<br />

managed by <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors nor as advice<br />

of any nature.<br />

Past performance is not a guide to the future.<br />

The value of investments and any income<br />

from them can go down as well as up.<br />

You may not get back the original amount<br />

invested. The information contained within<br />

this document should not be viewed as<br />

investment, regulatory, tax or legal advice<br />

nor as a recommendation of any nature.<br />

<strong>Aviva</strong> Investors Global Services Limited,<br />

registered in England No. 1151805.<br />

Registered Office: No. 1 Poultry, London<br />

EC2R 8EJ. Authorised and regulated in the<br />

UK by the Financial Services Authority and a<br />

member of the Investment<br />

Management Association.<br />

MC2738-V001-259966-12/0813/300613<br />

© 2011 <strong>Aviva</strong> Investors.

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