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Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series 2007/03 ... - Vlerick Public

Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series 2007/03 ... - Vlerick Public

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Explaining the inconclusive findings in board research<br />

Many explanations can be given for the lack of consistent findings in empirical<br />

research on the direct relationship between the board of directors and corporate performance.<br />

In essence, they all boil down to two issues. These are (i) a lack of clear construct definition,<br />

and (ii) the reliance on incomplete research models.<br />

First, the diverging findings have been attributed to the varying definitions and<br />

operationalizations of the constructs used in empirical research. Daily et.al. (1999), for<br />

example, identified over twenty separate ways of defining board composition. The earliest<br />

studies distinguished inside from outside directors and board composition was measured using<br />

three different approaches: (absolute) number of outsiders, industry inside-outside norm and<br />

outsider/insider proportion or dominance 2 (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Later on, researchers<br />

increasingly wanted to capture the independence of the outside directors and have been<br />

separating independent directors from interdependent or affiliated directors, who are<br />

considered to be characterized by a lack of independence. In such an approach, board<br />

composition has been operationalized by the independent/interdependent distinction or by the<br />

proportion of affiliated directors (Dalton et.al., 1998). In addition to the complexity of<br />

uniformly defining board composition, the measurement of performance is also subject to<br />

considerable discussions (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Hawawini et.al., 20<strong>03</strong>).<br />

Although some scholars rely on market-based measures, research on boards of directors has<br />

been dominated by accounting measures (Dalton et.al., 1998; Coles et.al., 2001).<br />

Performance measures rooted in financial accounting are being criticized because they (i) are<br />

subject to managerial manipulation, (ii) undervalue assets, (iii) are influenced by accounting<br />

standards such as depreciation policies, inventory valuation and treatment of certain revenue<br />

and expenditure items and (iv) are affected by differences in methods for consolidation of<br />

accounts (Chakravarthy, 1986). Furthermore, a review by Johnson et al. (1996) has revealed a<br />

list of distinct financial performance measures on which empirical research has relied,<br />

emphasizing the fact that certain measures have additionally been adjusted to account for<br />

industry effects or risk in a different manner. Consequently, the variety in definitions and<br />

measures applied in empirical research makes comparison of studies difficult and may cause<br />

the inconsistent findings.<br />

2 Proportion was calculated by dividing the number of outside or inside directors to board size. In contrast, “dominance”<br />

denoted the existence of a large majority of outside or inside directors on the boards, and was treated as a dichotomous<br />

variable (outsider versus insider-controlled)<br />

6

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