Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ... Federal Court - Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure Developments ...
Page: 156 49 In the result, I would reaffirm that in civil cases there is only one standard of proof and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. In all civil cases, the trial judge must scrutinize the relevant evidence with care to determine whether it is more likely than not that an alleged event occurred. [606] The present action is fact driven. The outcome will depend upon the factual findings, whether those facts have been admitted or are findings that I have made upon consideration of the evidence. The case turns on credibility and inferences that are reasonably drawn from the evidence. 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) [607] In some respects, this case may be described as a “circumstantial” case since the evidence invites me to draw conclusions that are consistent with the totality of the evidence. I refer to the decision Folch v. Canadian Airlines International (1992), 17 C.H.R.R. D/261 (Cdn. Human Rights Trib.), at para. 50, where the tribunal explained that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is evidence that is consistent with the fact that is sought to be proven and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion”. [608] Similarly, Justice MacGuigan in Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Satiacum (1989), 99 N.R. 171 (F.C.A.), stated that: The common law has long recognized the difference between reasonable inference and pure conjecture. Lord Macmillan put the distinction this way in Jones v. Great Western Railway Co. (1930), 47 T.L.R. 39 at 45, 144 L.T. 194 at 202 (H.L.): The dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that it is a mere guess. An inference in the legal sense, on the other hand, is a deduction
Page: 157 from the evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal proof. The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference. [609] I have drawn inferences from the evidence, as will appear from my Reasons. C. Credibility Assessment 2010 FC 495 (CanLII) (i) General [610] Credibility of witnesses does not depend on marital status, religious affiliation or practise, professional designations or civic honours. It is to be determined in accordance with the factors that have been identified in the jurisprudence, as summarized in the seminal decision dealing with the assessment of credibility, Faryna v. Chorny (1951), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 171 (B.C.C.A.). [611] In that case the Court said the following at page 174: The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. Only thus can a Court satisfactorily appraise the testimony of quick-minded, experienced and confident witnesses, and of those shrewd persons adept in the half-lie and of long and successful experience in combining skilful exaggeration with partial suppression of the truth. Again a witness may testify what he sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken. For a trial Judge to say "I believe him because I judge him to be telling the truth", is to come to a conclusion on consideration of only
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Page: 157<br />
from the evidence, and if it is a reasonable<br />
deduction it may have the validity of legal proof.<br />
The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take<br />
it, always a matter of inference.<br />
[609] I have drawn inferences from the evidence, as will appear from my Reasons.<br />
C. Credibility Assessment<br />
2010 FC 495 (CanLII)<br />
(i)<br />
General<br />
[610] Credibility of witnesses does not depend on marital status, religious affiliation or practise,<br />
professional designations or civic honours. It is to be determined in accordance with the factors that<br />
have been identified in the jurisprudence, as summarized in the seminal decision dealing with the<br />
assessment of credibility, Faryna v. Chorny (1951), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 171 (B.C.C.A.).<br />
[611] In that case the <strong>Court</strong> said the following at page 174:<br />
The credibility of interested witnesses, particularly in cases of<br />
conflict of evidence, cannot be gauged solely by the test of whether<br />
the personal demeanour of the particular witness carried conviction<br />
of the truth. The test must reasonably subject his story to an<br />
examination of its consistency with the probabilities that surround<br />
the currently existing conditions. In short, the real test of the truth of<br />
the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the<br />
preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed<br />
person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in<br />
those conditions. Only thus can a <strong>Court</strong> satisfactorily appraise the<br />
testimony of quick-minded, experienced and confident witnesses,<br />
and of those shrewd persons adept in the half-lie and of long and<br />
successful experience in combining skilful exaggeration with partial<br />
suppression of the truth. Again a witness may testify what he<br />
sincerely believes to be true, but he may be quite honestly mistaken.<br />
For a trial Judge to say "I believe him because I judge him to be<br />
telling the truth", is to come to a conclusion on consideration of only