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Agency Assurance - Universität St.Gallen

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29<br />

Audit committees must not only address communications made by their own officers<br />

and shareholder relations staff, they need to consider also reviewing the transparency<br />

of statements and reports of external agents with influence in the financial markets.<br />

The cases of Henry Blodget at Merrill Lynch, Jack Grubman at Salomon Smith Barney<br />

(subsidiary of Citicorp), and Frank Quattrone at Credit Suisse First Boston represent<br />

the widespread criticism of the investment banking industry. These and other high<br />

profile investment advisory analysts were making buy recommendations to the public<br />

of their client companies’ shares throughout the 1990’s, while their own internal<br />

analyses and actions over the same period were to sell.<br />

In response to these hype-related actions being exposed, it seems another form of<br />

intransparency has surfaced, that is to downplay positive results. There were<br />

indications in 2003 that financial analysts at investment banks may have made overly<br />

conservative earnings estimates as a form of “conditioning” of investors to help keep<br />

stock prices rising as companies’ actual announced earnings “beat” the estimates. 17<br />

The accounting profession’s own criticism of the usefulness of standard financial<br />

reports while promoting value based reporting, as well as the government’s<br />

requirements of standard risk language in every prospectus (regardless of the actual<br />

risk content of the proposed transaction), provide further examples of intransparency,<br />

even though these external agents’ intentions were to improve information asymmetry.<br />

An organization needs more transparent financial statements and announcements and a<br />

rigorous MSI disclosure regime for its shareholders and stakeholders, which takes<br />

responsibility for the information distribution channel and serves analysts and other<br />

financial information intermediaries. Microeconomic supply and demand logic calls<br />

for building trust in the shareholder base. Existing equity holders’ confidence in the<br />

corporation will lead to a scarcity of shares willing to be sold, while good<br />

communications practices also create demand from outside investors, helping to<br />

support or drive up the price of the shares, i.e. the company value.<br />

Confidence in the stock markets overall will provide the vehicle for liquidity for<br />

shareholders when they need it in the future, and for management to acquire large<br />

blocks of investment funds. The result should be a higher loyalty from shareholders,<br />

poking holes in the short-term investment logic so often criticized by CEO’s and<br />

17 Schwartz (2003).

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