Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...

Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ... Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...

22.01.2015 Views

Page: 370 Q You will admit today on behalf of both companies that they entered into a lease with the government of Canada for the site at which the mill is located A Q made A Q made Yes. And that under that lease there were lease payments to be Yes. Will you admit today that the lease payments were not fully 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) A I’m not sure when they would have ceased being paid. They have. Assuming your question, I guess they have. I know they were paid all the way through the operation and even after the operation of the mill to at least a certain date. Q Will you admit today that there is the outstanding amount of $4,060 plus Goods and Services Tax in respect of the last payment owed to Her Majesty the Queen under that lease A I can’t verify it either way, but, again, if you’re presenting those numbers from the Government of Canada, I believe it to be true. [1383] The Defendant bears the burden of establishing the breach of contract and recovery of damages as alleged in paragraph 30B of the Counterclaim. [1384] The Counterclaim is advanced pursuant to Rule 189 of the Rules. The Defendant must show that, independent of the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of the main claim, there is jurisdiction with respect to the Counterclaim. In this regard, I refer to the decision in Gaudet v. Canada et al. (1998), 148 F.T.R. 13 (T.D.).

Page: 371 [1385] The Defendant’s claim is based upon a contract. According to the Counterclaim, the lease was subject to the Territorial Lands Act and the Territorial Lands Regulations. Both meet the status of “federal law”, as discussed in Mueller (Karl) Construction Ltd. v. Canada (1992), 59 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.). Assuming that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s Counterclaim relative to an alleged breach of contract, but not deciding the point, I note that jurisdiction is one thing and proof, upon the balance of probabilities, is another. 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) [1386] The only evidence tendered by the Defendant is the indefinite evidence from Mr. Alan Kerr, quoted above. If this evidence constitutes an admission, it is subject to being weighed in terms of its probative value and relevance. In this regard, I refer to the decision in Clarke v. Minister of National Revenue (2000), 189 F.T.R. 76 (T.D.), at para. 46. [1387] In my opinion, the evidence of Mr. Kerr as to any outstanding rent is equivocal at best. He does not profess personal knowledge of the matter. He appears to accept at face value the dollar amount alleged by the Defendant, but he does not accept that rent had ceased to be paid. [1388] There is no evidence at all about the terms of the original lease, of any of the amendments, or of any of the assignments. There is no basis for the Court to determine if any of the amendments or the assignments affected the liability of SYFC in the matter of paying rent under the original lease. Indeed, para. 6 of the Defence to Counterclaim, quoted above, presents a complex answer to liability of SYFC in that regard. The Defendant made no submissions in that regard.

Page: 371<br />

[1385] The Defendant’s claim is based upon a contract. According to the Counterclaim, the lease<br />

was subject to the Territorial Lands Act and the Territorial Lands Regulations. Both meet the status<br />

of “federal law”, as discussed in Mueller (Karl) Construction Ltd. v. Canada (1992), 59 F.T.R. 161<br />

(T.D.). Assuming that this <strong>Court</strong> has the jurisdiction to entertain the Defendant’s Counterclaim<br />

relative to an alleged breach of contract, but not deciding the point, I note that jurisdiction is one<br />

thing and proof, upon the balance of probabilities, is another.<br />

2010 FC 495 (CanLII)<br />

[1386] The only evidence tendered by the Defendant is the indefinite evidence from Mr. Alan Kerr,<br />

quoted above. If this evidence constitutes an admission, it is subject to being weighed in terms of its<br />

probative value and relevance. In this regard, I refer to the decision in Clarke v. Minister of National<br />

Revenue (2000), 189 F.T.R. 76 (T.D.), at para. 46.<br />

[1387] In my opinion, the evidence of Mr. Kerr as to any outstanding rent is equivocal at best. He<br />

does not profess personal knowledge of the matter. He appears to accept at face value the dollar<br />

amount alleged by the Defendant, but he does not accept that rent had ceased to be paid.<br />

[1388] There is no evidence at all about the terms of the original lease, of any of the amendments,<br />

or of any of the assignments. There is no basis for the <strong>Court</strong> to determine if any of the amendments<br />

or the assignments affected the liability of SYFC in the matter of paying rent under the original<br />

lease. Indeed, para. 6 of the Defence to Counterclaim, quoted above, presents a complex answer to<br />

liability of SYFC in that regard. The Defendant made no submissions in that regard.

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