Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ... Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Page: 290 [1101] In 1996, the LFN had been granted a THA in approximately six months. This included an OIC. [1102] There was a meeting between the YFIA and DIAND, including Minister Nault, on May 20, 2000. At the May 20 th meeting, Minister Nault characterized the industry’s difficulties in accessing a long term adequate supply of timber as a “little hurdle”. SYFC was represented at this meeting; 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) see Exhibit P-79, Tab 282. [1103] In any event, it is my opinion that the absence of an OIC is not fatal to the Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of contract and I so find. [1104] The Defendant complains that there is no consideration for the alleged contract. I disagree. [1105] In the case of this unilateral contract, the “consideration” was the construction of the mill. As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Sail Labrador, at para. 33: …a unilateral contract is a contract in which only one party undertakes a promise. This promise takes the form of an offer which can only be accepted by performance of the required act or forbearance. Such performance provides the other party's consideration, allowing it to enforce the original promise (Treitel, at pp. 35-36; Waddams, at p. 111; United Dominions Trust (Commercial), Ltd. v. Eagle Aircraft Services, Ltd., [1968] 1 All E.R. 104 (C.A.)). [1106] The construction of the mill is the event which provided the consideration to the Defendant and led to the crystallization of the unilateral contract. In support of this finding I refer to the
Page: 291 decision in Daulia Ltd. v. Four Millbank Nominees Ltd., [1978] 2 All E.R. 557 (C.A.), at 560 to 561 as follows: The concept of a unilateral or ‘if’ contract is somewhat anomalous, because it is clear that, at all events until the offeree starts to perform the condition, there is no contract at all, but merely an offer which the offeror is free to revoke. Doubts have been expressed whether the offeror becomes bound so soon as the offeree starts to perform or satisfy the condition, or only when he has fully done so. In my judgment, however, we are not concerned in this case with any such problem, because in my view the plaintiffs had fully performed or satisfied the condition when they presented themselves at the time and place appointed with a banker’s draft for the deposit and their part of the written contract for sale duly engrossed and signed, and the retendered the same, which I understood to mean proferred it for exchange. Actual exchange, which never took place, would not in my view have been part of the satisfaction of the condition but something additional which was inherently necessary to be done by the plaintiffs to enable, not to bind, the defendants to perform the unilateral contract. 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) Accordingly in my judgment, the answer to the first question must be in the affirmative. Even if my reasoning so far be wrong the conclusion in my view is still the same for the following reasons. Whilst I think the true view of a unilateral contract must in general be that the offeror is entitled to require full performance of the condition which he has imposed and short of that he is not bound, that must be subject to one important qualification, which stems from the fact that there must be an implied obligation on the part of the offeror not to prevent the condition becoming satisfied, which obligation it seems to me must arise as soon as the offeree starts to perform. Until then the offeror can revoke the whole thing, but once the offeree has embarked on performance it is too late for the offeror to revoke his offer. [1107] The benefits of the mill were not meant to be one-sided. Employment would be provided as local woodsmen would have the opportunity to engage in the timber industry in accordance with the regulations that required 60 percent of all timber cut in Yukon to be processed there, before one log
- Page 239 and 240: Page: 239 James Moore. That meeting
- Page 241 and 242: Page: 241 391605 B.C. Ltd. was give
- Page 243 and 244: Page: 243 (3) The representor must
- Page 245 and 246: Page: 245 [932] For the reasons not
- Page 247 and 248: Page: 247 proposed mill project. Mr
- Page 249 and 250: Page: 249 [949] Mr. Fehr’s eviden
- Page 251 and 252: Page: 251 commitments and they’ve
- Page 253 and 254: Page: 253 observations of his manne
- Page 255 and 256: Page: 255 [973] As well, the fact t
- Page 257 and 258: Page: 257 all of its commitments. T
- Page 259 and 260: Page: 259 JUSTICE: Mr. Nault is not
- Page 261 and 262: Page: 261 [996] Moreover, the evide
- Page 263 and 264: Page: 263 (b) Was the representatio
- Page 265 and 266: Page: 265 Thus, where an advising p
- Page 267 and 268: Page: 267 Q. And you understood tho
- Page 269 and 270: Page: 269 considering the balance o
- Page 271 and 272: Page: 271 was withheld addressed th
- Page 273 and 274: Page: 273 [1037] Was that reliance
- Page 275 and 276: Page: 275 build a mill was consider
- Page 277 and 278: Page: 277 [1052] As a result, I fin
- Page 279 and 280: Page: 279 servants. That was a subj
- Page 281 and 282: Page: 281 [1068] As I understand th
- Page 283 and 284: Page: 283 contract. Liability can a
- Page 285 and 286: Page: 285 [1084] Mr. Alan Kerr and
- Page 287 and 288: Page: 287 [1093] Given the nature o
- Page 289: Page: 289 [1096] The Plaintiffs sub
- Page 293 and 294: Page: 293 which are commonly endeav
- Page 295 and 296: Page: 295 [1115] The Defendant reli
- Page 297 and 298: Page: 297 [1123] With respect to th
- Page 299 and 300: Page: 299 adequate supply of timber
- Page 301 and 302: Page: 301 In the circumstances of t
- Page 303 and 304: Page: 303 4. Breach of Fiduciary Du
- Page 305 and 306: Page: 305 place the Crown in the un
- Page 307 and 308: Page: 307 to injure the plaintiff.
- Page 309 and 310: Page: 309 There are no special dama
- Page 311 and 312: Page: 311 two, which I propose to p
- Page 313 and 314: Page: 313 MR. WHITTLE: I am satisfi
- Page 315 and 316: Page: 315 items thereof may be inac
- Page 317 and 318: Page: 317 [1188] It is not disputed
- Page 319 and 320: Page: 319 …The difficulty in fixi
- Page 321 and 322: Page: 321 [1202] In closing argumen
- Page 323 and 324: Page: 323 opinion testimony on the
- Page 325 and 326: Page: 325 that it “came directly
- Page 327 and 328: Page: 327 [1228] Mr. Van Leeuwen sa
- Page 329 and 330: Page: 329 company would have been g
- Page 331 and 332: Page: 331 diesel and the actual pri
- Page 333 and 334: Page: 333 the weight to be given to
- Page 335 and 336: Page: 335 [1262] Mr. Van Leeuwen pr
- Page 337 and 338: Page: 337 reasonable. The estimatio
- Page 339 and 340: Page: 339 [1280] In cross-examinati
Page: 291<br />
decision in Daulia Ltd. v. Four Millbank Nominees Ltd., [1978] 2 All E.R. 557 (C.A.), at 560 to 561<br />
as follows:<br />
The concept of a unilateral or ‘if’ contract is somewhat anomalous,<br />
because it is clear that, at all events until the offeree starts to perform<br />
the condition, there is no contract at all, but merely an offer which<br />
the offeror is free to revoke. Doubts have been expressed whether the<br />
offeror becomes bound so soon as the offeree starts to perform or<br />
satisfy the condition, or only when he has fully done so. In my<br />
judgment, however, we are not concerned in this case with any such<br />
problem, because in my view the plaintiffs had fully performed or<br />
satisfied the condition when they presented themselves at the time<br />
and place appointed with a banker’s draft for the deposit and their<br />
part of the written contract for sale duly engrossed and signed, and<br />
the retendered the same, which I understood to mean proferred it for<br />
exchange. Actual exchange, which never took place, would not in<br />
my view have been part of the satisfaction of the condition but<br />
something additional which was inherently necessary to be done by<br />
the plaintiffs to enable, not to bind, the defendants to perform the<br />
unilateral contract.<br />
2010 FC 495 (CanLII)<br />
Accordingly in my judgment, the answer to the first question must be<br />
in the affirmative.<br />
Even if my reasoning so far be wrong the conclusion in my view is<br />
still the same for the following reasons. Whilst I think the true view<br />
of a unilateral contract must in general be that the offeror is entitled<br />
to require full performance of the condition which he has imposed<br />
and short of that he is not bound, that must be subject to one<br />
important qualification, which stems from the fact that there must be<br />
an implied obligation on the part of the offeror not to prevent the<br />
condition becoming satisfied, which obligation it seems to me must<br />
arise as soon as the offeree starts to perform. Until then the offeror<br />
can revoke the whole thing, but once the offeree has embarked on<br />
performance it is too late for the offeror to revoke his offer.<br />
[1107] The benefits of the mill were not meant to be one-sided. Employment would be provided as<br />
local woodsmen would have the opportunity to engage in the timber industry in accordance with the<br />
regulations that required 60 percent of all timber cut in Yukon to be processed there, before one log