Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ... Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Page: 224 out of business. In these circumstances, I have previously found that not only was the harm foreseeable, but the Defendant had actual foresight of the consequences of her actions. [852] I find that it was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendant that her conduct would result in expectation losses to the Plaintiffs. 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) (b) Causation [853] The next question to be faced is the effect of that negligence. Did the negligence of the Defendant cause damage to the Plaintiffs According to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, in assessing causation a court must take a robust and pragmatic approach to the undisputed primary facts of the case. In other words, assessment of causation requires the application of common sense to the established facts. [854] In order to establish causation, the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant caused or contributed to the injury. However, it is not necessary that the Defendant be the only cause. The Supreme Court of Canada explained this in Athey v. Leonetti, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, at paras. 16 to 17: In Snell v. Farrell, supra, this Court recently confirmed that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's tortious conduct caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The causation test is not to be applied too rigidly. Causation need not be determined by scientific precision; as Lord Salmon stated in Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, [1972] 2 All E.R. 475, at p. 490, and as was quoted by Sopinka J. at p. 328, it is "essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense". Although the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, in some circumstances
Page: 225 an inference of causation may be drawn from the evidence without positive scientific proof. It is not now necessary, nor has it ever been, for the plaintiff to establish that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the injury. There will frequently be a myriad of other background events which were necessary preconditions to the injury occurring. To borrow an example from Professor Fleming (The Law of Torts (8th ed. 1992) at p. 193), a "fire ignited in a wastepaper basket is . . . caused not only by the dropping of a lighted match, but also by the presence of combustible material and oxygen, a failure of the cleaner to empty the basket and so forth". As long as a defendant is part of the cause of an injury, the defendant is liable, even though his act alone was not enough to create the injury. There is no basis for a reduction of liability because of the existence of other preconditions: defendants remain liable for all injuries caused or contributed to by their negligence. (Emphasis in original) 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) [855] In our legal system, a defendant does not escape liability because other factors contributed to the harm. As was discussed in Athey at paras. 19 to 20: The law does not excuse a defendant from liability merely because other causal factors for which he is not responsible also helped produce the harm: Fleming, supra, at p. 200. It is sufficient if the defendant's negligence was a cause of the harm: School Division of Assiniboine South, No. 3 v. Greater Winnipeg Gas Co., [1971] 4 W.W.R. 746 (Man. C.A.), at p. 753, aff'd [1973] 6 W.W.R. 765 (S.C.C.), [1973] S.C.R. vi; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal Injury Damages in Canada (2nd ed. 1996), at p. 748. This position is entrenched in our law and there is no reason at present to depart from it. If the law permitted apportionment between tortious causes and non-tortious causes, a plaintiff could recover 100 percent of his or her loss only when the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the injuries. Since most events are the result of a complex set of causes, there will frequently be nontortious causes contributing to the injury. Defendants could frequently and easily identify non-tortious contributing causes, so plaintiffs would rarely receive full compensation even after proving that the defendant caused the injury. This would be contrary to established principles and the essential purpose of tort
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Page: 225<br />
an inference of causation may be drawn from the evidence without<br />
positive scientific proof.<br />
It is not now necessary, nor has it ever been, for the plaintiff to<br />
establish that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the<br />
injury. There will frequently be a myriad of other background<br />
events which were necessary preconditions to the injury occurring.<br />
To borrow an example from Professor Fleming (The Law of Torts<br />
(8th ed. 1992) at p. 193), a "fire ignited in a wastepaper basket is . .<br />
. caused not only by the dropping of a lighted match, but also by<br />
the presence of combustible material and oxygen, a failure of the<br />
cleaner to empty the basket and so forth". As long as a defendant is<br />
part of the cause of an injury, the defendant is liable, even though<br />
his act alone was not enough to create the injury. There is no basis<br />
for a reduction of liability because of the existence of other<br />
preconditions: defendants remain liable for all injuries caused or<br />
contributed to by their negligence.<br />
(Emphasis in original)<br />
2010 FC 495 (CanLII)<br />
[855] In our legal system, a defendant does not escape liability because other factors contributed to<br />
the harm. As was discussed in Athey at paras. 19 to 20:<br />
The law does not excuse a defendant from liability merely because<br />
other causal factors for which he is not responsible also helped<br />
produce the harm: Fleming, supra, at p. 200. It is sufficient if the<br />
defendant's negligence was a cause of the harm: School Division of<br />
Assiniboine South, No. 3 v. Greater Winnipeg Gas Co., [1971] 4<br />
W.W.R. 746 (Man. C.A.), at p. 753, aff'd [1973] 6 W.W.R. 765<br />
(S.C.C.), [1973] S.C.R. vi; Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Personal<br />
Injury Damages in Canada (2nd ed. 1996), at p. 748.<br />
This position is entrenched in our law and there is no reason at<br />
present to depart from it. If the law permitted apportionment<br />
between tortious causes and non-tortious causes, a plaintiff could<br />
recover 100 percent of his or her loss only when the defendant's<br />
negligence was the sole cause of the injuries. Since most events are<br />
the result of a complex set of causes, there will frequently be nontortious<br />
causes contributing to the injury. Defendants could<br />
frequently and easily identify non-tortious contributing causes, so<br />
plaintiffs would rarely receive full compensation even after<br />
proving that the defendant caused the injury. This would be<br />
contrary to established principles and the essential purpose of tort